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The Journal of Historical Review

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#### From the Editor

In this issue The Journal of Historical Review is proud to introduce Italian Revisionist Carlo Mattogno to the English-speaking world. Mr. Mattogno, a classicist and Orientalist trained in Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, and Hebrew, has during the past three years produced a stream of Revisionist monographs painstakingly analyzing and debunking Exterminationist claims relating to the Holocaust. This first part of Mr. Mattogno's "historico-bibliographical introduction to Revisionist historiography," which ran first in the outstanding French Revisionist quarterly Annales d'histoire révisionniste, is as lucid and salient an exposure of Exterminationist rodomontade on the "Final Solution"—myth and reality—as we've seen anywhere. (Part II will appear in the Fall issue of The JHR.)

The Journal is also pleased to welcome Paul Grubach, a graduate student in sociobiology, to the ranks of Revisionist writers. Mr. Grubach's careful study of the function of the charge of "anti-Semitism" as not merely thwarting but rendering taboo discussion of the role of Jews in American and world politics could not be more timely in the light of recent developments in Washington and the Middle East.

Two important articles by Editorial Advisory Committee member Mark Weber appear in this issue. Weber's "Open Letter to the Reverend Herbener" is not only an important survey of the scanty documentary evidence on the transit camps of Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka, which Exterminationists present as "killing centers," but a challenge to Exterminationists to debate their claims in the public forum, a challenge that has been taken up by a group of fundamentalist Christian Exterminationists subsequent to the appearance of the "open letter" in 1987. The debate is scheduled for early 1988, in Washington, D.C. Weber's analysis of West Germany's huge reparations payments to Jews, and to the state of Israel, since the 1950's is noteworthy, not merely for documenting the massive subvention these enforced payments have represented for Jewry, but for using the reparations statistics to impugn still further the arbitrary and false figure of six million Jews dead in Europe during the Second World War.

Martin Merson, a former naval officer, veteran of the Pacific War, and retired federal administrator, has, in reviewing an important testimony by the late Admiral James O. Richardson, leveled important criticisms at the American Establishment historians of Pearl Harbor, who remain as anxious as ever to safeguard the Roosevelt flame by continuing to tarnish the reputations of the unwitting defenders of Pearl Harbor. Merson has further reported

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### The Myth of the Extermination of the Jews: Part I

#### CARLO MATTOGNO

#### 1. "Not a document remains, or perhaps ever existed."

What strikes one most in the voluminous literature dedicated to the "extermination" of the Jews is the disparity existing between so grave an accusation and the fragility of the evidence furnished for its support.

The elaboration and realization of so gigantic an "extermination plan" would have required a very complex organization, technically, economically, and administratively, as noted by Enzo Collotti:

It is easy to understand that so horrifying a tragedy could not physically be carried out by only a few hundred, or even by a few thousand, that it could not be accomplished without a very extensive organization, benefiting by the help and collaboration of the most diverse sectors of national life, practically all branches of government, in other words, without the collusion of millions of people who knew, who saw, who accepted, or who, in any case, even if they did not agree, kept silent and, most often, worked without reacting in making their contribution to the machinery of the persecution and the extermination.<sup>1</sup>

Gerald Reitlinger underscores that:

Hitler Germany was a police state of the highest degree, that has left hundreds of tons of documents and thousands of precious pieces of evidence.

So that, finally,

. . . there is, in truth, nothing that this adversary has not confided to paper.  $\ensuremath{^2}$ 

At the end of the Second World War the Allies seized

. . . all the secret archives of the German government, including the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Army and the Navy, of the National Socialist Party, and of the Secret State Police [Gestapo] of Heinrich Himmler.<sup>3</sup>

Those archives were sifted by the victorious powers with a view toward the Nuremberg trials:

Hundreds of thousands of seized German documents were assembled in all haste at Nuremberg in order to be used as evidence against the principal Nazi war criminals.<sup>4</sup>

The Americans alone examined 1,100 tons of documents<sup>5</sup> from which they selected 2,500 documents.<sup>6</sup>

One would expect, then, to be submerged by a flood of documents establishing the reality of the "extermination" of the Jews, but matters presented themselves in a very different manner, as is recognized by Léon Poliakov:

The archives torn from the bowels of the Third Reich, the depositions and accounts of its chiefs permit us to reconstruct in their least detail the birth and the development of its plans for aggression, its military campaigns, and the whole range of processes by which the Nazis intended to reshape the world to their pattern. Only the campaign to exterminate the Jews, as concerns its completion, as well as in many other essential aspects, remains steeped in fog. Psychological inferences and considerations, third- or fourth-hand accounts, allow us to reconstruct the developments with a considerable verisimilitude. Certain details, nevertheless, will remain unknown forever. As concerns the concept proper of the plan for total extermination, the three or four principal actors are dead. No document remains, and has perhaps never existed. That is the secret of the masters of the Third Reich. As boastful and cynical as they were on other occasions, they covered up their major crimes.<sup>7</sup>

Since the first version of Léon Poliakov's work<sup>8</sup> the situation has not changed:

Despite the great harvest of Nazi documents captured by the Allies at the end of the war, it is precisely the documents concerning the process of the formation of the idea of the "final solution of the Jewish question" that are missing, to the point that up until the present it is difficult to say how, when, and exactly by whom the order to exterminate the Jews was given.<sup>9</sup>

The "plan for total extermination" still remains a mystery, even from the technical, economic, and administrative viewpoint:

The technical genius of the Germans allowed them to mount, within a few months, an efficient, rationalized death industry. Like every industry it comprised research and development, and administrative services, accounting, and records. Many aspects of these activities remain unknown to us, and remain hidden by a secret incomparably more opaque than that of the German war industries. The German rocket and torpedo technicians, the economic planners of the Reich have survived, and have given up their plans and their processes to the victors; almost all the technicians of death have disappeared, after having destroyed their records.

Extermination camps had sprung up at first with rudimentary

installations, which were then perfected; who perfected them? A veritable mastery of crowd psychology was manifested, to the end of assuring the perfect docility of the men intended for death: who were the promoters? There are so many questions to which, at the moment, <sup>10</sup> we can find only fragmentary, and sometimes hypothetical, replies. <sup>11</sup>

Fragmentary information allows us to have an imperfect notion of the part played by the technicians of euthanasia in the extermination of the Polish Jews. But many points still remain in darkness; in general the history of the Polish camps is very imperfectly known.<sup>12</sup>

But a systematic "extermination plan" evidently presupposes a specific order that, by force of circumstance, can be imputed only to the Führer. Now one must set down that this phantom-like Führerbefehl (command of the Führer) is submerged in the most impenetrable blackness.

Walter Laqueur acknowledges:

To the present day a written order by Hitler regarding the destruction of the European Jewish community has not been found, and, in all probability, this order was never given.<sup>13</sup>

Colin Cross admits:

There does not exist then, anything like a written order signed by him for the extermination of the Jews in Europe.<sup>14</sup>

Christian Zentner acknowledges:

One cannot fix the exact moment when Hitler gave the order-without doubt never drawn up in writing-to exterminate the Jews.<sup>15</sup>

#### Saul Friedländer admits:

It is not known precisely when the idea of the physical extermination of the Jews imposed itself on Hitler's spirit.<sup>16</sup>

Joachim Fest acknowledged:

To the present day the question of knowing when Hitler made the decision for the Final Solution of the Jewish question is in abeyance, and for the simple reason that not a single document on the subject exists.<sup>17</sup>

The total absence of evidence permits the official historians to give free rein to the most diverse speculations.

After having insinuated that "it is Adolf Hitler in person who undoubtedly signed the death sentence of the Jews of Europe,"<sup>18</sup> Léon Poliakov continues:

All that we can affirm with certainty is that the genocidal decision was made by Hitler at a time that may be set between the end of the campaign in the west, in June 1940, and the aggression against Russia, a year later. Contrary to the account of Dr. Kersten, it seems to us more probable to set it some months later [the autumn of 1940], that is to say, at the beginning of 1941. Here we get into the game of psychological deductions, to which we are obliged to appeal in order to provide a response to the second and throbbing question: what could have been the factors that weighed in the Hitlerian resolution?<sup>19</sup>

Poliakov affirms, consequently, "with certainty" that the "extermination" decision was made in the space of a year (June 1940 - June 1941)!

That he brings into play here largely "the game of psychological deductions" is demonstrated by the fact that in another work, he moves forward imperturbably by a year and a half the fateful decision of the Führer (September 1939 instead of June 1941).

The program of the National Socialist Party called for the elimination of Jews from the German community; between 1933 and 1939 they were methodically bullied, plundered, forced to emigrate; the decision to kill them to the last man also dated from the beginning of the war.<sup>20</sup>

Arthur Eisenbach declares on this subject:

It is today verified that the plans for the massive extermination of the Jewish population of Europe had been prepared by the Nazi government before the outbreak of the Second World War, and were thereupon carried out gradually, according to the European political and military situations.<sup>21</sup>

According to Helmut Krausnick, Hitler gave the secret order to exterminate the Jews "at the latest in March 1941."<sup>22</sup>

Item 79 of the judgement in the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, on the contrary, maintains that the extermination order "was given by Hitler himself shortly before the invasion of Russia,"<sup>23</sup> while the judgement of the Nuremberg trial pronounces:

The plan for the extermination of the Jews was formulated immediately after the aggression against the Soviet Union.<sup>24</sup>

In a report drawn up in Bratislava 18 November 1944, Dieter Wisliceny, former Hauptsturmführer and Eichmann's representative in Slovakia, affirmed that to his knowledge "the decision of Hitler that ordered the biological extermination of European Judaism [sic]" must be dated back to "after the beginning of the war with the United States,"<sup>25</sup> that is, it would have been after 11 December 1941.

This is why all that the official historians can affirm "with certainty," to use Poliakov's expression, is that the supposed "decision of the Führer" and the alleged "extermination order" were given over a time lapse of nearly two years!

Just as fanciful is the sham order of Himmler that would have put an end to the extermination of the Jews.

Olga Wormser-Migot asserts on the subject:

No more than there exists a written order in clear text for extermination by gas at Auschwitz does there exist a written order to stop it in November  $1944.^{26}$ 

She adds more precisely:

Last remark on the gas chambers: Neither at the Nuremberg trial, nor in the course of the different [occupation] zone trials, nor at the trial of Höss at Cracow, of Eichmann in Israel, nor at the trials of the camp commanders, nor from November 1964 to August 1965 at the Frankfurt trial [Auschwitz "second echelon" accused] was there ever produced the famous order signed by Himmler 22 November 1944 ending the extermination of the Jews by gas and putting a finish to the Final Solution.<sup>27</sup>

Kurt Becher, former SS Standartenführer, affirmed that Himmler gave this order "between mid-September and mid-October 1944,"<sup>28</sup> which contradicts the testimony of Reszö Kastner, according to whom Kurt Becher had told him that Himmler on 25<sup>29</sup> or on 26<sup>30</sup> November 1944 had ordered the crematories and the "gas chambers" to be destroyed and to suspend the "extermination" of the Jews.

Strangely, this phantom order that even the Auschwitz Kalendarium puts at 26 November 1944<sup>31</sup> is deemed to have gotten into the Auschwitz crematories on 17 November, or nine days before the order itself was delivered!<sup>32</sup>

According to other testimony reported in Het doedenboek van Auschwitz, the order came from Berlin even sooner, on 2 November 1944.<sup>33</sup>

At Nuremberg Wisliceny declared that Himmler's counterorder was sent in October 1944.<sup>34</sup>

In conclusion there exists no document establishing the reality of the "plan to exterminate" the Jews, so that "it is difficult to say how, when, and exactly by whom the order to exterminate the Jews was given."

Such is the most recent conclusion of Exterminationist historiography.

From 29 June to 2 July 1982, the School of Higher Studies in Social Sciences and the Sorbonne organized, in Paris, an important international conference on the theme: "Nazi Germany and the Extermination of the Jews."

In the introductory report, titled "The historiographical debate on Nazi anti-Semitism and the extermination of the Jews," Saul Friedländer adduced in evidence the presence of two fundamental tendencies of the most recent historiography in regard to the genesis and development of the "extermination" of the Jews.<sup>35</sup>

The first is the thesis of the continuity "that established right from the start a cause-and-effect relationship between Nazi ideology since its origins, in particular, that of Hitler and the annihilation of the Jews."<sup>36</sup> The other is the idea of discontinuity that implies "a certain anarchy at the level of the decision-making centers, that restores to certain responsible subalterns of the Nazi hierarchy their importance and eliminates, in part, the idea of one supremely responsible man, Hitler, in that which concerns the Jewish policy."<sup>37</sup>

Not only are these two interpretations contradictory, but indeed both are without foundation.<sup>38</sup>

Neither the thesis of inexorable continuity and of planning the total extermination of the Jews before the attack on the USSR, nor that of discontinuity and improvisation can be demonstrated in reality, in view of the present state of the sources; such is the conclusion reached by Krausnick and Wilhelm at the end of their monumental study of the Einsatzgruppen.<sup>39</sup>

At the end of his report Saul Friedländer traces a "framework of the acquisitions of [Exterminationist] historiography" in which, regarding the extermination of the Jews, he admits:

The question of the date on which the total physical extermination of the Jews was decided, as well as the elaboration of the plan for the "final solution" remain unresolved.<sup>40</sup>

These "acquisitions" have been fully confirmed in the presentations of two other historians.

Uwe Dietrich Adam in his account "Nazi measures regarding the Jews from the start of the Second World War up to the German attack against the USSR," declared:

However, the precise date at which this "final solution" was ordained constitutes a problem not yet resolved for German and for world history. $^{41}$ 

#### And again:

Insofar as no one has yet discovered a written trace of this order [to liquidate the Jews under German control] in the sources which have been exploited up to the present, and insofar as that seems unlikely, it is incumbent on the historian to date it as precisely as possible by appealing to interpretation. Since the methods and the hypotheses on this subject are very numerous, we find ourselves confronted with very diverse opinions.<sup>42</sup>

In his account "The decision concerning the final solution," Christopher R. Browning spoke of "essential divergences" among Exterminationist historians:

The decision concerning the final solution has been the object of a large number of historical interpretations. The essential divergences seem to involve two connected questions: on the one hand, the nature of the decision process and, more particularly, the role of Hitler and his ideology; on the other hand, the moment when the decision was made. As Martin Broszat rightly remarked, so great a variety of interpretations warns us that every theory on the origin of the final solution is in the domain of probability rather than of certitude.<sup>43</sup>

Browning then presents a survey recapitulating these "essential divergences":

For Lucy Dawidowicz, the conception of the final solution preceded its accomplishment by twenty years; for Martin Broszat, the idea emerged from praxis-the sporadic murder of groups of Jews gave birth to the idea of killing the Jews systematically. Between these two polar extremes, one finds a large variety of interpretations. Thus Eberhard Jäckel maintains that the idea of killing the Jews formed in Hitler's mind around 1924. Stressing Hitler's threatening declarations at the end of the thirties, Karl Dietrich Bracher supposes that the intention existed from this period. Andreas Hillgruber and Klaus Hildebrand affirm the primacy of ideological factors but propose no precise date. Others, not all functionalists, place the turning point in 1941; however, several dates are proposed for that year. Léon Poliakov judges that the beginning of 1941 is the most likely date, and Robert Kempner and Helmut Krausnick maintain that Hitler made the decision in the spring, in connection with the preparations for the invasion of Russia. Raul Hilberg thinks that the decision was made during the summer, when the massacres carried out in Russia fostered the belief that this solution was possible for a victorious Germany throughout Europe. Uwe Dietrich Adam states that it was made in autumn, at the time when the military offensive faltered and a "territorial solution" for a massive expulsion to Russia proved impossible. Finally Sebastian Haffner, who is certainly not a functionalist, defends a still later date, at the beginning of December, when first presentiment of defeat pushed Hitler to seek an irreversible victory over the Jews.44

At this point, Browning asks:

How to explain such a diversity of interpretations regarding the character and the date of the decision on the final solution?

This diversity is explained, according to Browning, by a subjective ground-the different vantage points occupied by the "intentionalists" and the "functionalists" – and an objective ground which is in reality the real reason, "by the lack of documentation."<sup>45</sup>

**Browning continues:** 

There are no written archives in which Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich discuss the subject of the final solution, and none of the three survived to testify after the war. That is why the historian must himself reconstruct the decision process at the top by extrapolating from events, documents, and external testimony. Just like Plato's man in the cave, he only sees reflections and shadows, not reality. This risky process of extrapolation and reconstruction leads inevitably to a large variety of conclusions.<sup>46</sup>

Browning insists many times on the nearly total absence of documents concerning the "extermination plan" for the Jews:

Nevertheless, in spite of everything known about the German invasion of Russia, there is no specific documentation on the destiny reserved for the Russian Jews. In order to obtain an answer to this question it is necessary to have recourse to postwar testimony, to indirect proofs and to scattered references in the later documents.<sup>47</sup>

If the decision to kill the Jews in Russia indeed was taken before the invasion, on the other hand the circumstances and the exact moment of this decision remain obscure. It is impossible to determine if the initiative came from Hitler or from someone else, from Heydrich for example. Moreover, it is not known whether Hitler had already made his decision in March, when he announced clearly to the military that the Russian war would not be a conventional war, or if the complaisance of the military pushed them in the end to widen the circle of intended victims beyond the "Judeo-Bolshevik intelligentsia." Insufficient documentation does not permit a definite response to these questions, allowing only informed hypotheses.<sup>48</sup>

It is not known, and doubtless will never be known when and how Heydrich and his immediate superior, Himmler, became aware of their new mission.<sup>49</sup>

Finally:

There was no written order for the final solution, and we have not a single reference to a verbal order, outside of that furnished by Himmler and Heydrich, who stated they acted in accord with the Führer.<sup>50</sup>

To conclude, the "acquisitions" of Exterminationist historiography, up to the present, are still: "Not a document remains, or perhaps ever existed."

#### 2. The National Socialist Policy for Jewish Emigration

The alleged "extermination plan" for the Jews, aside from not being corroborated by any document, is refuted decisively by National Socialist policy in the matter of Jewish emigration, a policy which we can trace here only in its essential lines.

In a letter to his friend Gemlich of 16 September 1919, considered to be "the first written document of Hitler's political career,"<sup>1</sup> he states on the subject of the Jewish question:

Rational anti-Semitism must, however, lead to the struggle against the privileges of the Jew that he alone possesses, in contrast to the other foreigners who dwell among us (legislation relative to foreigners), and to their legal and systematic suppression. But its ultimate goal must be, immutably and above all else, the removal of the Jews.<sup>2</sup>

On 13 August 1920 in Munich Hitler gave a speech, "Why Are We Anti-Semites?," in which he repeated that a scientific knowledge of anti-Semitism must translate into action ending in "the removal of the Jews from among our people."<sup>3</sup>

The solution of the Jewish question became the principal inspiration of the National Socialist political program and of the racial doctrine. Indeed, as Poliakov notes: ... that there had to be exterminations is not apparent, furthermore, from any of the National Socialist dogmas, or their principal writings. *Mein Kampf*, where the word "Jew" appears on almost every page, is mute on the fate that will befall them in the National Socialist state. The official party program<sup>4</sup> declares that "a Jew cannot be a compatriot" nor, consequently, a citizen, while the commentaries on the program call more explicitly for "the expulsion of the Jews and undesirable foreigners."<sup>5</sup>

The removal of the Jews from the Reich was the focal point of Hitler's policy toward the Jews from his accession to power. On 28 August 1933 the Reich Economics Ministry and the Jewish Agency for Palestine agreed to what was called the Haavara Abkommen, which was an accord (Abkommen) to facilitate the transfer (Haavara)<sup>6</sup> of German Jews to Palestine.<sup>7</sup>

A note of the Foreign Affairs Ministry dated 19 March 1938 presaged the breaking of the accord because, as may be read in point 3, it was not in the interest of Germany to organize the emigration of rich Jews with their capital, which [German] interest rested rather "on a mass emigration of Jews."<sup>6</sup>

The Nuremberg laws of 15 September 1935<sup>9</sup> reaffirmed, by legislation, Articles 4 and 5 of the party program formulated in Munich 24 February 1920. The goal of the law on Reich citizenship, and of that for the defense of German blood and honor, was to separate and isolate the Jewish foreign body from the German organism in view of the approaching expulsion, as underscored by Reitlinger:

In 1938, shortly before the Munich "agreement," when the Fifth Supplementary Decree had just finished ousting the Jews from the last of the free professions, Wilhelm Stuckart, who not only drafted, but was in large part the promoter of the Nuremberg laws, wrote that from here on the objective of the racial laws was attained. A great number of decisions carried out thanks to the Nuremberg laws "lose importance as one nears the final solution of the Jewish problem." The phrase, as is evident, was not yet a mask for the concept of the extermination of the race; on the contrary, it alluded clearly to the fact that the laws did not intend to perpetrate the Jewish problem, but rather to eliminate the reasons for it. The Jews had to leave the Reich, once and for all.<sup>10</sup>

In fact at the end of 1936 a service for Jewish questions was constituted as part of the SS Security Service. "The essential goal of the new agency was the study of all questions preparatory to a mass emigration of the Jews."<sup>11</sup>

In 1938 there was instituted in Vienna the Central Office for Jewish Emigration (Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung), the direction of which was entrusted to Adolf Eichmann by Heydrich.<sup>12</sup>

On 12 November 1938, some days after what was called "Crystal Night" (the night of broken glass) Göring convened the Council of

Ministers to face the difficult situation thereby created.

The attitude of the National Socialist chiefs appears unequivocally as one goes through the stenographic record of the meeting. Heydrich declared that the ejection of the Jews from German economic life did not resolve "the fundamental problem of the end objective: the removal of the Jews from Germany." At Vienna, by order of the Reichskommissar, a central office for Jewish emigration had been set up, by whose intervention at least 50,000 Jews had left Austria, while in the same period only 19,000 had left the Old Reich. That is why he proposed to establish, in the Reich as well, a central service similar to that of Vienna, and to establish an emigration operation to be completed in 8 to 10 years. Finance Minister von Krosigk approved Heydrich's proposal: he agreed to make every effort toward the evacuation abroad of the Jews. Interior Minister Frick repeated that the objective had to be to make the largest possible number of Jews emigrate.<sup>13</sup>

In order to overcome the economic difficulties entailed by Jewish emigration, in December 1938 Hitler approved the Schacht plan.

The proposition discussed by Schacht with Lord Bearsted, Lord Winterton, and Mr. Rublee in London in December was, in large outline, the following: The German government would freeze the assets of the Jews to use them as a fund to guarantee an international loan amortizable in 20-25 years. Supposing that the Jewish assets were valued at 1.5 billion marks, there would have been a sufficient amount of foreign exchange to finance the emigration of Jews from the greater Reich over 3-5 years in the normal course of events.

After Schacht's return to Germany, he met with Hitler in Berchtesgaden on 2 January 1939 concerning the reception his proposals had recieved in London. Hitler seemed to be impressed, as three days later he named Schacht special delegate for the augmentation of Jewish emigration.<sup>14</sup>

In January 1939 Schacht and [George] Rublee, director of an "intergovernmental" committee for the emigration of German Jews, agreed in London to a basic plan forseeing the emigration of about 400,000 Jews in the space of 3 years.<sup>15</sup>

Reitlinger attributes the failure of the Schacht plan to the reaction aroused in Hitler by Schacht's refusal to increase the circulation of paper money, following which, on 20 January 1939, Schacht was dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank. However, in an interview given Rolf Vogel in January 1970, Schacht declared that the plan was checkmated by the opposition of Chaim Weizmann.<sup>16</sup>

Meanwhile, National Socialist policy in the matter of Jewish emigration forged ahead.

On 24 January 1939 Göring promulgated a decree authorizing the establishment of a Reich Central [Office] for Jewish Emigration.

Göring summarized at the outset National Socialist policy toward

the Jews in lapidary fashion:

The emigration of the Jews from Germany is to be furthered by all means [Die Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland ist mit allen Mitteln zu fördern].

It is precisely to that end that he established the Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration mentioned above, which had as its assignment "the adoption of all measures to prepare for an intensified emigration of the Jews," and lastly to facilitate the bureaucratic procedures for the emigration of each individual.

The direction of the Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration Göring entrusted to Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police.<sup>17</sup>

In the course of the first meeting of the Committee of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration (11 February 1939), Heydrich discussed, above all, the Schacht-Rublee plan:

This plan evidently is destined to become the basis of a massive and organized Jewish emigration, but its implementation seems not yet to be ensured; it would be an error to count solely on it. We must therefore continue to encourage emigration by all the means at our disposal, leaving the plan aside.<sup>18</sup>

A Foreign Affairs Ministry report 25 January 1939 titled The Jewish Question as a Factor of Foreign Policy in 1938 unequivocally confirmed the animating principle of National Socialist Jewish policy:

The end objective of German policy in regard to the Jews is the emigration of all Jews living in the territory of the Reich [Das letzte Ziel der deutschen Judenpolitik ist die Auswanderung aller im Reichsgebiet lebenden Juden).<sup>19</sup>

This report upheld "a radical solution of the Jewish question by emigration—such as has been pursued here for years [eine radikale Lösung der Judenfrage durch die Auswanderung—wie sie hier schon seit Jahren verfolgt wird]," according to the commentary of SS-Obersturmführer Ehrlinger of the Reich Central Security Department.<sup>20</sup>

After the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, Eichmann received an order from Heydrich to establish "a central office for Jewish emigration" in Prague.<sup>21</sup> In the pertinent document, signed by Reich Protector von Neurath on 15 July 1939, one reads this:

In compliance with Reich regulations, to the end of obviating hindrances and delays it is necessary to group together the treatment of all questions relating to Jewish emigration. In view of the accelerated increase and regulation of the emigration of Jews from Bohemia-Moravia, the "Central Office for Jewish Emigration" of Prague is therefore created.<sup>22</sup> Despite growing difficulties, National Socialist policy in the matter of Jewish emigration was pursued even during the war.

The major difficulty was undoubtedly the poorly dissimulated anti-Semitism of the democratic countries, which on the one hand made an outcry against the persecution of the Jews by the National Socialists, and on the other, refused to accept the persecuted Jews, as appeared clearly in the course of the Evian conference that unfolded from 6 to 15 June 1938.

This conference was organized at the initiative of President Roosevelt to the end of facilitating the emigration of the victims of National Socialist persecution and, first of all, the Jews. But the good intentions of the American president appeared suspect from the beginning. Michel Mazor writes:

At his Warm Springs press conference President Roosevelt limited the possibilities of Evian by saying that no revision or increase of immigration quotas into the United States was envisioned because of it. In his invitation to that conference, addressed to thirty-three countries, Roosevelt emphasized that it was not expected of any country that it would consent to receive more immigrants than the norm stipulated by its legislation then in force.

On such a basis, the Evian conference, from its inception, was doomed to failure. In fact, its result was "that the free world abandoned the Jews of Germany and of Austria to their pitiless fate."<sup>23</sup>

For her part, Rita Thalmann recalls:

Drawing a lesson from the conference, the Danziger Vorposten notes that "one loves to pity the Jews as long as such pity heightens an evilintentioned agitation against Germany, but that no state was disposed to fight the culture damage to central Europe by taking some thousands of Jews. The conference," concluded the newspaper, "therefore is a vindication of German policy toward the Jews."

At all events, the German leaders had the evidence that the thirtytwo states which took part in the Evian conference (the USSR and Czechoslovakia were not represented; Italy had declined the invitation; Hungary, Romania, and Poland had sent observers with the sole intent of asking that they be relieved of their own Jews) had no intention of taking charge of the persecutees, or indeed of concerning themselves seriously about their fate.<sup>24</sup>

Paradoxically, immediately after the Evian conference, beginning at the end of 1938, one notes a diminution in emigration from the Reich, "because other countries opposed themselves more and more to new immigrations of Jews."<sup>25</sup>

In March 1943 Goebbels could again remark sarcastically:

What will be the solution of the Jewish question, will a Jewish state be created one day anywhere whatsoever? We'll know that later. But it is curious to note that the countries whose public opinion is aroused in favor of the Jews still refuse to receive them. They say these are the pioneers of civilization, geniuses of philosophy and artistic creation, but when one wants them to accept these geniuses, they close their frontiers: "No no, we don't want them!" This is, it seems to me, a unique example in world history of one declining to welcome genius!<sup>26</sup>

The rapid defeat of Poland suggested a provisional solution to the National Socialist leaders. On 23 September 1939 Heydrich sent an express-letter [Schnellbrief] to all chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police. In that letter, which had as subject "The Jewish Question in the Occupied Territory," he set forth the measures that were agreed on in Berlin at a meeting that same day, which were summarized in two points: the final goal [Endziel] and the stages of its achievement. In view of this final goal, the Jews were to be concentrated in towns after the campaign.<sup>27</sup>

Poliakov comments:

It is a question of a "final end." What was it? Not at all extermination, yet; we are only in 1939. A passage in the document gives us a key: in the territory "lying to the east of Cracow" the Jews are not to be touched; and if in other regions they are gathered together near the railroad stations, it is evidently so they may be evacuated more easily. To what destination? Very certainly to that "region to the east of Cracow."<sup>28</sup>

It is thus, always according to Poliakov, that there was designed:

The project to resolve the Jewish question by gathering all Jews under Nazi domination into the region of Lublin, at the frontier of the USSR. The plan for the creation of a "Jewish reservation" was given a certain publicity in the columns of the German press of the period. A territory was chosen, delimited, it seems (the information is incomplete and contradictory) by the Vistula, the San, and the USSR border, within which the Jews were to devote themselves to works of colonization, under surveillance of the SS.<sup>20</sup>

But, because of unfavorable circumstances the project was never completely realized.

During this period the German government continued its traditional emigration policy. In effect, as Poliakov remarks:

... parallel to these deportations to the east, the "Center [Central Office -Ed.] for Jewish Emigration" made efforts to expel the German Jews to other destinations. Legal emigration had become almost impossible: a thin stream of emigrants meanwhile continued to trickle out, from Austria in particular, via Italy toward overseas countries. Some clandestine convoys, formed with the cooperation of Eichmann, attempted to go down the Danube by boat, with Palestine as their destination; but the British government refused to allow these travelers without visas to enter the Jewish national homeland. We shall later on meet again with this bitter paradox of the Gestapo pushing Jews to safety, while His Majesty's democratic government bans access to the future victims of the crematory ovens.<sup>30</sup>

The defeat of France furnished the occasion for carrying out the

policy of Jewish emigration on a large scale:

When, after the collapse of France, enormous prospects opened before the eyes of the Nazis, a plan long cherished by certain persons among them returned to the agenda with new topicality. They believed, in short, to have in hand the key to "the definitive solution of the Jewish question." We have seen that in the course of the astonishing meeting of 12 November 1938, Göring had mentioned the "question of Madagascar." Himmler himself had dreamed of that since 1934, a witness assures us. Park all the Jews on a big island, that, moreover, belongs to France-that must have satisfied their love of symbolism. Whatever the case, after the armistice of June 1940 the idea was propounded by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, taken up enthusiastically by the RSHA and approved by Himmler as well as by the Führer himself, it seems.<sup>31</sup>

During the meeting of 12 November 1938, Göring had in fact informed those present that the Führer, according to what he had told Göring personally three days before, was preparing a foreign policy gesture toward those powers which had raised the Jewish question, in order to arrive at a solution to the Madagascar question. "He will say to the other states: Why are you always talking about the Jews? Take them!"<sup>32</sup>

Himmler was equally favorable to a massive Jewish emigration, as is seen by the note "Some thoughts on the treatment of foreign population groups in the East" of May 1940, in which he wrote:

I expect to see the idea "Jew" effaced definitively, thanks to the emigration of all Jews to Africa, or to a colony. $^{33}$ 

In the same note he rejected:

... the Bolshevik method of physically exterminating a people, with the innermost conviction that that is un-German and impossible.  $^{34}$ 

On 24 June 1940 Heydrich informed Foreign Affairs Minister Ribbentrop that more than 200,000 Jews had emigrated from the territory of the Reich, but that . . .

... the overall problem [Gesamtproblem] constituted by the 3,250,000 Jews who found themselves under German rule could no longer be resolved by emigration [durch Auswanderung —words underlined in the original]; which is why the necessity of a "final territorial solution (eine territoriale Endlösung] becomes apparent.<sup>35</sup>

Following that letter, the Foreign Affairs Ministry worked out the "Madagascar project."

On 3 July 1940 Franz Rademacher, responsible for Jewish affairs at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, drew up a report titled: "The Jewish Question in the Peace Treaty" which opens with the following declaration:

The imminent victory gives Germany the possibility and, in my opinion, also the duty, to resolve the Jewish question in Europe. The desirable solution is: all the Jews out of Europe.

After having set forth the responsibilities of the Foreign Affairs Ministry relative to that solution, Rademacher goes on: "Section D II proposes as a solution to the Jewish question: in the peace treaty France should make Madagascar available for the solution of the Jewish question and transfer and indemnify the 25,000 French who live there. The island will come under German mandate."<sup>38</sup>

It is precisely in this, just as Joseph Billig discerned, that "the territorial solution of the Jewish question, as Heydrich designated it to Ribbentrop," consisted.<sup>37</sup>

Rademacher's report was approved by Ribbentrop and transmitted to the Reich Central Security Department, which "elaborated a detailed plan for the evacuation of the Jews to Madagascar and for their settlement there; this plan was approved by the Reichsführer-SS."<sup>38</sup>

On 12 July 1940, upon returning from Berlin, where he had been received by Hitler, Hans Frank, governor of Poland, made a speech in which he declared:

From the viewpoint of general policy, I would like to add that it was decided to deport all the Jewish communities of Germany, of the General Government [Poland], and of the Protectorate [Bohemia-Moravia] to an African or an American colony as soon as possible after having made peace: Madagascar, which France would have to abandon to that end, has been suggested.<sup>39</sup>

On 29 July Frank repeated that Hitler had decided that the Jews would be completely evacuated as soon as overseas transport permitted.<sup>40</sup>

Otto Abetz, former German ambassador to Paris, declared, in return, that the destination of the Jews would be the United States:

I have spoken just once, 3 August 1940, with the Führer about the Jewish question. He told me that he wanted to resolve the Jewish question for Europe in general, that is, by means of a clause in the peace treaty making it a condition that the vanquished countries transfer their Jewish nationals out of Europe. He wanted in the same way to influence the states with which he was allied. On that occasion he mentioned the United States of America as a country that had not long been overpopulated as was Europe, and therefore was able still to take in some millions of Jews.<sup>41</sup>

In October 1940 Alfred Rosenberg wrote an article titled: "Jews to Madagascar." As far back as 1927, he recalled, at the anti-Jewish congress in Budapest:

... the question of a future evacuation of Jews from Europe was taken up, and on that occasion appeared for the first time the proposal to promote precisely Madagascar as the future domicile of the Jews.

He reiterated that proposal, hoping that "the Jewish high finance" of the United States and of England<sup>42</sup> would collaborate in the

installation of a "Jewish reservation" on Madagascar, a matter that he considered to be a "world problem."

According to a communication, dated 3 November 1940, from Bormann to Rosenberg, Hitler at that time opposed the publication of the article in question, while not ruling out its possible publication in the following months.<sup>43</sup>

This was because the Germans at the time were in contact with the Vichy government on the subject of the Madagascar project:

It was therefore natural that Hitler put off public notice of the project until later. In his speech of 30 January 1941 (anniversary of the assumption of power) he limited himself to proclaiming that "Judaism will cease to play its role in Europe." That also was in harmony with the Madagascar plan.<sup>44</sup>

It seems, nevertheless, that Hitler did not thereafter authorize Rosenberg to publicize the Madagascar project. In fact, at the conference on "The Jewish Question as a World Problem" held by Rosenberg 28 March 1941, he declared, in the name of all Europeans:

For Europe the Jewish question will not be resolved until the last Jew has left the continent for a Jewish reservation.

On the subject of that reservation, Rosenberg limited himself to declaring:

In regard to the practical realization and the place of transfer, or evacuation, many things naturally have been said over the years. It is not necessary at present to deal with that question. Its solution will be left to a future accord.<sup>45</sup>

Goebbels, in turn, according to the testimony of Moritz von Schirmeister, a former Propaganda Ministry official, spoke publicly and repeatedly of the Madagascar project.

Dr. Fritz: Where were the Jews to be evacuated to according to the declarations of Dr. Goebbels?

Von Schirmeister: Up until the first year, including the Russian campaign, Dr. Goebbels mentioned several times the Madagascar plan at conferences at which he presided. Afterwards, he changed his mind and said it was necessary to set up a new Jewish state in the east, to which the Jews then would be sent.<sup>46</sup>

Interrogated at Nuremberg about a document of 24 September 1943, Ribbentrop responded:

The Führer then proposed the evacuation of the European Jews to North Africa—but Madagascar also came up. He ordered me to make contact with the various governments to induce emigration of Jews, and their exclusion from important organizations as far as possible. That order was then directed by me to the Foreign Affairs Ministry and, as far as I can remember, contacts were made repeatedly with several governments on the subject of emigration of Jews to North Africa, which was anticipated.<sup>47</sup>

In the note, "Madagascar Project", 30 August 1940, Rademacher declared that the establishment of the General Government of Poland and the annexation of the new eastern districts had put a very great number of Jews under German rule. That and other difficulties, such as the hardening immigration legislation on the part of overseas countries, made it difficult to complete the "solution of the Jewish question in the territory of the Reich, and including the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, by means of emigration,"<sup>46</sup> on schedule, or for a date not too far distant, whence, precisely, the Madagascar project.

Eichmann went to work with a will:

He surrounded himself with maritime experts, to work out a transport plan; this was to be carried out by a pool of the big German navigation companies. Embarkation would be at the principal North Sea and Mediterranean ports. At the same time, he strove to have all Jewish fortunes confiscated for the benefit of the "Central Fund." He sent emissaries to the occupied or controlled countries in order to gather statistics on the number, age, occupational distribution, etc., of the Jews. These detailed statistics, we shall see, will serve another end. . . Everything was in readiness so that the machinery could go into action when peace was concluded.<sup>49</sup>

Indeed, in the note quoted from above, Rademacher, reckoning that the transfer of four million Jews to Madagascar would take about four years, wrote:

After the conclusion of peace, the German merchant marine will no doubt be thoroughly occupied in another fashion. It is therefore necessary to include in the peace treaty that France and England put at our disposal the tonnage required for the solution of the Jewish problem.<sup>50</sup>

The paragraph "Financing" in the "Madagascar Project" note opens with the following phrase:

The realization of the proposed "final solution" requires considerable means.  $^{\mathfrak{s}_1}$ 

The infamous "final solution of the Jewish question," then, reduces simply to the transfer of the European Jews to Madagascar, as acknowledged in the judgement of the Eichmann trial:

Until it was abandoned, the "Madagascar Plan" was sometimes referred to by the German leaders as "the final solution of the Jewish question."<sup>52</sup>

As we know, that expression would later become, according to the official historians, synonymous with the "extermination" of the Jews:

Final Solution of the Jewish question was one of the conventional phrases to designate the Hitlerian plan to exterminate the European Jews. German functionaries employed it, beginning in the summer of 1941, in order to avoid having to admit to each other the existence of this plan; however, even before then, on diverse occasions, the expression had been used to designate, essentially, the emigration of the Jews.<sup>53</sup>

In reality, this assertion is arbitrary, and entirely without foundation, not only because no evidence supports it, but because existing documents refute it categorically.

Here we must limit ourselves to some brief considerations. The investigators at Nuremberg knew perfectly well that an "extermination plan" which, according to the prosecution, brought about the death of "more than four and a half million"<sup>54</sup> or of "six million"<sup>55</sup> Jews could not have been carried out without leaving the least trace in the Nazi archives and, from the juridical standpoint, they could not have recourse to the subterfuges of the official historians, according to whom all the compromising documents were destroyed.

Thus they worked out an audacious method of exegesis, allowing one to say whatever he wants, regardless of any document. The foundation of that exegetic method rests on an arbitrary speculation according to which the supreme National Socialist authorities adopted, even for their most private documents, a kind of code language, to which the Nuremberg investigators pretended, naturally, to have discovered the key. Whence the systematic distortion-to serve the extermination thesis-of completely harmless documents.

The most widely known example of this systematic travesty concerns precisely the interpretation of the term *Endlösung*(final solution), which has been made a synonym for "extermination of the Jews."<sup>56</sup> As we shall soon see, the "final solution" by the transfer of European Jews to Madagascar was succeeded—but only as an alternative—by "the final territorial solution" of deporting the European Jews to the eastern territories occupied by the Germans.

On 20 May 1941 Heydrich stopped Jewish emigration from France and from Belgium, and the immigration of Jews into the occupied territories, in order to reserve all emigration possibilities for the Jews of the Reich, and "in consideration of the no doubt early final solution of the Jewish question." <sup>57</sup>

Uwe Dietrich Adam comments:

This document was later often, due to its formulation, poorly interpreted. Göring ordered all authorities to facilitate the emigration of the Jews from the Reich and the areas under its protectorate, insofar as possible, even during the war. On the other hand, the emigration of Jews from France and from Belgium was to be forbidden due to "the final solution which, without a doubt, draws near." The deceptive term "final solution" was interpreted by generations of historians as designating a physical destruction, whereas at that time it signified only the emigration of the Jews to Madagascar.<sup>57</sup>

In the event, by a letter of 31 July 1941 Göring entrusted to Heydrich the task of making all necessary preparations regarding the "final solution," that is, to organize the total and definitive emigration or evacuation of the Jews who found themselves under German rule. The letter declared, in effect:

Supplementing the task already assigned to you by decree of 24 January 1939, to find the most advantageous solution of the Jewish question, by means of emigration or evacuation, possible in the circumstances, I charge you herewith to proceed with all preparations necessary on the organizational, concrete, and material levels in order to arrive at a total solution [Gesamtlösung] of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe. Insofar as the competent authorities of other branches may find themselves concerned here, they will have to participate. I charge you also to submit to me quickly a complete plan [Gesamtentwurf] showing the organizational, the concrete, and material preliminary measures to achieve the final solution of the Jewish question to which we all aspire.<sup>58</sup>

According to the method of interpretation mentioned above, that letter would constitute one of the fundamental documents of the history of the "extermination"<sup>39</sup>: the expression "final solution" appears indeed, to designate, as Reitlinger maintains, "the Hitlerian plan for the extermination of the Jews of Europe."

In reality, and the text shows it clearly, the desired "final solution of the Jewish question" is a solution by means of emigration or evacuation."

Heydrich himself, writing 6 November 1941 that for years he had been charged with preparing the "final solution" in Europe, <sup>20</sup> made clear that this responsibility was derived from the decree 24 January 1939 and identified the "final solution" precisely as "the final solution by way of emigration or of evacuation."

That the official historians' interpretations are tendentious is evidenced by the fact that G. Reitlinger and W. Shirer, citing the letter in question, suppress precisely that part of the document that speaks of emigration and evacuation.<sup>61</sup>

Göring's letter of 31 July 1941 refers exclusively to Jewish emigration and evacuation, and that is confirmed by a very important document, the 21 August 1942 memorandum of Martin Luther.

In this document Martin Luther, chief of the department "Germany" in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, recapitulates the essential points of National Socialist policy in regard to the Jews. Luther goes on:

The principle of German policy on the Jewish question after the

assumption of power was to promote Jewish emigration by every means. To accomplish this General Field Marshal Göring, in his capacity as chief of the Four Year Plan, established in 1939 a Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration, the direction of which was entrusted to Gruppenführer Heydrich in his role as chief of the security police.

After having referred to the Madagascar plan, which had at that time been by-passed by events, Luther went on to note that Göring's letter of 31 July 1941 followed up Heydrich's letter, which we have already cited, in which Heydrich informed Rademacher that:

The overall problem constituted by the 3,250,000 Jews who found themselves under German rule could no longer be resolved by *emigration*; which is why the necessity of a "final territorial solution" becomes apparent.

Luther went on to write:

Knowing that, Reich Marshal Göring on 31 July 1941 charged Gruppenführer Heydrich with making, in collaboration with all German central agencies interested, all necessary preparations for a total solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe

Luther continues:

In compliance with that order, Gruppenführer Heydrich called a meeting 20 January 1942 of all interested German agencies, a meeting at which the under secretaries of the other ministries, and I myself from the Foreign Ministry, were present.

At that meeting Gruppenführer Heydrich explained that the responsibility assigned him by Reich Marshal Göring had been given him by order of the Führer, and that the Führer from then on authorized the evacuation of the Jews to the east, as a solution other than emigration.

In compliance with that order by the Führer, the evacuation of the German Jews was undertaken.

The destination consisted of the eastern territories, via the General Government:

Evacuation via the General Government is a provisional measure. The Jews ultimately will be transferred to the eastern occupied territories when the necessary conditions are created.<sup>82</sup>

In a note of 14 November 1942 headed "Financing the measures related to the solution of the Jewish problem," Ministerial Counselor Maedel confirmed:

It is some time ago that the Reichsmarschall charged the Reichsführer-SS and chief of the German police with preparing measures appropriate to assuring the final solution of the Jewish problem in Europe. The Reichsführer-SS has charged the Chief of the Security Police and the SD with the execution of that task. The latter has, first of all, expedited, by special measures, the legal emigration of the Jews to overseas countries. When the war made overseas emigration impossible he made preparations for the progressive clearance of the Reich territory of its Jews by their evacuation to the east.<sup>63</sup>

The difficulties of the war and the prospects opened by the Russian campaign had brought about the provisional abandonment of the policy of total emigration.

In consequence, emigration of Jews from Germany was suspended 23 October 1941<sup>64</sup> for the duration of the war, but, it seems, the order was not executed because it was sent out again 3 January 1942<sup>65</sup> and promulgated finally by Himmler 4 February 1942. On that date the "military commander" in France published the following ordinance:

The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police at RMdJ has ordered the general cessation of all Jewish emigration from Germany and from the occupied countries.

Himmler reserved to himself authorization of particular emigrations when the interests of Germany required.<sup>66</sup> Yet up until 31 March 1943, Jews of Italian, Finnish, Swiss, Spanish, Portuguese, Danish, and Swedish citizenship were permitted to return to their countries.<sup>67</sup>

Heydrich's conference mentioned by Luther was held 20 January 1942 in Berlin at Gross Wannsee 56/58. The "minutes" relating to that conference open with a summary of National Socialist policy regarding the Jews:

The Chief of Security Police and of the Security Service, SS Gruppenführer Heydrich, opened the meeting by announcing his appointment to responsibility for the preparation of the final solution of the European Jewish question [Endlösung der europäischen Judenfrage], and indicated that the object of the meeting was to clear up questions of principle. To respond to the wish of the Reichsmarschall to see a plan for organizational measures, and on concrete and material questions posed by the final solution of the Jewish question in Europe, all central agencies directly interested must agree first of all to coordinate their efforts.

It is the Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police (and of the security police and of the security service) who will be responsible for the totality of the measure necessary for the solution of the Jewish question regardless of geographical boundaries.

The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service thereupon gave a brief insight into the fight against this adversary up to the present time. Its essential phases are:

a) Forcing the Jews out of the vital spheres of the German people

b) Driving the Jews out of the living space of the German people.

To arrive at these goals, the only possibility of provisional solution has been to accelerate and to undertake in systematic fashion the emigration of the Jews out of the territory of the Reich.

In January 1939, at the order of the Reichmarschall, there was created a Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration, at the head of which was placed the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service. This service had as its mission, in particular:

- a) to take all measures for the preparation of an intensified emigration of the Jews;
- b) to orient the course of emigration;
- c) to hasten emigration in particular cases.

The object was to cleanse the German living space of its Jews by legal means.

In consequence of that policy, up to 31 October 1941, and this despite manifold difficulties, about 537,000 Jews emigrated from the old Reich, from Austria, and from the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.

The minutes continue:

Meanwhile, the Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police [Himmler], in view of the dangers of emigration in wartime, and in view of the possibilities offered in the east, has forbidden the emigration of Jews.

From that time on, with the prior authorization of the Führer, emigration gave way to another possible solution, evacuation of the Jews to the east.

Although one will not fail to recognize these actions as merely alternative possibilities [Ausweichsmöglichkeiten], the practical experience already gathered in this field is of signal importance for the final solution of the Jewish question.<sup>86</sup>

By order of the Führer the final solution, i.e., the total emigration of the European Jews, thus was replaced by evacuation to the occupied territories of the east, but only as a palliative, until taking up the question again after the end of the war. In the event, by a memorandum dated Berlin August 1940, Luther had communicated to Rademacher the following:

On the occasion of a conference with Ambassador Abetz in Paris, he informed me that when he reported to the Führer on France about two weeks ago, the Führer told him that he intended to evacuate all the Jews from Europe after the war.<sup>69</sup>

This is not the only document in which Hitler manifests this intention regarding the European Jews. Indeed, according to a Reich Chancellery note of March-April 1942, Hitler intended to take up the Jewish question after the war,<sup>70</sup> and on 24 July 1942 he himself affirmed that after the end of the war he "would strike town after town if the Jews did not move out and did not emigrate to Madagascar or to another Jewish national state."<sup>71</sup>

Some months earlier, on 7 March 1942, Goebbels had written in his diary:

The Jewish question will have to be written up in a plan on a pan-European scale. There remain more than eleven million Jews in Europe. In the first place it is necessary to concentrate them all in the east. After the war we will be able eventually to assign them an island, perhaps Madagascar. In any case, there will be no peace in Europe as long as the Jews on the Continent are not totally excluded.<sup>72</sup>

The intention of the Nazis to resolve the Jewish question after the end of the war appears also in the so-called "Brown File," which goes back to the summer of 1941.

The paragraph "Directive for the solution of the Jewish question" of this document, which B. Nellessen says "sanctioned severe measures, but not extermination," <sup>73</sup> opens with the following phrase:

All measures concerning the Jewish question in the occupied territories of the east must be taken with the thought that after the war the Jewish question in Europe will find a general solution.<sup>74</sup>

A note by Luther of 17 October 1941 likewise mentions, in reference to Jews interned in France, "the measures to be taken after the war toward fundmental solution of the Jewish question."<sup>74a</sup>

In compliance with Hitler's directives the Madagascar project was then provisionally abandoned. An informative letter of 10 February 1942 by Rademacher gives the reason for this:

In August 1940, I sent you, for your files, the plan for the final solution of the Jewish question [zur Endlösung der Judenfrage] formulated by my office, according to which in the peace treaty the island of Madagascar was to be required of France but the practical execution of that task was to be entrusted to the Reich Central Security Agency. In conformance with that plan, Gruppenführer Heydrich has been charged by the Führer with solving the Jewish question in Europe.

Meanwhile, the war against the Soviet Union has put more territory for the final solution [für die Endlösung] at our disposal. Consequently, the Führer has decided to expel the Jews not to Madagascar, but to the east. Therefore it is no longer necessary to look to Madagascar for the final solution. [Madagaskar braucht mithin nicht mehr für die Endlösung vorgesehen zu werden].<sup>75</sup>

Some weeks before then, on 27 January 1942, the Führer had declared:

The Jews must leave Europe. The best thing is that they go to Russia.<sup>78</sup>

A "notice" of 9 October 1942 captioned, "preparatory measures for the solution of the Jewish problem in Europe. Rumors about the condition of the Jews in the east" summarizes the stages and explains clearly the meaning of "final solution":

For almost 2,000 years a struggle, until now in vain, has been

carried on against Jewry. It is only since 1933 that the ways and means have been found to separate Jewry completely from the German masses.

The task, with a view to a solution, accomplished up until the present, may be summarized, grosso modo, as follows:

- I. Exclusion of the Jews from the private spheres of the German people. Laws will guarantee to future generations protection against a new influx of the enemy.
- II. The attempt to drive the enemy completely out of the Reich territory. By reason of the very limited living space at the disposal of the German people, it is expected that this problem can be resolved principally by an accelerated Jewish emigration.

After the declaration of war, in 1939, the possibilities for emigration diminished more and more. On the other hand, as distinct from the living space of the German people, its economic space grew rapidly, although, by reason of the great number of Jews living in those territories, a total evacuation of the Jews by emigration is no longer possible.

Since the next generation itself will no longer feel the problem so intimately and will no longer understand it as clearly as in the light of past experience, and since this question, once put, demands a definitive answer, the problem must be solved by the present generation.

The removal or the total withdrawal of the millions of Jews living in the European economic space [Lebensraum] constitutes an urgent need for the vital security of the German people.

Beginning with the territory of the Reich, continuing with the other European territories comprehended in the definitive plan, the Jews will be deported progressively to large camps already established, or in course of being established, where they will have to work and from whence they will be deported farther to the east.

The accomplishment of these tasks calls for a "merciless strictness," which is to say that the deportation of the Jews to the east must be total and inflexible.

Final solution of the Jewish question, then, never meant "Hitlerian plan for the extermination of the European Jews."<sup>78</sup>

At the Nuremberg trial Hans Lammers, former chief of the Führer's chancellery, interrogated by Dr. Thoma, affirmed he knew many things on the subject of the "final solution."

In 1942 he learned that the Führer had entrusted to Heydrich—through the intermediation of Göring—the task of solving the Jewish question. In order to know more, he contacted Himmler and asked him "What exactly was meant by the final solution of the Jewish question?" Himmler answered that he had received from the Führer the assignment to bring about the final solution of the Jewish question and that "this task consisted essentially of the fact that the Jews had to be evacuated from Germany." Subsequently this explanation was confirmed to him by the Führer personally.

In 1943 rumors, according to which the Jews were killed, circulated. Lammers tried to get at the source of these rumors, but without results, as they were founded always on other rumors, so he came to the conclusion that they were the product of enemy radio propaganda.

Nevertheless, to clarify the matter, Lammers again turned to Himmler, who denied that Jews might be killed legally: they were simply evacuated to the east, and that was the task that Hitler had entrusted to him. In the course of these evacuations aged or sick persons could have died, of course, and there could have been accidents, air attacks, and revolts that Himmler had been constrained to repress bloodily, to set an example, but that was all.

Lammers then went once more to the Führer, who gave him the same reply as Himmler:

He told me: I shall decide later where the Jews will go; at the moment they are being put there.

Dr. Thoma then asked Lammers:

Himmler never told you that the final solution for the Jews consisted in their extermination?

Lammers: There was never a question of that. He spoke only of executions.

Dr. Thoma: When did you learn that five million Jews had been exterminated?

Lammers: I learned it here, some time ago.79

So it is only at Nuremberg that the chief of the Reich Chancellery received knowledge of the alleged "extermination" of the Jews!

The statistical report: "The Final Solution of the European Jewish Question" [Die Endlösung der europäischen Judenfrage] by Richard Korherr summarizes numerically the results of National Socialist policy in the matter of Jewish emigration until 31 December 1941. 557,357 Jews had emigrated from the Old Reich, from the Sudetenland, from the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, and from Austria. At least an equal number had emigrated from the eastern territories and from the Central Government, as the figure reproduced by Korherr, 762,593 Jews, combines emigrations and the excess of natural mortality.<sup>80</sup>

In conclusion, Adolf Hitler, from 1933 to 1942, had authorized the emigration of at least a million Jews who found themselves under his control.

As to the others, why exterminate them? Poliakov himself remarks on this subject:

From a more down-to-earth viewpoint, to what good? It is so much more economical to put them to work at the hardest tasks, parking them on a reservation, for example.<sup>81</sup>

This is precisely what Hitler did.

As the war went on, the concentration camps and the ghettos became indeed important centers for the German war economy, and this is why "the exploitation of Jewish manpower was another source of substantial revenue for the Third Reich and its men." <sup>82</sup>

The concentration camp at Auschwitz, for example, the territory of which comprised a "sphere of interest" of about 40 square kilometers, was the center of gravity of a vast industrial zone. It furnished manpower to numerous German industries, among which were Farbenindustrie, Berghütte, Vereinigte Oberschlesische Hüttenwerke AG, Hermann Göringwerke, Siemens-Schuckertwerke, Energie Versorgung Oberschlesien AG, Oberschlesische Hydrierwerke, Oberschlesische Gerätebau G.m.b.h., Deutsche Gas u. Russgesellschaft, Deutsche Reichsbahn, Heeresbauverwaltung, Schlesische Feinweberei, Union-Werke, Golleschauer Portland-Zement AG.

In the course of the years 1942-1944 the central Auschwitz camp counted 39 outside camps, of which 31 were for detainees used as manpower, 19 among them employing mainly Jewish detainees.<sup>83</sup>

At Monowitz 16 Farbenindustrie factories employed 25,000 Auschwitz detainees, about 100,000 civilian workers, and about 1,000 English POWs.<sup>84</sup>

Even the ghettos were transformed into economic centers of great importance. With the revolt of the Warsaw ghetto "the German war industry in the east lost one of its important supply centers."<sup>85</sup>

The second ghetto in economic importance after that of Warsaw was the Lodz ghetto: "Its manufactures of all kinds, and in particular, its textile industries, constituted support of great value to the German economy."<sup>86</sup>

On 19 January 1942 there was created the SS Economic Management Head Office [SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt: SS-WVHA],<sup>87</sup> the aim of which was precisely "to utilize on a large scale the detainee manpower."<sup>86</sup> On 3 March Himmler ordered the inspectorate of the concentration camps to be transferred from the SS Main Directorate [SS-Führungshauptamt] to the SS-WVHA in order to centralize in Agency Group D [Amtsgruppe D] the direction of the war effort in relation to manpower.<sup>89</sup> An important modification was thus made in the function of internment in concentration camps, as is underscored by SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl, Chief of the SS-WVHA, in a letter of 30 April 1942 to the Reichsführer SS:

The war evidently has made necessary a change in the structure of the concentration camps, and to radically modify their functions in regard to the employment of detainees. The increase in the number of detainees solely for reasons of security, of re-education, or of prevention, is no longer of primary concern. The main emphasis is placed on the economic aspect. The mobilization of all work capacity for war purposes (increase of armament) first of all, and later for construction in peacetime, must be given higher priority with each day.<sup>90</sup>

These dispositions were equally valid for the Jews. As early as 25 January 1942 Himmler had sent the following order to SS-Brigadeführer Glücks, Inspector-General of Concentration Camps:

Inasmuch as soon we shall not be able to reckon with Russian prisoners of war, I shall send a great number of Jews and Jewesses expelled from Germany into the camps. Prepare to receive, in the course of the next four weeks, 100,000 Jews and up to 50,000 Jewesses in the concentration camps. Important economic tasks will be entrusted to the concentration camps in the coming weeks. SS Gruppenführer Pohl will inform you about this in detail.<sup>91</sup>

At the beginning of 1943, about 185,000 Jews were employed in war industry on territory under the control of the Reich.<sup>92</sup>

On 7 September 1943 all the Jewish work camps in the General Government-10 in the district of Lublin alone-were released by the SS-WVHA and became auxiliary camps of Lublin.<sup>93</sup>

On 5 April 1944 in the territories under Reich jurisdiction there were 20 concentration camps and 105 work camps.<sup>94</sup>

In May 1944 Hitler ordered the employment of 200,000 Jews as manpower in the Jäger construction program of ministerial director Dorsch. The order concerning guard personnel was issued by Himmler on May 11:

The Führer has ordered that 10,000 Waffen-SS, including officers and non-commissioned officers, be assigned to the surveillance of 200,000 Jews that the Reichsführer-SS is sending into the concentration camps of the Reich in order to employ them on the great construction projects of the Organization Todt and on other important military works.<sup>95</sup>

The former Hungarian Interior Minister, Gabor Wajna, reported a declaration by Himmler according to which: "Since the Jews have been employed on the Jäger program, production has increased 40%."96

According to an SS-WVHA letter dated "Oranienburg, 15 August 1944" it appeared that the internment of 612,000 persons—among whom were 50,000 Jews of the Hungary program—in concentration camps was imminent.<sup>97</sup>

The importance of the work potential represented by the Jews appears even more plainly when the pressing need of the German war industry for manpower is considered.

On 21 March 1942 Hitler named Fritz Sauckel general plenipotentiary for the employment of manpower with the assignment of providing for that need.<sup>98</sup> According to a report sent by Sauckel to Hitler and Göring 27 July 1942, 5,124,000 foreign workers were employed in the Reich. Despite that, the need for manpower was so great that in January 1943 Sauckel ordered the total mobilization of all Germans for the war economy. On 5 February 1943 at the Gauleiter Congress held in Posen, Sauckel declared:

The extraordinary harshness of the war has constrained me, in the name of the Führer, to mobilize several million foreigners for employment in the German war economy, in order to assure maximum output.

But at the beginning of 1944 Hitler called for 4,000,000 additional workers.<sup>99</sup> At the same time living conditions in the concentration camps were made easier in order to get higher production from the detainee labor force.

On 20 January 1943 SS-Brigadeführer Glücks, Chief of Agency Group D of the SS-WVHA, transmitted to the concentration camp commanders Himmler's order of 20 December 1942<sup>100</sup> to reduce the deathrate in the camps by every means, and holding them "personally responsible for exhausting every possibility to preserve the physical strength of the detainees."<sup>101</sup>

Following that order—as is noted by SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl on 30 September 1943 in a statistical report to the Reichsführer-SS—thanks to the amelioration of hygienic conditions, nourishment, and clothing, the mortality in the concentration camps was in constant decline, having fallen from 10% in December 1943 to 2.09% in August 1943.<sup>102</sup>

An SS-WVHA order of 18 November 1943 to the Auschwitz command recommended giving a bonus to the detainees—even to the Jews—who distinguished themselves by their work.<sup>103</sup>

The "extermination" of the Jews therefore was an economic absurdity, as Poliakov himself recognized, <sup>104</sup> the more so as, according to Colloti:

... it was, among other reasons, the economic necessity of making use of their labor that prevented the massive extermination of Soviet war prisoners wanted by Hitler.<sup>105</sup>

But if the economic need of the Germans was so pressing in regard to the Russians, why was it not equally so in regard to the Jews?

The official historians reply by maintaining that the "extermination" of the Jews, corresponding to the fundamental objective of the Führer, took precedence over no matter what economic exigency, even at the risk of assuming a clearly countereconomic character. Hannah Arendt formulated this thesis in admirable fashion:

The incredible character of these horrors is closely tied to their uselessness on the economic plan. The Nazis stubbornly pushed the useless to the injurious when, in the midst of war, despite their shortage of construction materials and of rolling stock, they erected enormous and costly enterprises of extermination, and organized the transport of millions of people. From the viewpoint of a strictly utilitarian world the contradiction manifest between that manner of behavior and the military imperatives lends the whole undertaking a crazy and chimerical air.<sup>106</sup>

It is only too easy to object that if the "extermination" of the Jews was so important to Hitler to the point of allowing the imperative needs of the German war economy to take second place, and even harm it, he certainly would not have permitted—up through the first two years of the war—the emigration of at least a million Jews!

In reality, the "Europa Plan," on which talks began in official form in the spring of 1944, shows to what extent the Nazis were utilitarian in that which concerned the Jews. Himmler proposed to exchange one million Jews (children, women, old people) for "10,000 trucks, a thousand tons of coffee, and a bit of soap."<sup>107</sup>

Joel Brand, who conducted the negotiations for the Jewish side, went to Istanbul and from there to Cairo:

In truth, it was the Allies who raised obstacles. Joel Brand was interned by the British authorities without having had the possibility of accomplishing his mission; and the State Department forbade Dr. Schwarz, the director of the American Jewish Joint [Committee] to deal with enemy subjects.<sup>108</sup>

Joel Brand succeeded in transmitting the German proposal to Lord Moyne, then British Minister of State for the Middle East, who answered him:

And what am I supposed to do with a million Jews? Where shall I put them?  $^{109}\,$ 

The fragility of the abovementioned thesis is linked closely to the fragility of the reasons that are supposed to explain "the extermination of the Jews." Almost all the official historians are certain that it is necessary to investigate those reasons in the presumed National Socialist concept according to which the Jews "as an inferior race" were to be exterminated "for the sole fact of being Jewish." That thesis is rejected categorically by the reality of the policy in the matter of Jewish emigration—which became even forced emigration—pursued by the government of the Reich up through the first two years of the war.

Poliakov himself acknowledges, without quibbles, the lack of foundation for that thesis. After having asked himself the throbbing question of why the decision for "extermination" was made, he goes on:

"Hatred of the Jews," "Hitler's madness," are the more general terms, which, at the same time, say nothing; and Hitler—at least as long as the fate of the Reich had not been sealed—was a calculating and informed politician. For the rest, we have seen the extermination of the Jews has no part in Nazi aims. Why, then, was that decision, of which we have seen all the irrationality it comprised, taken, and why just at that given time?

Let us try then to look further ahead, always remaining fully aware of what such deductions, in the absence of all testimony, all minutes of proceedings, all irrefutable documents, can offer in the way of speculation and fragility.<sup>110</sup>

In other words, not only when, and by whom, but even why the decision to exterminate the Jews would have been taken, is unknown.

On the subject of the reasons for that presumed decision, in fact, the official historiography is able to supply nothing but "deductions" that are "speculative" and "fragile" and beyond that are in manifest contradiction with the **REALITY** of National Socialist policy in the matter of Jewish emigration, as Christopher Browning recognizes:

The assumption that Nazi Jewish policy was the premeditated and logical consequence of Hiter's anti-Semitism cannot be easily reconciled with his actual behavior in the years before 1941. For example, Hitler's view of the Jews as the "November criminals" who caused Germany's defeat in World War I was as fervently held as any of his anti-Jewish allegations. Indeed, the oft-cited passage from *Mein Kampf* lamenting that twelve or fifteen thousand Jews had not been gassed during the war makes far more sense in the context of the stabin-the-back legend than as a prophecy or intimation of the Final Solution. The "logical" consequence of the thesis of the Jew as wartime traitor should have been a "preventive" massacre of German Jewry before the western offensive or at least before the attack on Russia.

In actual practice Nazi Jewish policy sought a judenrein Germany by facilitating and often coercing Jewish emigration. In order to reserve the limited emigration opportunities for German Jews, the Nazis opposed Jewish emigration from elsewhere on the continent. This policy continued until the fall of 1941, when the Nazis prohibited Jewish emigration from Germany and for the first time justified the blocking of Jewish emigration from other countries in terms of preventing their escape from the German grasp. The efforts of the Nazi Jewish experts to facilitate Jewish emigration both before and during the war, as well as their plans for massive expulsions (what the Nazis euphemistically called "resettlement" or Umsiedlung) were not merely tolerated but encouraged by Hitler. It is difficult to reconcile the assumption of a long-held intention to murder the Jews of Europe with this behavior. If Hitler knew he was going to murder the Jews, then he was supporting a policy that "favored" German Jews over other European Jews and "rescued" from death many of those he held most responsible for Germany's earlier defeat.

It has been argued that Hitler was merely awaiting the opportune moment to realize his murderous intentions. Not only does that not explain the pursuit of a contradictory policy of emigration in the meantime, it also does not explain the long delay. If Hitler was merely awaiting the outbreak of conflict to pursue his "war against the Jews," why were the millions of Polish Jews in his hands since the fall of 1939 granted a thirty-month "stay of execution"?<sup>111</sup>

That this is true almost to the letter is shown by the following judgement of Robert Cecil, deputy director of the school specializing in contemporary European studies of the University of Reading in England, and since 1968 professor of history at that university:

The massacre of the Slavs, like that of the Jews, was a ritual homicide, that not only contributed nothing to the military victory, but, as we shall soon see, considerably impeded the Wehrmacht in its task.<sup>112</sup>

[Like that of the Jews, the "massacre of the Slavs" is without foundation, of course. -Ed.]

#### Notes

#### Part I

- 1. Enzo Collotti, La Germania nazista (Nazi Germany), Turin, 1973, p. 146.
- 2. Gerald Reitlinger, La soluzione finale: Il tentativo di sterminio degli ebrei d'Europa 1939-1945 (The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945), Milan, 1965 p. 593.
- 3. William L. Shirer, Storia del Terzo Reich, Turin, 1971, p. xiii.
- 4. Idem, p. xv.
- 5. Werner Maser, Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial, New York, 1979, p. 305.
- 6. The Trial of the Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946. Published in Nuremberg, Germany 1947. (Hereafter IMT, Vol. II, p. 169.)
- Léon Poliakov, Bréviaire de la haine (Breviary of Hate), Paris, 1979, p. 134.
- 8. See note 10.
- 9. Liliano Picciotto Fargion, "La congiura del silenzio" (The Conspiracy of Silence), La Rassegna mensile d'Israel, May-August 1984, p. 226.
- 10. The first edition of Poliakov's book is 1951. In the 1979 edition, here is what one can read in the preface: "This complete edition of *Bréviaire de la haine* conforms to the original 1951-1960 edition. There is no place to introduce important changes or supplements into it. Indeed, the knowledge we have of the 'racial' policy of the Third Reich, which sought to exterminate the Jews, and, with the help of sometimes similar processes, to reduce the number of Slavs, has not been enriched perceptibly since 1951." p. xiii.
- 11. Léon Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 208.
- 12. Idem, p. 218.
- Walter Laqueur: Was niemand wissen wollte: Die Unterdrückung der Nachrichten über Hitlers Endlösung (What Nobody Wanted to Know: The Suppression of News About Hitler's "Final Solution"), Frankfurt/M-Berlin-Vienna, 1981, p. 190.

- 14. Colin Cross, Adolf Hitler, Milan, 1977, p. 313.
- 15. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf.* An edition with commentary by Christian Zentner, Munich, 1974, p. 168.
- 16. Saul Friedländer, Kurt Gerstein ou l'ambigüité du bien (Kurt Gerstein or the Ambiguity of Good), Casterman, 1967, p. 92.
- 17. Joachim Fest, Hitler, 1974, p. 631.
- 18. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 124.
- 19. Idem, p. 126.
- 20. Leon Poliakov, Auschwitz, Paris (1964), 1973, p. 12.
- 21. Arthur Eisenbach, "Operation Reinhard, Mass Extermination of Jewish Population in Poland," in: Polish Western Affairs, 1962, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 80.
- 22. Broszat, Jacobsen, Krausnick, Anatomie des SS-Staates (Anatomy of the SS-State), Munich, 1962, Vol. 2, p. 297.
- 23. Bernd Nellessen, The Jerusalem Trial, Düsseldorf-Vienna, 1964, p. 201.
- 24. IMT, Vol. 1, p. 280.
- 25. Document XXXVIII-67 of the Jewish Contemporary Documentation Center, Paris, (hereafter: CDJC), cited by Poliakov & Wulf, The Third Reich and the Jews, Berlin, 1955, p. 94.
- Olga Wormser-Migot, Le Système concentrationnaire nazi (1933-1945), (The Nazi Concentration [Camp] System, 1933-1945), Presses Universitaires de France, 1968, p. 544.
- 27. Idem, p. 13.
- 28. PS-3762.
- 29. PS-2605.
- 30. Der Kastner-Bericht über Eichmanns Menschenhandel in Ungarn, (The Kastner Report on Eichmann's trading in human beings in Hungary), Preface by Prof. Carlo Schmidt, Munich, 1961, p. 242.
- 31. Hefte von Auschwitz (Auschwitz Notebooks), Wydawnnictwo Panstwowego Muzeum w Oswiecimiu, 8, 1964, p. 89, note 130.
- 32. Miklos Nyiszli, Auschwitz: A Doctor's Eyewitness Account, trans. Tibere Kremer and Richard Seaver, New York, 1961, p. 139.
- 33. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 374, p. 328.
- 34. IMT, Vol. IV, p. 398.
- 35. Saul Friedländer, "Il debattito storiografico sull'antisemitismo nazista e lo sterminio degli ebrei d'Europa," (The historiographical debate on Nazi anti-Semitism and the extermination of the European Jews), in: Storia Contemporanea, a. XIV, n. 3, June 1983, p. 399-422.
- 36. Idem, p. 413. This thesis is called "intentionalism."
- 37. Idem, p. 417. This thesis is known as "functionalism."
- 38. See on this subject Martin Broszat, "Hitler und die Genesis der Endlösung.' Aus Anlass der Thesen von David Irving." (Hitler and the Genesis of the "Final solution." Prompted by the Theses of David Irving), in Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte (hereafter VfZ), 1977, p. 739-775, and Christopher R. Browning, "Zur Genesis der Endlösung."

Ein Antwort auf Martin Broszat." (On the Genesis of the Final Solution.' A reply to Martin Broszat), in the same review, 1981, p. 97-109.

- 39. Saul Friedländer, "Il debattito ...," art. cit., p. 419. See the last pages titled "On the role of the Einsatzgruppen in the framework of the genesis of the Final Solution' of the Jewish question" in Helmut Krausnick's and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm's Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 1938-1942 (The Soldiers of the Ideological War. The Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and of the SD-Security Service 1936-1942), Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart, 1981, p. 622-636.
- 40. Saul Friedländer, art. cit., p. 420. The article by Saul Friedländer which appears in the proceedings of the 1982 Paris conference has been profoundly reshaped: there the author has quite simply passed over in silence "the acquisitions of [Exterminationist] historiography" that we have cited. Colloquium of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, L'Allemagne nazie et le génocide juif, Gallimard, Le Seuil, 1985, pp. 13-38.
- 41. L'Allemagne nazie et le génocide juif, op. cit., p. 177.
- 42. Ibid., pp. 177-178.
- 43. Ibid., pp. 190.
- 44. Ibid., pp. 192.
- 45. Ibid., pp. 192-193.
- 46. Ibid., pp. 193.
- 47. Ibid., pp. 196.
- 48. Ibid., pp. 197.
- 49. Ibid., pp. 200.
- 50. Ibid., pp. 211.

#### Footnotes – Part 2

- 1. Eberhard Jäckel, La concezione del mondo in Hitler (Hitler's World Concept), Milan, 1972, p. 66.
- 2. Ernst Deuerlein, "Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr" (Hitler's Entry Into Politics and the Reichswehr) in VfZ, 1959, p. 204.
- 3. Reginald H. Phelps, "Hitlers 'grundlegende' Rede über den Antisemitismus" (Hitler's 'ground-laying' speech on anti-Semitism), in VfZ, 1968, p. 417.
- 4. PS-1708.
- 5. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., Paris, 1979, p. 2.
- 6. Hebrew term meaning precisely "transfer." Properly transliterated, it reads "ha'abhârâh."
- Broszat, Jacobsen, Krausnick, Anatomie des SS-Staates (Anatomy of the SS-State), Munich 1982, Vol. 2, p. 263. Joseph Walk (editor), Das Sonderrecht für die Juden im NS-Staat, (The special legislation for the Jews in the NS-State), Heidelberg-Karlsruhe, 1981, p. 48.
- 8. NG-1889.

- 9. PS-1417.
- 10. Gerald Reitlinger, La soluzione finale . . . (The Final Solution), Milan, 1965, p. 23.
- 11. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 16.
- 12. Idem, p. 30. IMT, Vol. XXI, p. 586.
- 13. PS-1816, pp. 47, 55, and 56.
- Gerald Reitlinger, La soluzione finale (The Final Solution), op. cit., p. 36. At Nuremberg Schacht declared that if his plan had been carried out "not even a single German Jew would have perished." IMT, Vol. XX, p. 442.
- 15. Les Archives secrètes de la Wilhelmstrasse (The Secret Archives of the Wilhelmstrasse), V, book II, Paris, 1954, p. 135.
- 16. Erich Kern, Die Tragödie der Juden (The Tragedy of the Jews), Verlag K.W. Schütz KG, Preussisch Oldendorf, 1979, p. 73.
- 17. NG-2586-A.
- 18. Les Archives secrètes . . ., V, book II, op. cit., p. 122.
- 19. PS-3358.
- Reichsführer-SS to SD Führer of the SS-O.A. Re: "The Jewish question as a factor in foreign policy in 1938," 13 March 1939 in: Brown Book: War Criminals and Nazis in West Germany, Verlag Zeit im Bild, Dresden, n.d., Document 35 (photocopy without text; translation on p. 383).
- Ich, Adolf Eichmann. Ein historischer Zeugenbericht, (I Adolf Eichmann: A Historical Testimony), published by Dr. Rudolf Aschenauer, Druffel-Verlag, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1980, p. 99.
- 22. H.G. Adler, Der Kampf gegen die "Endlösung der Judenfrage" (The Struggle against the "Final Solution" of the Jewish Question), published by the Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst, Bonn, 1958, p. 8.
- 23. Mr. Mazor, "Il y a trente ans: la conférence d'Evian" (Thirty Years Ago: The Evian Conference), in Le Monde Juif, April-June 1968, No. 50, pp. 23 and 25.
- 24. Dix leçons sur le nazisme (Ten Lessons On Nazism), under the direction of Alfred Grosser, Paris, 1976, pp. 215-216.
- 25. Heinz Boberach (Editor), Meldungen aus dem Reich: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938-1945 (Reports from the Reich: The Secret Situation Reports of the SS Security Service 1938-1945), Pawlak Verlag, Herrsching 1984, Vol. 2, p. 7. Compare pp. 22 and 223.
- 26. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 302.
- 27. PS-3363.
- 28. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 41.
- 29. Ibidem.
- 30. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 44.
- 31. Idem, pp. 50-51.
- 32. PS-1816, p. 56.

- "Denkschrift Himmlers über die Behandlung der Fremdvölkischen im Osten (Mai 1940)" (Himmler's memorandum on the treatment of foreign population groups in the East [May 1940]), VfZ, 1957, p. 197.
- 34. Ibidem.
- 35. T-464.
- NG-2586-B. Compare Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. X, London, 1957, pp. 111-113.
- 37. Joseph Billig, La solution finale de la question juive (The Final Solution of the Jewish Question), Paris, 1977, p. 58.
- 38. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 52.
- PS-2233, IMT, Vol. XXIX. H. Monneray, La Persécution des Juifs dans les pays de l'Est présentée à Nuremberg (The Persecution of the Jews in the Eastern Countries Presented at Nuremberg), Paris, 1949, p. 202.
- 40. PS-2233, IMG, Vol. XXIX, p. 405.
- 41. NG-1838, p. 5.
- 42. CDJC Documents CXLVI-51 and CXLIII-229. Compare J. Billig, Alfred Rosenberg dans l'action idéologique, politique et administrative du Reich hitlérien (Alfred Rosenberg in the Ideological, Political, and Administrative Activity of the Hitlerian Reich), CDJC 1963, p. 196, notes 632 and 636.
- 43. CDJC Doc. CXLIII-229. Compare J. Billig, ibidem, p. 196.
- 44. Idem, p. 193.
- 45. CDJC Doc. CXLVI-23, pp. 83, then 67.
- 46. IMT, Vol. XVII, p. 275-276.
- 47. IMT, Vol. X, p. 449.
- 48. NG-2586-C. Compare Rolf Vogel, Ein Stempel hat gefehlt: Dokumente zur Emigration deutscher Juden (A [rubber] stamp was missing: documents on the emigration of German Jews), Munich-Zurich, 1977, p. 324.
- 49. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 54.
- 50. NG-2586-C. Compare Rolf Vogel, Ein Stempel . . ., op. cit., p. 324.
- 51. NG-2586-C. Compare Rolf Vogel, Ein Stempel . . ., op. cit., p. 330.
- 52. L. Poliakov, Le Procès de Jérusalem (The Trial in Jerusalem), Paris, 1963, p. 152.
- 53. Gerald Reitlinger, La soluzione finale . . . (The Final Solution . . .), op. cit., p. 19.
- 54. IMT, Vol. II, p. 140.
- 55. IMT, Vol. I, p. 283; Vol. III, p. 635; Vol. XXII, p. 289.
- 56. IMT, Vol. I, p. 280. Another well-known example of this systematic travesty concerns the interpretation of the term "Sonderbehandlung" (special treatment) which is considered by the official historians to be a simple synonym for "execution, putting to death, or assassination (a)." In reality, as Robert Faurisson points out: "Sonderbehandlung" can have a whole series of meanings, from the gravest to the most benign," and it is only in context that the precise meaning can be determined (b).

At Nuremberg Kaltenbrunner explained that the "special treatment" to which political personalities of rank, such as François-Poncet and Edouard Herriot, were subjected consisted in being put up in hotels under the most privileged conditions(c).

Another case where "Sonderbehandlung" indicated privileged treatment appears in Document PS-660(d). In the paragraph "Sonderbehandlung rassisch wertvoller Kinder" (special treatment of racially valuable children) it is affirmed that these children must be excluded from evacuation measures and sent into the Old Reich to be educated as Germans(e).

On p. 24, in the paragraph "special treatment of non-Polish minorities," it says that some ethnic minorities in Poland have not adopted, on the whole, Polish chauvinism, but, on the contrary, have often placed themselves on the German side politically. "The members of the minorities who have acted according to Polish [nationalist] thought are to be treated like Polish nationalists and deported, but the great mass of these minority populations must be left in their homeland, and not be subjected to particular restrictions." In both cases, consequently, "special treatment" means favorable treatment.

- (a) Georges Wellers, Les Chambres à gaz ont existé (The Gas Chambers Existed), op. cit., p. 36.
- (b) Robert Faurisson, Résponse à Pierre Vidal-Naquet (Reply to Pierre Vidal-Naquet), op. cit., p. 23.
- (c) IMT, Vol. XI, pp. 374-375.
- (d) Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen polnischen Gebiete nach rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten (The question of the treatment of the population of the former Polish territories from racial-political viewpoints), report by Dr. E. Wetzel, Berlin, 25 November, 1939.
- (e) PS-660, pp. 18-19.
- 57. NG-3104.
- 57a. L'Allemagne nazie et le génocide juif, op. cit., p. 187.
- 57b. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Inland II A/B, A2 83-25 Sdh. 4, Bd. 5913.
- 58. NG-2586-E, PS-710.
- 59. L. Poliakov, Le Procès . . . (The Trial . . .), op. cit., p. 158.
- 60. Henri Monneray, La Persécution des Juifs en France et dans les autres pays de l'Ouest présentée par la France à Nuremberg (The persecution of the Jews in France and in the other countries of the West, presented by France at Nuremberg), CDJC, 1947, p. 358.
- 61. William L. Shirer, Storia del Terzo Reich (History of the Third Reich), Turin, 1971, p. 1464; Gerald Reitlinger, La soluzione finale (The Final Solution), op. cit., p. 108.
- 62. NG-2586-J.
- 63. NG-4583. Cf. Le Monde Juif, January 1952, p. 9.
- 64. T-1209.
- 65. Das Sonderrecht . . . (The Special Legislation . . .), op. cit., p. 361.

- 66. NG-1970.
- 67. NG-2586-P
- 68. NG-2586-G. As is known, even what is called the "Wannsee Protocol" is interpreted in the sense of "extermination" of the Jews by the official historians. We shall limit ourselves here to pointing out that if evacuations to the east really had meant the deportation of the Jews to "extermination camps" in the east, they [evacuations-Ed.] certainly would not have been described as "palliatives." For a deeper examination of the question, v. Wilhelm Stäglich, Le Mythe d'Auschwitz: Etude critique (The Auschwitz Mythos: A Critical Study), La Vieille Taupe, Paris, 1986, pp. 42-62.
- 69. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. X, op. cit., p. 484.
- 70. PS-4025.
- 71. Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier (Hitler's Table Conversations at the Führer's Headquarters), Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag, Munich, 1981, p. 456.
- 72. Wilhelm Stäglich, Der Auschwitz Mythos, Grabert-Verlag, Tübingen, 1979, p. 116-118.
- 73. Bernd Nellessen, Der Prozess von Jerusalem (The Jerusalem Trial), op. cit., p. 29.
- 74. PS-702. H. Monneray, La Persécution des Juifs dans les pays de l'Est présentée à Nuremberg (The Persecution of the Jews . . . in the East), CDJC, 1949, p. 78. The document, undated, goes back, probably, to soon after the nomination of Rosenberg as Minister of the Eastern Occupied Territories (17 July 1941).
- 74a. Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Politische Abteilung III 245, AZ Po 36, Bd.I.
- 75. NG-5770.
- 76. Adolf Hitler, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1944 (Monologues in the Führer's Headquarters 1941-1944), annotated by Heinrich Heims, published by Werner Jochmann, Albrecht Knaus Verlag, Hamburg, 1980, p. 241.
- 77. PS-3244. H. Monneray, La Persécution . . . dans . . . l'Est . . . (The persecution . . . in the . . . East), op. cit., pp. 91-92.
- 78. Given the great importance attached to Göring's letter of 31 July 1941 by Exterminationist historiography, it may be permitted us to return to this point in order to refute one of the rare attempts of explanation that it offers on this subject.

George Wellers, in his polemic against Robert Faurisson, interprets the letter in question in the sense that "the task assigned on 24 January 1939, that is the emigration and the evacuation of the Jews, was superseded, if not closed," and that "it must thereafter have been completed, if not replaced by another, the total or final solution of the Jewish question" in a manner that, in conclusion, "the total or final solution is thus neither emigration or evacuation, nor the Nisko plan nor the Madagascar plan" (a) and, in consequence, cannot be but "extermination." This interpretation is without foundation. First of all, "extermination," being something radically different from emigration or evacuation, cannot be reasonably considered as a "complement"(b) to "the task" consistent with solving the Jewish question "by way of emigration and of evacuation."

In the second place, Jewish emigration was not officially "superseded" and "closed" until the Wannsee Conference, as is seen clearly in the "minutes" referring to it: "With the prior authorization of the Führer, emigration from now on has given place to another solution: the evacuation of the Jews to the east."

In his memorandum 21 August 1942, Luther, referring to the Wannsee conference, confirms: "At that meeting Gruppenführer Heydrich explained that his assignment by Reichsmarschall Göring had been given him by order of the Führer, and that the Führer thereupon had authorized the evacuation of the Jews to the east, instead of emigration."

It is evident that, on 31 July 1941, at least two months before the Führer authorized evacuation to the east, "instead" of emigration(c), it was precisely emigration that was being practiced.

This point is confirmed further by Luther's memorandum of 21 August 1942, in which is stated that it is precisely that fact of having recognized the impossibility of resolving by emigration (legal, to other countries) the overall problem of some 3,250,000 Jews from the territories occupied by the Germans, and consequently of having recognized the necessity of a "final territorial solution," that had led Göring to draw up his letter of 31 July 1941.

Rademacher's informational note of 10 February 1942 explains still more clearly that Heydrich had been charged by the Führer to bring about the solution of the Jewish question in Europe conforming to the "plan for the 'final solution' of the Jewish question," that is, conforming to the "Madagascar plan" that subsequently had been abandoned, and consequently no longer could be looked to for the "final solution," as in the meantime the war against the Soviet Union had offered the possibility of disposing of "other territories for the final solution."

The 31 July 1941 letter was thus plainly in conformity with the Madagascar plan, and this is why, in conclusion, Göring's "complement" consisted simply of the replacement of the emigration/evacuation solution—i.e., legal emigration to other countries—or deportation to the east (Poland, October 1939-March 1940) or to the west (non-occupied France: October 1940) of the Reich Jews only, according to the decree of 24 January 1939, by the final territorial solution through the emigration or the evacuation to Madagascar of all Jews from the European territories occupied by the Germans, a solution which, precisely for that reason, was called the "total" solution.(d)

- (a) Georges Wellers, Les Chambres . . ., op. cit., pp. 33-34.
- (b) Idem, p. 31 (Translation of Görings's letter 31 July 1941. The German word is "Ergänzung" (which can be either "complement" or "supplement.")
- (c) The Wannsee conference had been scheduled originally for Dec-

ember 1941 (PS-709; NG-2586-F). The Führer decision goes back probably to the month of October, as on 23 October 1941 Jewish emigration from Germany was stopped (T-1209), and, on the following day, the evacuation of 50,000 Jews from the old Reich, from Austria, and from Bohemia-Moravia to the east was ordered (PS-3921).

- (d) The term 'Gesamtlösung" thus was not originally a simple synonym for "Endlösung." At the time, it had, in effect, a purely quantitative sense in that it meant that the solution of the Jewish question limited previously to the territory of the Reich was now extended to the occupied European territories.
- 79. IMT, Vol. XI, pp. 61-63.

- 81. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 3.
- 82. Idem, p. 83. In this regard see the documentation-from the Exterminationist angle-of Joseph Billig in: Les Camps de concentration dans l'économie du Reich hitlérien (The Concentration Camps in the Economy of the Hitlerian Reich), Presses Universitaires de France, 1973.
- Contribution à l'histoire du KL Auschwitz (Contribution to the History of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp), State Museum at Oswiecim, n.d., pp. 44-57.
- Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, German Crimes in Poland, Warsaw, 1946, Vol. I, p. 37.
- 85. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 270.
- 86. Idem, p. 120.
- 87. NO-495; NO-719.
- 88. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 84.
- 89. PS-1063.
- 90. R-129.
- 91. NO-500.
- 92. NO-5194.
- 93. NO-599.
- 94. NO-020-a.
- 95. NO-5689.
- 96. NO-1874.
- 97. NO-1990.
- Enzo Collotti, La Germania nazista (Nazi Germany), Turin, 1973, p. 266.
- 99. Idem, p. 267.
- 100. G. Reitlinger, La Soluzione finale (The Final Solution), op. cit., p. 149.
- 101. NO-1523.
- 102. PS-1469.
- Hefte von Auschwitz (Auschwitz Notebooks), Auschwitz Museum, 6, 1962, p. 78.

<sup>80.</sup> NO-5193.

- 104. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 89.
- 105. Enzo Collotti, La Germania nazista (Nazi Germany), op. cit., p. 267.
- Hannah Arendt, Le Système totalitaire (The Totalitarian System), Paris 1972, p. 182.
- 107. G. Reitlinger, La Soluzione finale (The Final Solution), op. cit., p. 544.
- 108. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 296.
- 109. G. Reitlinger, La Soluzione finale, (The Final Solution), op. cit., p. 545.
- 110. L. Poliakov, Bréviaire . . ., op. cit., p. 126.
- 111. C. Browning, Fateful Months, Holmes & Meier, New York and London, 1985, pp. 14-15.
- 112. Robert Cecil, Il mito della razza nella Germania nazista: Vita di Alfred Rosenberg, (The Myth of Race in Nazi Germany: The Life of Alfred Rosenberg), Milan, 1973, p. 199.

## An Open Letter to the Rev. Mark Herbener

## MARK WEBER

T he following open letter was just publicly a traditionalist Lutheran (Box 168, New Haven, MO 63068) a traditionalist Lutheran an April 27, 1987. In it he following open letter was first published in Christian News, weekly friendly to Holocaust Revisionism, on April 27, 1987. In it Mark Weber responded to several letters by the Reverend Mark Herbener, a clergyman of the Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches and a member of the Dallas (Texas) Memorial Center for Holocaust Studies. Weber's letter has been translated into French and published in the excellent French Revisionist guarterly. Annales d'Histoire Révisionniste (Autumn-Winter 1987, No. 3; B.P. 9805, 75224 Paris CEDEX 05, France). Readers of The Journal of Historical Review will be happy to learn that the challenge to debate the historicity of the Holocaust issue at the conclusion of "An Open Letter to the Rev. Mark Herbener" has been accepted by a group of Christian fundamentalists led by attorney Glen Peglau; as of this writing the debate is projected for early 1989, and will be held in Washington, DC. The Rev. Herbener has not replied to Mr. Weber's arguments or to his questions. - Editor

Rev. Mark Herbener Mount Olive Lutheran Church Dallas, Texas

Dear Rev. Herbener:

Over the years, I have written a number of Revisionist articles and essays challenging the story that the German government systematically exterminated some six million European Jews during the Second World War.

I was therefore particularly interested to read your letters of March 5, 18 and 27 to Rev. Herman Otten, along with his replies, in recent issues of the weekly *Christian News*. I also felt called upon to reply with this open letter to some of the questions and points you raised.

You pose a question that you apparently believe that Revisionists cannot answer. You ask: "What happened to the Jews who were transported to Sobibor or Chelmno or Treblinka?"

#### No "Extermination Camps" In Germany

Here is my answer to your question:

The Holocaust story has changed quite a lot over the years. At one time it was alleged that the Germans exterminated Jews at camps in Germany proper, such as Dachau, Buchenwald, Oranienburg, and so forth. That part of the Holocaust story proved so untenable that it was quietly dropped more than twenty years ago. Not even prominent Jewish Holocaust historians still claim that there were any "extermination camps" in the territory of the old German Reich.

At the great Nuremberg trial of 1945-1946 and during the decades following the end of the Second World War, Auschwitz (especially Auschwitz-Birkenau) and Majdanek (Lublin) were generally regarded as the really important "death camps." At Nuremberg, for example, it was alleged that four million people were killed at Auschwitz and another one and half million at Majdanek. These fantastic figures have since been drastically revised downwards. In addition, more and more striking evidence has been presented in recent years which simply cannot be reconciled with the allegations of mass extermination at these camps.

For example, detailed aerial reconnaissance photographs taken of Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1944 (during the height of the alleged extermination period there) were made public by the CIA in 1979.<sup>1</sup> They show no trace of the piles of corpses, smoking crematory chimneys and masses of Jews awaiting death which should have been clearly visible if Auschwitz had indeed been an extermination center.

#### Sobibor, Treblinka, Chelmno, Belzec

During the last several years, the emphasis in the Holocaust story has been shifting once again, this time to four small camps in Poland: Sobibor, Treblinka, Chelmno and Belzec.

In keeping with this strategic shift, the question you pose does not deal with Dachau, Buchenwald or even Auschwitz, but rather with three small camps of which no trace remains and for which almost no documents are available. Virtually the only evidence presented to support the claim that these were extermination centers are a few very dubious and often contradictory postwar "testimonies." Especially in recent years, an effort has been made to present a coherent and self-consistent "Exterminationist" account of these camps. As a result, some of the more outrageous claims about them have been suppressed.

Let's take a closer look at each of the camps you ask about.

#### Sobibor:

For years this camp did not figure very prominently in Holocaust accounts, but that's no longer the case. Earlier this week, for

#### An Open Letter to the Rev. Mark Herbener

example, the CBS television network broadcast a new "docudrama" movie entitled "Escape From Sobibor."

Between 200,000 and 600,000 Jews were supposedly gassed at Sobibor in 1942 and 1943. Holocaust historians are not able to agree about what gas was supposedly used, how the camp was laid out, or even how many gas chambers there were.

Fortunately, a few secret documents have survived which explain the camp's function. On July 5, 1943, SS chief Heinrich Himmler sent a personal directive to several top SS leaders. In this directive, which was issued at the same time that Sobibor was supposedly functioning as an extermination center, Himmler ordered that . . .

... the Sobibor transit camp in the Lublin District is to be transformed into a concentration camp. A center for dismantling captured ammunition is to be established in the concentration camp.

In a letter dated July 15, 1943, the head of the SS concentration camp system, Oswald Pohl, explained to Himmler that a center for dismantling captured Soviet ammunition could be set up at Sobibor without having to transform it into a concentration camp. Sobibor would remain a transit camp with a special section for dismantling ammunition. This correspondence (Nuremberg document file NO-482) clearly shows that neither Himmler nor Pohl regarded Sobibor as an "extermination center."<sup>2</sup> These documents simply cannot be reconciled with the Holocaust portrayal of Sobibor.

Sobibor's location close to the border between German-ruled Poland and German-occupied Ukraine is consistent with its designation as a transit camp. Large numbers of Jews were in fact deported to the occupied Soviet territories in 1942 and 1943. It's quite logical that Jews would first be brought to transit camps near the border before being transported further east.

Rev. Herbener, you write that trainloads of Jews arrived at camps such as Sobibor and then returned empty to their places of origin. "What happened to them?" you ask, suggesting that these deported Jews must have been killed. The rather obvious answer is that Jews were kept in the transit camps only temporarily, and were then soon transported across the nearby Polish-Soviet border to camps and ghettoes further to the east.

Like Sobibor, Belzec was a small camp located near the Polish-Ukraine border. It is now regarded [by Exterminationists] as a major extermination center. A secret German memorandum dated March 17, 1942, by an official named Reuter specifically referred to Belzec as the "furthest border station" in Zamosc county from where many thousands of Polish "Jews will then be sent across the border [into the Ukraine] and will never again return to the [Polish] General Government."<sup>3</sup>

Polish underground courier Jan Karski (who now teaches at

Georgetown University), secretly visited the Belzec camp in 1942 in order to find out what was happening to the Polish Jews who were being sent there. In his book *The Secret State*, Karski described his visit to Belzec in detail.<sup>4</sup> He did not see any evidence of "gas chambers." To the contrary, he reported seeing trainloads of Jews leaving Belzec. This observation is completely consistent with Belzec's function as a transit camp, and cannot be reconciled with its alleged role as an extermination center.

For a time, the acting commandant of Sobibor was Gustav Franz Wagner. Some years after the war, he was found living in Brazil and was put on trial there. Jewish witnesses testified in court that he was responsible for 150,000 deaths and took special delight in brutally killing women and children. Wagner, however, swore that Sobibor had been a "model" work camp, not an extermination center. The Brazilian court rejected the prosecution's case and decided to neither convict nor extradite him. Wagner was released in 1979, but was found dead a short time later at his farm, knifed in the chest.

## **Chelmno:**

So little is known about Chelmno (or Kulmhof) that it is difficult to effectively refute the charge that it was a mass extermination center. Because there is no trace of a camp left today, even the precise location is uncertain. Shortly after the end of the war, the American Jewish Year Book (Vol. 47, p. 398) reported that 1,350,000 Jews were killed at Chelmno. The numbers of Jews now said to have been killed in this camp vary between 150,000 (Raul Hilberg) and 360,000 (Polish government).

Chelmo is the only camp where Jews were supposedly gassed, not in gas chambers, but in the sealed rear compartment of a large truck ("gas van"). This story is inconsistent with the allegation that the Germans exterminated Jews as part of a well-coordinated program. Although the German officials in charge of the "final solution" were supposedly very methodical and organized, they were never even able to decide on a single efficient means of killing Jews.

#### Treblinka:

Holocaust historians regard this as one of the most important German extermination centers. These days, it is often said that 850,000 Jews were killed at Treblinka, although figures of 700,000 to more than a million victims are sometimes also cited.

Contrary to what many believe, Treblinka was not a secret camp. A statement published in both German and Polish in the December 2, 1941, issue of the Amtlicher Anzeiger, the official bulletin of the government of German-ruled Poland, announced the establishment of the "Treblinka Labor Camp."<sup>5</sup> An internal German document dated July 7, 1942, likewise refers to the "Treblinka labor camp."<sup>6</sup> It is true that a number of documents exist which show that trainloads of Jews arrived at Treblinka, and that empty trains then left the camp. Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg has cited these German railway records as proof that Jews were therefore exterminated at Treblinka. But these documents prove nothing of the kind.

Although definitive evidence is not available, it would seem that Dr. Arthur Butz of Northwestern University is correct in concluding that Treblinka served both as a labor camp and as a transit camp for Jews being deported eastwards to the occupied Soviet territories.<sup>7</sup> Like Sobibor and Belzec, Treblinka was located near the Polish-Soviet border.

Since the war, a number of diagrams based on the memories of "eyewitnesses" have been produced which purport to show the layout of the camp. Interestingly these diagrams differ from each other in every important respect. Compare the diagrams given, for example, in these books: Into That Darkness, by Gitta Sereny; The Death Camp in Treblinka, edited by Alexander Donat; and, German Crimes in Poland, vol. 1, published by the Polish government in 1946.

## The Contradictions of "Eyewitnesses"

There is considerable confusion about just how Jews are supposed to have been killed at Treblinka.

According to one wartime "eyewitness" account compiled by the OSS, the U.S. government's main intelligence agency, Jews at Treblinka "were in general killed by steam and not by gas as had been at first suspected."<sup>9</sup> The New York Times reported on August 8, 1943, that two million Jews had already been killed at Treblinka by steaming them to death.<sup>9</sup>

U.S. prosecutors at the main Nuremberg trial supported the steam story. According to a Polish government report dated December 5, 1945, Jews were killed at the camp "by suffocating them in steam-filled chambers." This report was submitted as U.S. prosecution exhibit USA-293, and was published in the official Nuremberg trial record as document PS-3311.<sup>10</sup> An American prosecutor quoted from this document during his address to the tribunal on December 14, 1945.<sup>11</sup>

However, Samuel Rajzman, a Jew who took part in the Treblinka inmate revolt of August 1943, testified that Jews were "suffocated to death" at the camp with a machine that pumped air out of death chambers.<sup>12</sup>

Shortly after the war, the Jewish Black Book Committee of New York compiled and published a lengthy volume entitled *The Black Book* which described alleged German wartime atrocities in gruesome detail. The Jewish Black Book Committee carefully calculated that "Treblinka must have destroyed three million persons." The Germans supposedly used three diabolical techniques, including poison gas and steam, to kill some 10,000 Jews daily. But "the most widespread" method "consisted of pumping all the air out from the chambers with large special pumps."<sup>13</sup>

In the Nuremberg trial against Oswald Pohl (Case No. 4), U.S. Judge Michael A. Musmanno declared that "death was inflicted here [at Treblinka] by gas and steam, as well as by electric current." Citing Nuremberg document PS-3311, Musmanno declared: "After being filled up to capacity the chambers were hermetically closed and steam was let in."<sup>14</sup>

The story these days is that Jews were gassed at Treblinka with carbon monoxide from the exhaust of an engine, usually described as a diesel engine. However, as engineer Freidrich Berg has persuasively demonstrated, this story is highly improbable for technical reasons.<sup>15</sup> In spite of their obnoxious odor, diesel engines produce much smaller quantities of carbon monoxide than ordinary gasoline motors. It would thus be very difficult, if not impossible, to gas efficiently large numbers of people using diesel exhaust.

It's important to keep in mind that the "evidence" presented for steaming and suffocating at Treblinka is no less credible than the "evidence" now usually cited for gassing. The steaming and suffocating stories have apparently been dropped for the sake of credible consistency and because even upholders of the Holocaust story regard them as too bizarre to be readily believed.

#### Where Are the Remains?

Rev. Herbener, if more than a million Jews were exterminated at Sobibor, Chelmno and Treblinka, as you and other defenders of the Holocaust story insist, where are the remains of the dead? If more than 800,000 Jews were cremated at Treblinka alone, as many claim, and each cremated corpse resulted in, let us say, six pounds of ash and residual bone, there should be more than 240 tons of remains still left at the camp site. Why has no one bothered to present this persuasive evidence of mass extermination to the world?

It is quite true that the great bulk of the many hundreds of thousands of Jews who lived in eastern Europe at the outbreak of the Second World War were no longer there at the end of the conflict. The loss of this ancient center of Jewish life was certainly a catastrophic misfortune for the Jews of the world.

The question of what precisely happened to the Jews of eastern Europe is indeed an important one. One book that deals with this subject in some detail is Walter Sanning's impressive analysis, The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry.<sup>10</sup>

#### **Compare Fate of Jews with Germans**

In this regard, it is perhaps worth comparing the fate of the Jews of eastern Europe with that of the Germans in this part of the continent. Before the war there were more than nine and a half million Germans in eastern Germany, including East Prussia, Silesia, and so forth. There were another three million in what is now Czechoslovakia, and many hundreds of thousands in Poland and elsewhere. But in just a few turbulent years (late 1944 to 1948), more than 16 million Germans vanished from their ancient homelands in eastern and central Euorpe. Some 14 million fled or were forcibly expelled, and about two million perished. Hundreds of thousands were killed. (On this subject, the book Nemesis at Potsdam by American historian Alfred M. de Zayas is worth consulting.)<sup>17</sup>

In support of your view of the Holocaust story, you recommend the well-known "Stroop Report" on the destruction of the Jewish ghetto in Warsaw in April-May 1943. However, your quotation from the report that 56,000 Jews were apprehended in the ghetto and destroyed is misleadingly translated and taken out of context. The report refers elsewhere specifically to "about 7,000 (Jews who) were destroyed within the former ghetto in the course of the large-scale action."<sup>18</sup> In other words, these "destroyed" Jews perished during the fierce battle that raged there for almost three weeks. As the "Stroop Report" indicates, and as Jewish Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg confirms in his major study, the vast majority of the 56,000 Jews in the ghetto were transferred to various concentration and labor Camps.<sup>19</sup>

#### The Mermelstein-IHR Debate?

Rev. Herbener, you reject Rev. Otten's call for a fair and open exchange of views on the Holocaust, charging that it "has only wickedness as its intent." You inaccurately claim that such a debate has already taken place between Revisionists and Mel Mermelstein, a former Auschwitz inmate. It is true that the Institute for Historical Review paid a substantial sum to Mr. Mermelstein in an out-of-court settlement of his law suit. But this dispute was over whether Mermelstein had filed his claim properly and during the time period specified. The basic historical disagreement was never debated or settled.

It is also not true, as you assert, that "the Revisionist is running as fast as his legs can carry him to dodge the law." (Which Revisionist?) It is more accurate to say that the upholders of the Holocaust story are the ones who are running away. They refuse to answer or even discuss some very serious questions. Instead, they hide behind a propagandistic smoke screen of spectacular movies and television broadcasts, expensive "memorials" and polemical "museums."

In contrast to the situation in our country, where all that most people ever see and hear is the "Exterminationist" side, the Holocaust story has been the subject of significant controversy in Europe. It was heatedly debated for several hours on Swiss television and over French national radio. The consensus of impartial observers was that the Revisionists were the clear winners in these exchanges. The leading French daily, *Le Monde*,<sup>20</sup> and the respected Italian historical journal, *Storia Illustrata*,<sup>21</sup> have also given extensive coverage to both sides of this issue.

#### Who is "Self Serving?"

Rev. Herbener, you describe Revisionist material as "largely selfserving." In fact numerous Revisionists have suffered terribly for daring to write what they regard as the suppressed truth about this very emotional chapter of contemporary history. One French Revisionist, a teacher named François Duprat, was murdered with a car bomb.<sup>22</sup> Prof. Robert Faurisson of the University of Lyon in France has suffered in countless ways, including assaults by thugs. The homes and offices of American Revisionists have been firebombed. West German judge Wilhelm Stäglich wrote an essay about his wartime experiences at Auschwitz. As a result, he was forced into early retirement and his pension was cut. Later, because he wrote a critical analysis of the Holocaust claims about Auschwitz, the West German government revoked his doctorate in law.

No, Rev. Herbener, it is not the Revisionists who are self-serving, but rather those who uphold the Holocaust story. The politicians, businessmen and, yes, clergymen who support the Holocaust campaign are rewarded with acclaim and praise from powerful and influential organizations. You write that you "proudly serve" as a member of the Board of Directors of the Dallas Center for Holocaust Studies. Well, it doesn't take any courage to join the wealthy and prominent "beautiful people" who lend their names to the lavishly funded Holocaust committees, councils and centers around the country.

No media campaign is more self-serving than the sophisticated and well-financed Holocaust blitz. Zionist leaders frankly regard the perpetual effort as crucially important for their own interests. That's why, for example, the Israeli government provided \$850,000 to produce the Shoah film you endorse.<sup>23</sup> It's also no wonder the Zionist organizations are so determined to silence anyone who challenges their portrayal of history. As Professor W.D. Rubinstein of Australia candidly acknowledged in September 1979: "If the Holocaust can be shown to be a myth, the strongest of all weapons in Israel's propaganda armory collapses."<sup>24</sup>

#### The Holocaust – A New Religion

Among American Jews, the Holocaust has become both a flourishing business and a kind of new religion. Jewish author and

newspaper publisher Jacobo Timmerman put it this way in his book, The Longest War: "Many Israelis feel offended by the way in which the Holocaust is exploited in the Diaspora. They even feel ashamed that the Holocaust has become a civil religion for Jews in the United States. They respect the works of Alfred Kazin, Irving Howe, and Marie Syrkin. But of other writers, editors, historians, bureaucrats and academics they say, using the word Shoah, which is Hebrew for Holocaust; There's no business like Shoah business."<sup>25</sup> Another Jewish writer, Leon A. Jick, commented: "The devastating barb, 'There is no business like Shoah business' is, sad to say, a recognizable truth."<sup>26</sup> Well, at least a few perceptive Jews recognize this truth, even if many non-Jews do not.

Over and over again, the public is exhorted to "Never Forget." Given the relentless media campaign to make the fate of the Jews during the Second World War the central event of human history, how can anyone ever forget? There is no end to the heavy-handed motion pictures, the simplistic television specials, the vindictive hunt for "Nazi war criminals," the one-sided "educational courses," the self-righteous appearances by politicians and celebrities at Holocaust "memorial services," and so forth and so on.

Non-Jewish victims, of course, just don't merit the same concern. For example, there are no American memorials, "study centers," or annual observances for Stalin's victims, who vastly outnumber Hitler's.

#### **Distortion of Reality**

You write proudly, Rev. Herbener, of your annual participation in the "Interfaith Pleas for Soviet Jewry" in Dallas. You go on to charge that "the Soviet Union has virtually imprisoned all Jews in Russia." This claim, like so much of what we are told regarding Jewish affairs, is a distortion of reality.

It is certainly true that the Soviet government cracks down on all expressions of anti-Soviet nationalism, including Zionism. But Soviet Jews are not oppressed any more than, say, Soviet Ukrainians. Contrary to what Americans have been led to believe, Jews are not persecuted in the Soviet Union simply because they are Jews. In fact, Jews in the USSR are generally better off than most Soviet citizens, and Jews are well-represented among the members of the Soviet elite. This was documented, for example, in the CBS "60 Minutes" broadcast of March 22, 1987.

Moreover, in one important regard, Soviet Jews are a privileged group. They are virtually the only Soviet citizens who are allowed to emigrate to the United States (and other countries) in large numbers. About 98 per cent of the "Russians" who have moved to the U.S. in recent decades are Jews.

Since you express such concern for the victims of oppression, I

would be interested to know what public action you have taken on behalf of persecuted Christians in the Soviet Union. Have you participated in any "interfaith" pleas on behalf of oppressed fellow Lutherans in the USSR? It would be interesting to see how many Jewish leaders would be willing to participate in such an event.

#### **Questions For Herbener**

In your letters to Rev. Otten, you asked several pointed questions that I have tried to answer here. Now, I have some questions that I hope you will answer:

1. Do you believe that Jews were gassed at Dachau during the war years, as was alleged at Nuremberg and elsewhere, or do you agree with Jewish Holocaust historians who now concede that this story is not true? If you reject this story, why do you believe that the evidence for gassings at Dachau is less credible than the evidence for gassings at Auschwitz, Sobibor and other camps?

2. Do you believe the evidence that Jews were steamed to death at Treblinka? If so, why do you think that Holocaust historians now reject that evidence? If not, why not? Is the evidence for "steam chambers" any less credible than the evidence for "gas chambers"?

3. Do you believe the story that the Germans manufactured bars of soap from Jewish corpses during the war? If so, why do you think that Holocaust historians now reject this story? If not, are you ready to condemn those who spread this story as liars or misinformed defamers?

4. The prominent Jewish writer and former Auschwitz inmate Elie Wiesel wrote in his book, Legends of Our Time: "Every Jew, somewhere in his being, should set apart a zone of hate-healthy, virile hate-for what the German personifies and for what persists in the German." Do you agree with Wiesel?

5. Do you agree that spreading and supporting lies about the German nation and people is a violation of the commandment: "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor?"

If you wish, Rev. Herbener, I can readily provide documentation for any of the statements I've made in this open letter. Furthermore, I am willing to speak to any appropriate group about the points made in this letter or about the Holocaust issue in general. I am also prepared to publicly debate the Holocaust issue, as explained in the challenge recently issued by the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust (P.O. Box 931089, Los Angeles, CA 90093).

As limited as it is, your exchange of letters with Rev. Otten is a rare and welcome public exchange of views about an important issue. I thus appreciate this opportunity to reply to some of the questions and points you raised.

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# A Critique of the Charge of Anti-Semitism: The Moral and Political Legitimacy of Criticizing Jewry

## PAUL GRUBACH

#### I

As the distinguished scholar, Noam Chomsky, has noted elsewhere, even in open democratic societies such as ours, which lack the cruder forms of ideological control, there is still a public orthodoxy: a set of assumptions, ideas, and doctrines which is rarely, if ever, questioned.<sup>1</sup> A key aspect of the public orthodoxy is the psychosocial taboo. The latter can be defined as a private emotional aversion and a public social ban attached to certain modes of thinking and public criticism.

Specifically, if a belief deemed to be a component of the public orthodoxy is rejected, or even questioned, in public, the offender is liable to be labeled as "evil" and be subjected to social ostracism. There is a private, internal counterpart to this public inhibition: if an individual who accepts the reigning public orthodoxy rejects, or questions, one of its tenets privately, he will likely subject himself to feelings of guilt approaching a kind of "holy dread." In the words of Sigmund Freud, "The violation of the taboo makes the offender himself taboo."<sup>2</sup>

Examples of societies with public orthodoxies, which are in turn protected by psychosocial taboos, are not hard to find. For instance, consider the status of the Catholic Church and its theological doctrines in Medieval Europe and during the era of the Inquisition. To question the cardinal tenets of Christian belief was to risk not only ostracism but imprisonment, torture, and death. A more contemporary example is the case of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union. Every Soviet citizen is aware that to criticize the Communist party or its ideological doctrines exposes one to charges of "bourgeois corruption," "anti-Soviet slander," and "retrogressive counterrevolution," and corresponding censure and punishment. Finally, every sentient, dutiful American citizen knows that to criticize Jews as a group, Jewish culture, Jewish behavior patterns, the alleged Holocaust, etc., is to partake of "immoral, anti-Semitic racism." Carefully nurtured by the public media, the taboo on criticizing Jewry is deeply lodged in the consciousness of the great majority of Americans, directly influencing their acceptance or rejection of criticisms of Jewish attitudes and behavior, irrespective of the truth or falsity of such claims.

Is direct criticism of the Jews anti-Semitism, and, by implication, morally and politically illegitimate, and thus unworthy of serious examination? If not, what is the true meaning of the label "anti-Semitic" applied to such criticism?

This paper is directed toward those who harbor the following beliefs:

- 1. Criticism of the Jewish people, Jewish culture and behavior, etc., is synonymous with immoral racism;
- 2. At best this criticism is only to be tolerated due to First Amendment protection of free speech, or, at worst, to be censured and censored.

May the psychic chains of these opponents of taboo-free speech be broken.

## Π

According to the democratic political theory on which our republic is founded, the ultimate source of all political power resides in the people. Every citizen in a truly democratic state is supposedly endowed with an equal opportunity to state a case for a particular viewpoint, and to influence the decisions of the powers which govern.<sup>3</sup>

Concomitant to the democratic theory is the tenet that the various powers and forces—unconnected though they may be with government—which influence the social, economic, or political direction of society are subject to scrutiny and criticism by citizens of a democracy. According to the historian Bernard Bailyn, the notion that "preservation of liberty rests on the ability of people to maintain effective checks upon the wielders of power" was one of the political doctrines upon which the American Revolution was based.<sup>4</sup> Political and social power must be checked; otherwise, it becomes repressive. Public scrutiny and criticism are an effective check upon political and social power; immunity from criticism is tantamount to power unchecked.

Indeed, the First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees—among other forms of free speech—the citizen's right to examine and criticize publicly the various social and political forces which influence our nation's destiny. Granted, the First Amendment does not sanction crying "fire" in a crowded theater. It certainly does, however, safeguard criticism of ideas, theories, ideological forces, and sectarian groups which steer the sociopolitical course of society, irrespective of the fact that the criticism in question may violate the sensibilities of a powerful group. Any factor—be it a group, institution, body of ideas, set of cultural values, etc.—which affects the social system, laws, historical development, and political policies of a democratic nation is subject to public criticism by citizens of that democracy.

In short, citizens of our democracy have a moral and political right to publicly analyze, debate, and criticize the powers which influence the sociopolitical direction of the nation. It follows, then, that anything which inhibits or silences public criticism of a socially and politically powerful group amounts to an infringement of a basic democratic right.

Consider the impact, then, of a psychosocial taboo which links in the minds of citizens a sense of evil and shame with negative criticism of a socially and politically powerful group, and affixes a public label of "evil person" to anyone who criticizes this same group. The taboo then amounts to an infringement of a citizen's right to question a group which has a decided effect upon the fortunes and fate of his society. How many will endure moral censure by their own conscience (an overwhelming sense of "I am evil") for thinking "heretical thoughts"? Of those forthright thinkers undeterred by such self-censure, how many will publicly voice their criticism of such a group, if the end result is being tarred as "evil" and exposed to consequent social ostracism?

Let us examine different aspects of Jewish social and political influence upon the American scene.

Since Jews vote in disproportionately high numbers (unlike other ethnic groups, which are usually underrepresented at the polls), the Jewish vote is a significant factor in many elections. According to the author of Jews and American Politics, Stephen D. Isaacs, the Jewish vote is ". . . certainly enough to be decisive in a close election, and even more influential considering that these votes tend to be cast as a bloc and are clustered in big electoral-vote states."<sup>5</sup> Thus, Jewish voting power cannot be viewed merely as individual Jews exercising power individually. Rather, the Jewish vote is a type of political power which Jews exercise as a group.<sup>6</sup>

2. Jews are 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> to 3 times as likely to be found in Congress than are non-Jews, in proportion to their numbers in the general population.<sup>7</sup> Eight members of the Senate and thirty members of the House are Jewish.<sup>8</sup> Regarding Jewish influence in the halls of Congress and the government bureaucracy, Jewish political commentator Wolf Blitzer wrote:

Whether in the Pentagon, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the White House, the National Security Council, the Justice Department, the FBI or the Congress, there is no shortage of Jews working in very senior and extremely sensitive positions.<sup>9</sup> 3. Approximately 50 percent of monetary contributions to the Democratic Party come from the Jewish community.<sup>10</sup> There is an intimate connection between economic contributions to a political party and the overall policies which that party will espouse. The Jewish contributions to the Democratic Party are large enough to enable immense Jewish influence over a mainstay of the American political system. In the words of one Democratic strategist, "You can't hope to go anywhere in national politics, if you're a Democrat, without Jewish money."<sup>11</sup>

4. The Left has exerted a significant influence upon American society as a whole culturally as well as politically, and Jews have always been a major force on the Left.<sup>12</sup> According to a major study of the left, "From its inception, Americans of Jewish background played a key role in the Communist Party."<sup>13</sup> Of the New Left of the 1960s, the same authors point out that American Jews "... provided a majority of its most active members and perhaps even a larger proportion of its top leadership."<sup>14</sup> Jewish intellectuals Erich and Rael Jean Isaac were much more blunt: "The students [of the New Left student movement] were mostly Jews."<sup>15</sup>

5. The mid 1970s saw the emergence of a "neo-conservative" movement, the political impact of which, on Democrats as well as Republicans, has been profound. Jews played—and continue to play—a central role in "neo-conservatism."<sup>16</sup>

6. The Israel lobby is a powerful outgrowth of the American Jewish community. Its political and social power, its ability to influence American foreign policy vis-a-vis the Middle East, have been amply documented elsewhere.<sup>17</sup> Bernard Gwertzman, writing in the pro-Zionist New York Times, admits:

I don't think there is really any doubt that Israel has the most efficient, most influential domestic lobby in this country. The Reagan Administration, for instance, never makes any move in the Middle East without consulting with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the chief pro-Israeli lobby, and many senators and congressmen routinely look to that group for guidance on Middle East issues.<sup>18</sup>

7. Organized crime has made an undoubted impact on the social and economic history of the United States. According to The Jewish Almanac, in reference to Jewish gangsters, "It would not be an exaggeration to say that their influence on organized crime in the United States during the 1920's and 1930's rivaled, if not exceeded, that of their Italian counterparts."<sup>19</sup>

8. Jewish economic influence in the United States is significant—to put it mildly!—and no short, one-paragraph essay could possibly do it justice. For a discussion of Jewish influence in banking, finance, industry, etc., the reader is referred to one such study.<sup>20</sup>

9. One of the key instruments of Jewish influence in the United States has been the American mass media and book publishing industry. As early as 1936, approximately 50 percent of the tastemaking and taste-influencing media (the book-publishing industry included) was Jewish-owned.<sup>21</sup> The pervasive Jewish ownership of major media outlets has continued to the present.

The largest commercial chain of radio stations in America today, Universal Broadcasting, is owned by a Jew, Howard Warshaw.<sup>22</sup> A significant number of the most influential newspapers and periodicals—such as the New York Times, Washington Post, St. Louis Post Dispatch, TV Guide, New Republic, to name just a few—are owned by individuals of Jewish background.<sup>23</sup> One of the largest communications empires in the United States is the Jewish-owned Newhouse chain. It encompasses twenty-one daily newpapers, five magazines, six television stations, four radio stations, and twenty cable-TV systems.<sup>24</sup>

In 1974, a writer who closely studied Jewish socio-political influence in the United States found that ". . . the (television) networks are owned and managed largely by Jews."<sup>25</sup> He subsequently added:

... all three commercial networks grew up under brilliant Jews-the National Broadcasting Company as part of General David Sarnoff's Radio Corporation of America, the Columbia Broadcasting System under William S. Paley, and the American Broadcasting System under Leonard Goldenson, after its split from NBC's old "Blue Network."<sup>26</sup>

In a study published in 1973, it was estimated that 58 percent of the television news producers and editors at ABC television were Jewish.<sup>27</sup> A 1971 study revealed that approximately half of the producers of prime-time television shows were Jews.<sup>28</sup>

In a very recent study of Jews and the American cinema, a Jewish researcher concluded: "Jews have had control of the means of [film] production and thus have enjoyed a protected image despite their minority status in society."<sup>20</sup> Fifty percent of the major book publishing houses are Jewish-owned.<sup>30</sup> Accordingly, the Jewish cultural establishment, through its massive influence in the mass media, is able to determine to a large degree what will and what will not be published, and can thus project its ethno-cultural beliefs upon the mass of American people.

One is therefore justified in agreeing with psychoanalyst Ernst Van den Haag, presented in The Jewish Mystique: Jews as a group-diaspora Jewish culture in America-are a considerable social and political force in American society. They form a cultural elite which exerts a decided impact upon the sociopolitical direction of American society. In the words of the president of the American Jewish Congress, Theodore Mann, "We [Jews] have real political power, and have come to feel our strength."<sup>31</sup> In the cautionary words of Marshal Bregar, former Jewish liaison to the Reagan White House, "We must be sober and not just exult in all the Jewish power we have."<sup>32</sup>

To make the argument perfectly clear, it is framed in the form of a simple syllogism.

- Major premise: Inherent in democratic political theory is the right of every citizen to publicly and privately examine and criticize those powers which influence the social, political, or economic life of society.
- Minor premise: American Jewry-inclusive of its cultural values - is one such powerful group which has a significant impact upon the social, political, and economic life of democratic society.
- Conclusion: Therefore, it is the right of the citizen to examine and criticize, Jewry and its sociopolitical power structure.

There is, further, a direct corollary to this syllogism: the existence of the psychosocial taboo by which "criticism of Jewry is synonomous with immoral racism" is an infringement of the democratic right to question any powerful sociopolitical interest. This taboo functions as a self-administered censure, making one feel guilty for thinking critically about the political and social power of Jewry, and also subjects any public criticism of the Jews to derisive labeling as "racist anti-Semitism." Bearing these caveats in mind, how many Americans dare risk exercising their right to criticize American Jewry? How many businessmen, professionals, labor leaders, academics, intellectuals, and politicians will close their minds and abdicate their duties under the spell of this taboo, dismissing out of hand possibly truthful claims concerning Jewry merely because these claims constitute negative, unflattering criticism?

To render Jews, their cultural values, beliefs, biases, history, etc., exempt from critical scrutiny has traditionally been the chief function of the charge of anti-Semitism. It is, as we shall soon see, a politico-intellectual weapon of the powerful Jewish establishment, used to silence its critics. In a historical sense, it is similiar to the charge of heresy employed by powerful theocratic powers in ages gone by, or the charge of anti-Soviet slander used by the Communist Party in the Soviet Union today. In all these cases, entrenched powers employ such charges, the very raising of which is intended to terrorize, against critics which they deem a threat. By associating a sense of evil with criticism of their power or the doctrines they promote, these politico-cultural establishments protect their power and ideological doctrines from rational criticism. Even against the claim that Jews as a group do not have power, that only individual Jews have power,<sup>33</sup> the argument still applies. If particular Jewish cultural values, beliefs, customs, and the like are causing politically or socially influential Jewish individuals to make decisions which affect society at large, then it is the citizen's right to subject these same Jewish values, beliefs, or cultural characteristics, which affect society through the decisions of individual Jews, to rational criticism.<sup>34</sup>

The implications of these arguments are even greater than they may appear at first glance. It is not here argued that criticism of the Jews should be "tolerated" for "freedom of speech" reasons, to satisfy a legal technicality of the First Amendment. Rather, within a society which espouses a democratic philosophy, it is indeed morally correct to examine and criticize all aspects of the sociopolitical power of the Jews. Thus negative criticism of the Jews is not immoral per se. Quite to the contrary! It is the blanket charge of anti-Semitism, raised in the face of any challenge to Jewish power and influence, which is immoral.

III

The question remains: if the taboo ("criticism of Jewry is evil"), and the manner in which the charge of anti-Semitism is utilized are incompatible with democratic principles, then why does the anti-Semitism taboo hold sway in a society such as ours which is based upon democratic principles? If neither from reason or the principles of American democracy, from where do they derive their power to influence? To which irrational proclivities of man—if not to his rational faculties—do they appeal in order to make them so effective and persuasive? What functions do they really serve? Whose interests or needs do they meet?

To answer these questions we must start at the beginning, with properly defined terms. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, an "anti-Semite" is defined as "a person who is hostile towards or prejudiced against the Jews."<sup>35</sup> In a previous issue of this publication, L.A. Rollins alluded to the criteria used by many Jews and non-Jews to determine who fits this definition.<sup>36</sup> If an individual makes a statement critical of Jews, it is *inferred* that this person harbors a hatred of and prejudice toward Jews. These criteria, the manner in which anti-Semitism is determined (i.e., if a statement is critical of Jews, then the individual who made the claim is thereby an anti-Semite) are firmly implanted in the minds of many Jews and Gentiles. Needless to say, this outlook is a part and parcel of the public orthodoxy.

Mr. Rollins certainly exposed the non sequitur involved here. Critical statements of Jews do not necessarily indicate hatred and prejudice toward Jews. Indeed, critical statements directed toward Jews might equally serve to indicate that the individual who made the statements harbors within himself—rather than hatefulness and prejudice—a deep sense of humanitarianism.

For example, consider the case of John Demjanjuk, a Ukrainian-American who was accused of war crimes, stripped of his citizenship, and sent to Israel for a show trial. In regard to the Demjanjuk case, Dr. Edward Rubel made the statement: "Jewish Zionist pressure groups in Washington speak through the OSI for the U.S. government." Quite expectedly, a Jewish member of the ADL, Yitzhak Santis, charged Rubel with "anti-Semitism."<sup>37</sup> That is, Santis interpreted Rubel's statement as being critical of Jews, and thus has inferred that he harbors a hatred of irrational beliefs about Jews. But does this latter inference necessarily follow? By no means!

On the basis of Rubel's statement, one could justifiably make quite another inference. Specifically, Rubel could instead harbor a firm belief in Mr. Demjanjuk's innocence, and out of deep, humanitarian concern for the latter's plight, have spoken out against the forces which he sincerely believes are wrongfully persecuting Demjanjuk. In other words, humanitarian concern for Demjanjuk, and not hatred of Jews, may have caused Rubel to speak critically of Jewish pressure. Santis, however, has automatically assumed hostile intent on the part of Rubel. (The question now remains: what psychosocial forces have induced Santis to assume hostile intent? More on this point later.) In addition, Rubel's claim—that the OSI functions as a governmental arm of Jewish Zionist pressure groups—is not an irrational prejudice, but rather a quite plausible view which is supported by the evidence.<sup>38</sup>

But even if statements critical of Jews do indicate that the expounder of such statements harbors hostility toward Jews, the statements in question may nevertheless be true. An example will serve to illustrate the point.

Ernest Dube, a black professor who at one time held a teaching position at the State University of New York (Stony Brook), taught that Zionism is a form of racism in his courses.<sup>30</sup> A visiting Israeli professor, Selwyn K. Troen, charged Dube with "anti-Semitism," adding that the equation of Zionism with racism is "sloganeering that is practiced by the anti-Semite.<sup>340</sup> In accusing Dube of anti-Semitism, precisely what does Troen mean? Stating that Dube is an anti-Semite, according to the dictionary definition of the term cited above, is tantamount to claiming that he harbors, deep down, a neurotic hatred of Jews. This hatred of the Jews has caused him to make irrational, derogatory, and prejudicial statements about them ("anti-Semitic sloganeering").

Case closed, end of story. Dube should be dismissed as a neurotic crank, dismissed from his teaching job, as well, and his claim that Zionism is a form of racism should likewise be dismissed as an obviously false and prejudicial statement.<sup>41</sup>

Here we have an excellent example of an admixture of an ad hominem fallacy and an "emotional language" fallacy. The fact that Professor Dube may have an alleged character deficiency—a deeprooted hatred of Jews—has nothing to do with the objective truth or falsity of his teaching that Zionism equals racism. Dube's personal character traits are logically irrelevant to the correctness or incorrectness of his arguments or claims concerning political Zionism. That is, Zionism could indeed be a form of racism, regardless of whether Dube harbors a personal hatred of Jews.

In addition, to label the belief in question as the "sloganeering of the anti-Semite" is to do just that and nothing else. "Anti-Semitic sloganeering" is an emotion-loaded phrase attached to the claim, but it does nothing to disprove the truth of the claim. It is a linguistic artifice, the effect of which is to conjure up all the negative emotions and responses associated with the code word of "anti-Semitism" in the minds of listeners, and thus induce them to reject out of hand Dube's statement that Zionism equals racism. In the words of the logician, Alex Michalos, "The fallacy of confusion with emotional language is committed when, without increasing the supporting evidence for a view, the view is made more persuasive by the use of emotional language."<sup>42</sup>

Has there in fact been any evidence offered to demonstrate that Dube's teaching is false? No evidence at all was offered in the statements of Dube's accusers to disprove his teaching. (That Zionism is indeed a form of racism, according to liberalhumanitarian definitions of the term, has been convincingly argued by many authors.)<sup>43</sup>

The Dube case exemplifies beautifully the two-fold fallaciousness of the way in which the charge of anti-Semitism functions. On the one hand it is an argument *ad hominem*, attacking a person's motives and character instead of his thesis. (Under objective conditions, an asserted theory or fact is to be examined quite independently of the attitude or psychic makeup of him who asserts it.) That the charge of anti-Semitism indeed functions as an argumentive bludgeon to silence all critics of Jews, Zionism, and the state of Israel has been noted by individuals—including Jews—of all political persuasions.<sup>44</sup> A classic diversionary tactic, it shifts attention away from a fair examination of the critic of Jewry's claims, and casts ridicule on the critic and his character instead.

Instead of offering reasons or evidence to disprove the claims of the "anti-Semite," the tactic places an emotive label (a code word which elicits automatic, negative responses) on the claims, thereby magically, through an illogical sleight of hand, disposing of them.

Regarding fallacies of this nature, the logician Irving Copi pointed out: "How they succeed in being persuasive despite their logical incorrectness is in some cases to be explained by their expressive function of evoking attitudes likely to cause the acceptance of, rather than supplying grounds for the truth of, the conclusions they urge."<sup>45</sup> That many learned intellectuals, well-schooled in the subleties of logic, can throw rationality to the winds and accept such outright fallacies at face value is a tribute to the psychological power of the charge of anti-Semitism.

## IV

It is to the psychological essence of the charge of anti-Semitism which our analysis must now turn. Specifically, what psychological attitudes does the charge evoke to make it so potent, coercive, and persuasive an instrument in the minds of Jews who employ it and Gentiles who are subject to it?

First, why is the label of "anti-Semite" such an awesome threat, to be greatly feared by any and all social critics of the Jews? According to anthropological observation in most societies known to man, there is a stigma attached to mental illness.<sup>40</sup> Our society is no exception to this rule. And it is here, in the reflexive, unthinking, subliminal association of anti-Semitism (read: criticism of Jews) with psychological sickness that the charge of anti-Semitism derives its awesome power to intimidate, coerce, and silence.

It is firmly rooted in the tenets of popular psychology (read: mediapromoted ideology), that anyone who criticizes Jews as a group has an underlying emotional problem, and this supplies the underlying reason for his criticism. Jews as a group are presented as blameless and powerless, an oppressed minority forever being victimized: by Arab terrorists, Soviet anti-Semites, Germans, Austrians, East Europeans—the list is endless. By this reading the "racist" critic of Jews alleviates his own intense psychological problems by criticizing and attacking the powerless Jews. Needless to say, anything said by so confused an individual need only be disregarded.

According to Paul Findley, a former Congressman who dealt extensively with Middle-Eastern issues in his tenure, the charge of anti-Semitism "... is an accusation that brings disdain and horror to just about everyone. No one wants to be accused of being anti-Semitic, and the accusation has been developed into the most odious attack that can be made on an American citizen."<sup>47</sup> Jewish interests, through their pervasive influence on American thinking, have successfully programmed the popular psyche as follows: criticism of the Jews equals hatred of the Jews, which in turn equals mental sickness.<sup>48</sup> Those charged with "anti-Semitism" are prey to the consquences of the distinctly human disgust, aversion and suspicion reserved for the mentally ill.

Furthermore, the charge of anti-Semitism serves both as a Jewish

sword and a Jewish shield. On the one hand, it is an *ad* hominem attack upon the character of a critic of Jewry. As such, it functions as a threat, used to intimidate and to coerce the critic or potential critic into silence, and to defame his character and dismiss his assertions if he speaks out. Thus it is an offensive weapon, a Jewish sword.

Now, let us see how it functions as a defensive shield for Jewish people. The charge of anti-Semitism can provide Jews psychological insulation from negative criticism, which, even though it be legitimate, is too painful for conscious acceptance. A Jew can easily sweep the criticism from conscious awareness by saying, "He [the critic of Jewry] is just an anti-Semite. Therefore, whatever he says about the Jews is false, and I don't have to listen to him." In a word, it is an excellent example of the Freudian defense mechanism of rationalization.

This could well be one of the major psychic forces behind this seemingly endless drive by certain Jewish organizations to "discover anti-Semitism" in the critics of Zionism and other forms of Jewish social and political influence. The charge of anti-Semitism could thus function as a conscience-salving self-deception for Jewish people.

V

Let us review some of the major points of this essay. The following cultural programming is a key part of the public orthodoxy: in America today: a) statements critical of Jews imply antipathy toward Jews, and b) antipathy toward Jews or Jewish organizations are the sign of a psychological disturbance. Previously, we have seen that statements critical of Jews do not necessarily arise from a hatred of Jews. Even if they did, this does not render the assertions false.

Let us analyze the validity of belief b. Let it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that a man bears hostility toward Jews or Jewish organizations. The public orthodoxy, the cultural conventions of our time, demand that we assume the man is either mentally disturbed or "evil." Is this necessarily true? Is it not possible that feelings of antipathy toward the Jews may stem from normal psychological reactions caused by the collective behavior of large numbers of Jews? Consider the following examples.

Israeli-Jewish rule of the Israeli-occupied Arab territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) has been extremely oppressive. The native Palestinians living there are subject to confiscation of their lands, a wide range of legal discrimination; torture and cruel treatment of Palestinian dissidents; arbitrary arrest and deportation; administrative detention without trial for up to six months; collective punishment (the detonation of living quarters of families of individuals who are merely suspected of an offense); the

placement of arbitrary curfews on whole towns; murders and political killings; violation of the native Palestinian's right to privacy; the severe restriction of the press, freedom of speech, peaceful assembly and association, and movement within the territories; and severe restrictions on academic freedom.<sup>40</sup> According Congressman George Crockett Jr. (D-MI), who made a fact-finding visit to the Middle East in 1985, the Israeli military government in the occupied territories is ". . . a finely honed instrument of oppression against an entire subject people."50 Father Edward Dillon, a frequent lecturer on Middle-East-related issues, has summed up the situation perfectly when he wrote: "Palestinians have become resident aliens in their own land, without effective recourse for almost any infringement of basic human rights."51 [The brutal repression of desperate Palestinian demonstrations over the six months following December, 1987 has amply borne these statements out-Ed.]

In view of what Palestinian Arabs have experienced at the hands of groups of Israeli Jews, and considering that their awful experiences are the result of the policies of a Jewish Zionist government, is not one justified in concluding that any generalized feelings of hostility they may harbor toward the Jews are, in a psychological sense, explicable? Would not similar feelings flair up in a group so oppressed by Jews, or by like oppressors with so indentifiable a group character? (A psychological reaction may be explicable, even normal, but not necessarily morally justifiable, of course.)

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 provides another case in point. Post-World-War-II Hungarian society was very oppressive, a virtual Stalinist concentration camp. By 1956 at least one quarter of the entire Hungarian population had been jailed at one time or another, most often on trumped-up charges. If one's father had been a landowner or an officer during the Horthy era, university education was denied him, the higher professions closed, and his fate seemed sealed: to perform menial tasks for the rest of his life. There was additionally the full gamut of Stalinist suppression of religion and freedom of speech, as well as torture and execution of political dissidents.

As historian David Irving has pointed out, the leadership of the Communist regime, including the top echelons of the secret police, was almost entirely Jewish.<sup>52</sup> Working from CIA reports, Irving has demonstrated that the great majority of those Hungarians who took part in the revolution, and who subsequently were interviewed by psychologists in America, were motivated by anti-Jewish feelings.<sup>53</sup>

In view of the oppression that these Hungarians had experienced at the hands of a virtual totalitarian, Jewish-controlled government, may one not be justified in concluding that their hostility to Jews was a normal psychological response—in the sense that most people under the same set of circumstances would respond almost identically—caused by the collective, oppressive behavior of a large and influential group of Hungarian Jews?

The case of Jewish influence upon American foreign policy regarding the Middle East provides us with another instructive example. It has been well documented elsewhere that the Zionist establishment virtually controls the general direction of American Middle East foreign policy, and Jewish Zionist manipulation of our government for its own ends is quite extensive. In reference to this manipulation of the American government, Admiral Thomas Moorer has commented: "If the American people understood what a grip those people have got on our government, they would raise up in arms. Our citizens don't have any idea what goes on." In other words, if the American people knew how certain Zionist Jews are manipulating the American political system to the detriment of the American people, anti-Jewish hostility would become widespread—a quite normal, mass psychological response to the immoral collective behavior of a large group of Zionist Jews.

In a past issue of The National Jewish Post and Opinion, the Jewish columnist, Arlene Peck wrote: "I have my own feelings about the Germans and benevolence isn't one of them. I traveled to Munich briefly a few years ago and couldn't wait to get out of that country... I can't help if I'm not a forgiving person."<sup>54</sup> Quite obviously, she is telling us that she bears hostility toward the Germans. Yet, the public orthodoxy demands that we sympathize with her by saying: "Well, considering the oppression that Jews have suffered at the hands of Germans, it is certainly normal and understandable that Jewish people are hostile toward the Germans."

Just as hostility to Germans may be a normal psychological response for Jewish people under certain circumstances, so too, Arab, Hungarian, and American antipathy to Jews can also be a normal psychological response under certain circumstances. The equation of all anti-Jewish hostility with psychological sickness is false. Anti-Jewish feeling, at times, may be a normal psychological reaction—a reaction which could be induced in most humans given the circumstances—to the collective behavior of large groupings of Jews. (Of course, antipathy to the Jews as a group may be normal, but not morally justifiable. I am not suggesting that people who suffer at the hands of Jewish oppressors should hate all Jews, merely that, considering the psychic makeup of humankind, hostility to Jews can be a normal, not a pathological, reaction—though not an ethical reaction—given certain conditions.)

## Conclusion

1. Jewry is an established social and political power in the United States. In concurrence with the democratic principles of our society, it is morally and politically correct to offer criticism of Jewry and its politico-cultural power.

2. The potency of the charge of anti-Semitism—its ability to silence critics of the Jews—derives not from the force of reason, but rather, from the force of an irrational, deeply ingrained, cultural convention: specifically, the unthinking association of a sense of evil with criticism of the Jews.

3. The charge of anti-Semitism is a Jewish sword and shield. A Jewish sword, it is an *ad* hominem attack on any critic of the Jews. By focusing on the critic's character, it induces people to reject his assertions on Jewish behavior out of hand, without fair examination.

A Jewish shield, the charge serves as a psychological defense mechanism whereby Jewish people can insulate themselves from criticism which is too painful to confront consciously.

In a political and sociological sense, the charge of anti-Semitism is a powerful weapon of the Jewish cultural and political establishment, used in an undemocratic manner to silence its opponents and to enable that establishment to operate with impunity. Thus, the accusation of anti-Semitism is an essential tool of Jewish power and influence.

4. In our society almost every form of social and political power has its share of critics. The government bureaucracy, the so-called military-industrial complex, the CIA, Big Business, the Catholic Church, Christian fundamentalists, the oil companies, Ronald Reagan, the political Left, the political Right: all have their outspoken critics.

Americans are told from their cradles to their graves that their country is the "land of the free," the "home of free speech," the nation in which the citizenry is able to question and challenge all forms of social and political influence. Let one invoke this right of free speech and engage in criticism of the power and influence of American Jewry, however, the reigning cultural conventions demand that we label him "anti-Semitic."

Our democratic philosophy allows for the political and moral legitimacy of criticism of the Jews as a group. If all forms of social and political influence have their tolerated, even respected critics, then let the critic of Jewish influence speak openly. By the canons of our free society, even Jewry should ultimately benefit from an open discussion of the power of Jews in politics, economics, and culture in modern America.

#### Notes

- 1. Chomsky's introduction to Israel's Sacred Terrorism, by Livia Rokach (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1980), p. xiii.
- 2. Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 11th ed., s.v. "Taboo," by Northcote W. Thomas, quoted in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, 6 bks., trans. and ed. Dr. A.A. Brill, The Modern Library (New York: Random House, 1938), 5:823.
- 3. The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 1967 ed., s.v. "Democracy," by Stanley I. Benn.
- 4. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 65.
- 5. Jews and American Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1974), p. 7.
- 6. See footnote 33.
- 7. "Jews in Congress show anti-Semitism reduced," The National Jewish Post and Opinion, 27 February 1985, p.3.
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- 9. Wolf Blitzer, "U.S. sends Jewish envoys to help deal with Israel," Cleveland Jewish News, 27 June 1986,
- 10. Charlotte Sailkowski, "America's Israel Aid Budget Grows," Christian Science Monitor, 30 November 1983, p. 5.
- 11. Quoted in Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1985), p. 47.
- 12. Arthur Liebman, Jews and The Left (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979), p. 1.
- Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians, and the New Left (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 98.
- 14. Ibid., p. 80.
- Review of Roots of Radicalism, in The American Spectator, vol. 16, no.
  5. (May 1983), p. 26.
- 16. Rothman and Lichter, Roots of Radicalism, p. 105.
- 17. See Findley, They Dare To Speak Out; Cheryl Rubenberg, "The Middle East Lobbies," The Link, vol. 17, no. 1 (January-March 1984); Earl D. Huff, "A Study of a Successful Interest Group: The American Zionist Movement," Western Political Science Quarterly, vol. 25 (March 1972), pp. 109-124; Lee O'Brien, American Jewish Organizations and Israel (Washington, D.C.: Institute For Palestine Studies, 1986); Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection II: What Price Peace? (New Brunswick, N.J.: North American, 1982): Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy (New York, 1978).
- Review of The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection, by Steven Emerson, 11 July 1985, p. 17.

- 19. Richard Siegel and Carl Rheins, comps. and eds., *The Jewish Almanac* (New York: Bantam, 1980), p. 58.
- 20. Wilmot Robertson, Chapter 15 of The Dispossessed Majority, "The Jews," (Cape Canaveral, Florida: Howard Allen, 1981), pp. 152-201.
- 21. See the short discussion of *Fortune* magazine's 1936 report on Jews in America in James J. Martin's, *The Man Who Invented "Genocide"*: The Public Career and Consequences of Raphael Lemkin (Torrance, California: Institute for Historical Review, 1984), p. 54.
- 22. Edwin Black, "Owned by Jews, evangelical radio spreads Gospel," Cleveland Jewish News, December 1985, p. 13.
- 23. Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection II, p. 219.
- 24. Richard Siegel and Carl Rheins, The Jewish Almanac, p. 99.
- 25. Stephen D. Isaacs, Jews and American Politics, p. 46.
- 26. Ibid., p. 46.
- E.J. Epstein, News From Nowhere (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 222-23, cited by Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, Roots of Radicalism, p. 97.
- Muriel Cantor, The Hollywood TV Producer (New York: Basic Books, 1971), cited by Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, Roots of Radicalism, p. 97.
- 29. Particia Erens, The Jew in American Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 28.
- 30. James Yaffe, *The American Jews* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 225.
- 31. Cynthia Dettelback, "Coming of Age' 54th GA Theme," Cleveland Jewish News, 22 November 1985, p. A-6.
- 32. Ibid., p. A-6.
- 33. Hyman Bookbinder, of the American Jewish Committee, once made a claim to this effect, as quoted in Stephen D. Isaacs, Jews and American Politics, p. 246. Among other things, he said: "... But as for Jewish political power-large P partisan Power-there is relatively little organized Jewish political Power." Based upon the evidence presented in this essay, I believe that one is justified in rejecting this claim as false. Jews as a group do have political power-and a lot of it.
- 34. The view expounded here differs significantly from that of Dr. Robert A. Hall, Jr. ("The Persecution of P.G. Wodehouse," The Journal of Historical Review vol. 7, no. 3, Fall 1986, p. 350). Speaking of P.G. Wodehouse, he wrote: "He was very much aware that there are too many individual differences among members of any group to justify judging it en masse." By logical extension, then, there are too many individual differences among members of any group to justify criticizing it en masse. Although there are many individual differences among members of any cultural grouping, this still does not rule out the persistence of general patterns of behavior and thought among individuals of the group, nor characteristics common to the group as a whole. The Jewish historian, Lucy S. Dawidowicz, has made this clear in The War against the Jews: 1933-1945 (New York: Bantam, published

by arrangement with Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1975), p. 464. Jewish behavior during the crises of WW II, she noted, was in large part determined by ". . . the dominant values of Jewish tradition and culture and a modal national character and personality. National character reflects the enduring formative influences of a people's culture and history. Through the processes of socialization during which the values of the group and patterns of behavior common to all its members are transmitted by family and peers, each individual's uniqueness is modified and seasoned by national characteristics."

- 35. American Heritage Dictionary, (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston. 1982, 1985), s.v. "anti-Semite."
- 36. Review of Why the Jews? The Reason for Anti-Semitism, by Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin, The Journal of Historical Review, vol. 5, nos. 2, 3, 4, (Winter 1984), pp. 376-77.
- 37. Yitzhak Santis, "Supporters of Demjanjuk seeking to discredit OSI," Cleveland Jewish News, 3 January 1986, p. 10.
- For a good discussion on how some Americans are being railroaded, see Peter Carr, "Justice Department, Media, KGB Pump U.S. 'Nazimania'," The Spotlight, 2 March 1987, p. 31.
- David Bird, "State U. Professor in a Dispute on Zionism Stand Is Denied Tenure," New York Times, 18 August 1985.
- 40. Lee O'Brien, American Jewish Organizations and Israel, p. 219.
- 41. Dube was made to leave the university. See the source in footnote 39.
- 42. Alex C. Michalos, Improving Your Reasoning (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 78.
- United Nations, General Assembly, 2400th Plenary Meeting, 10 43. November 1975, Resolution 3379 (XXX) Determining That Zionism is a Form of Racism; Sami Hadawi, "Who Are the Palestinians?," The Journal of Historical Review, vol. 4, no. 1, (Spring 1983), pp. 43-59; Abdeen Jabara, Zionism and Racism, Arab World Issues, Occasional Papers: No. 3 (Detroit: Association of Arab-American Graduates, 1976); Louise Cainkar, ed., Separate and Unequal: The Dynamics of South African and Israeli Rule (Chicago: Palestine Human Rights Campaign, 1985); Regina Sharif, Non-Jewish Zionism: Its Roots in Western History (London: Zed Press, 1983); David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (Faber and Faber, 1977; London: Futura Publications, a division of MacDonald & Co., 1978); for a good discussion of the close ideological affinity between National Socialist and Zionist racialism, see Francis R. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp. 16-21.
- 44. Douglas Reed, The Controversy of Zion (Torrance, California: Noontide Press, 1985), p. 174; Vladimir Begun, "The Accusation of Anti-Semitism," Sputnik, September 1980, p. 31; Dewey M. Beagle, Prophecy and Prediction (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pryor Pettengill, 1978), pp. 201-02; Fred Reed, "Intimidating the Press in Israel," Washington Post, 28 June 1982; Charles M. Fischbein, "Money Talks to Media, and Media Controls Information," The Spotlight, 22 September

1986, p. 19; see the letter of Dr. Alfred M. Lilienthal, reprinted in Richard V. London, "Author Challenges GOP Lawmaker to Change Attitude on 'USS Liberty'," *The Spotlight*, 2 February 1987, p. 5; finally see the statements of former Undersecretary of State George W. Ball, the journalist Harold Piety, and Jewish intellectual Roberta Strauss Feuerlicht in Paul Findley, *They Dare to Speak Out*, pp. 127, 268, 296.

- 45. Introduction to Logic, 5th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1978), p. 88.
- 46. Joseph Julian, Social Problems, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980), p. 48.
- 47. "Congress and the Pro-Israel Lobby (Interview)," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. xv, no. 1 (Autumn 1985), p. 107.
- 48. Examples and evidence in support of this statement are so numerous, it would be impractical to list it all here. However, the following should suffice to illustrate the point.

In reference to the legitimate criticism which Liberty Lobby (a populist institution based in Washington) has consistently advanced throughout the years, a very important ADL official, Arnold Forster, has stated the following: "There is more than ample scientific basis... for unequivocally stating that anti-Semitism is a disease, and that its disseminators are just as dangerous [as] any Typhoid Mary." See Liberty Lobby, Conspiracy Against Freedom: A Documentation of One Campaign of the Anti-Defamation League Against Freedom of Speech and Thought in America, ed. Willis A. Carto (Washington, D.C.: Liberty Lobby, 1986), p. 106.

Notice how Zionist ideologues deal with Revisionist critiques of the "Holocaust." Robert Faurisson has pointed out how Elie Wiesel uses the following terms—all of which conjure up the idea of mental illness—in reference to the Revisionists: "indecent pamphleteers with morally deranged minds," "Those hateful and vicious persons," "it is to take leave of one's senses;" "this entire affair arises from lunacy." See "Revisionism on Trial: Developments in France, 1979-1983," The Journal of Historical Review, vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 1985), p. 177. L.A. Rollins has uncovered other examples of the same. See "The Holocaust as Sacred Cow," The Journal of Historical Review, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1983), pp. 37-38.

49. Palestine Human Rights Campaign (U.S.A.) and Committee Confronting the Iron Fist (Jerusalem), Special Report (Chicago: Palestine Human Rights Campaign, 1986); Palestine Human Rights Campaign and American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Report on Israeli Human Rights Practices in the Occupied Territories for 1985 (Chicago: Palestine Human Rights Campaign, n.d.; Washington, D.C.: American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, n.d.); Jan Abu Shakrah, "The Making of a Non-Person," The Link, vol. 19, no. 2, (May-June 1986); Raja Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985); Israel Shahak, "A Summary of the System of Legal Apartheid Which Is in Force in the Occupied Territories," Palestine Human Rights Newsletter vol. VI, no. 4, (July-August 1986), p. 9; "Crockett Assails Repression of Palestinians," Palestine Perspectives, October 1985, p. 12.

- 50. "Crockett Assails Repression of Palestinians," Palestine Perspectives, October 1985, p. 12.
- Review of Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank, by Raja Shehadeh, in "The Making of a Non-Person," The Link, vol. 19, no. 2, (May-June), p. 14.
- 52. David Irving, "On Contemporary History and Historiography," The Journal of Historical Review, vol. 5, nos. 2, 3, 4, (Winter 1984), pp. 265-266; David Irving, Uprising! (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981); R.V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 163.
- 53. David Irving, "On Contemporary History and Historiography," p. 266; David Irving, Uprising!, pp. 47-50.
- 54. "Arlene Gets Serious on Mr. Reagan," The National Jewish Post and Opinion, 1 May 1985, p. 9.

Foreword by ADMIRALS KIMMEL and HALSEY.

> Admiral Theobald was there! He was on duty at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and he was at Admiral Husband Kimmel's side from the verv beginning of FDR's efforts to cover up his own infamy on the 'day of infamy" by heaping the blame on Pearl's army and navy commanders. A one-time chief of staff to the U.S. Naval fleet, Rear Admiral Robert

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# **REVIEW ARTICLE**

# On the Treadmill to Truth

# ON THE TREADMILL TO PEARL HARBOR: THE MEMOIRS OF ADMIRAL JAMES O. RICHARDSON (USN RETIRED), AS TOLD TO VICE ADMIRAL GEORGE C. DYER (USN RETIRED). Washington DC: Naval Historical Division, Department of the Navy, 1973, 471 pages.

#### MARTIN MERSON

O n the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson (USN Retired), As Told to Vice Admiral George C. Dyer (USN Retired), with an introduction by Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, (USN Retired), Director of Naval History, is a fundamental book for anyone interested in ascertaining the truth concerning the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, including the role of Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and the Navy's state of readiness. A of the Richardson book appeared in Officer Review (The review Military Order of the World Wars), Vol. 27, No. 6, January 1988, page 5.<sup>1</sup> Although this book was completed in 1958, the publication date appearing in the book is 1973. To this reviewer's knowledge there is no satisfactory explanation for the fifteen-year delay in making the book available to the public. We have unofficial information that the delay may have been due to the fact that Harold Stark. Chief of Naval Operations during the crucial early war years. did not die until 1972: the book is indeed highly critical of Admiral Stark. This writer has also been told that Admiral Arthur Radford. then serving as Chief of Naval Operations, insisted that Chapter XXII, entitled "Retrospect," be included as a condition for publication.

The reader must bear in mind that Joe Richardson, to an extent unmatched in this century, had been personally groomed by FDR for the top operating job in the Fleet. The salient facts, as developed in the book, are summarized as follows (Admiral Richardson is the narrator):

**1.** "I held in my hand a piece of paper [just after leaving the White House on 9 March 1939]. It had just been handed to me by President Franklin D. Roosevelt":

| Office                    | Relief |
|---------------------------|--------|
| CNO Leahy retires 1 month | Stark  |
| after Congress adjourns   |        |

2. "I knew Rear Admiral Harold R. (Betty) Stark [at that time Commander of Cruisers, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet] very well. He was very capable, hard-working and one of the best-intentioned officers in the navy, as well as one of the most likeable. I believed then, and believe now, that his capacities, although marked, were not equal to those required by the Chief of Naval Operations billet, under conditions then existing.

"I believed also that few, if any, other senior officers in the Navy could have served the President so long and so satisfactorily as did Admiral Stark."

Two and a half years later, Executive Order 8984, which prescribed the duties of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Cooperative Duties of the Chief of Naval Operations, made Ernest J. King COMINCH. Stark, although remaining as CNO, had his wings significantly clipped. To all intents and purposes, King became the top uniformed officer of the Navy. King assumed his new post on 30 December 1941. This marked the beginning of the end for Harold Stark. Ultimately, he was "kicked upstairs," to a post in London. Thus Joe Richardson's appraisal of Stark proved prophetic.

**3.** On page 251, Adm. Richardson begins a discussion of War Plans, expressing this thought: ". . . It has seemed to me that the very real part of our pre-Pearl Harbor War Plans played in the Pacific War has never been sufficiently pinpointed." Richardson devotes many pages to a discussion of the evolution of War Plans—a field in which he enjoyed a recognized expertise.

On 26 January 1940, within three weeks of taking command of the U.S. Fleet, Richardson wrote to Stark and expressed the view that the Orange War Plans were unrealistic. He pointed out to Stark: "... You are the principal and only Naval Adviser to the boss and he should know that our Fleet cannot just sail away, lick Orange, and be back at home in a year or so. Also the probable cost (human and physical resources) of any war should be compared [with] the probable value of winning the war."

The Orange War Plans had been in effect since 1927 and little had been done to provide the Navy with the special resources needed to project major Fleet Operations any significant distance west of Hawaii. The fact is that FDR and the bureaucrats in Washington were concerned more with events in Europe and the Atlantic Ocean than they were with the Pacific Ocean area.

In any event, by July 1941, after strenuous urging by Adm. Richardson, the Orange War Plans were shelved in favor of the Rainbow War Plans. In mid-October 1940 Richardson wrote an official letter to Stark, pointing out that it was Richardson's firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan. Two months passed before Stark replied to this letter.

**Richardson comments:** 

My own belief is that Stark was not pleased by my official letter of 22 October 1940... I believe my official letter of October 22, 1940, in ragard to the dismal state of the Navy's War Plans, was probably one factor which made Stark accept with equanimity the President's urge to have me relieved.

**4.** The basing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor followed Fleet Problem XXI, which began on 2 April 1940, and was to have been completed on 9 May 1940, with the Fleet projected to return to the West Coast about 17 May 1940. In fact these plans were changed in Washington and Richardson was instructed to remain in Hawaiian waters. Richardson concludes Chapter XV with this statement: ". . . Basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor in May of 1940 was undertaken under a completly false premise, in my opinion. The false premise was that the Fleet so positioned would exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan."

The reviewer believes that Richardson-more than anyone in Washington-knew the state of readiness of the Fleet, and thus why it was essential that it return to the West Coast. In this regard, please note Richardson's wisdom in pointing out:

... In 1940, the policy-making branch of the Government in foreign affairs—the President and the Secretary of State—thought that stationing the Fleet in Hawaii would restrain the Japanese. They did not ask their senior military advisors whether it would accomplish such an end. They imposed their decision upon them.

It should be noted that Richardson has not in any way suggested that FDR deliberately stationed the Fleet at Pearl in order to "bait" the Japanese to attack. Such an implication might be derived from a similar set of facts, but Richardson, to his dying day, remained a dedicated naval officer, not a politician, thereby embodying the highest traditions of the Navy. One might wish that the Washington bureaucracy had among its number more men of the caliber of Joe Richardson.

**5.** Richardson risked his career by making two trips to Washington in order to confront the President personally on key issues of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Richardson expressed the danger of keeping a Fleet at Pearl, in view of his serious skepticism concerning its readiness. During his second visit Richardson told Roosevelt:

Mr. President, I feel that I must tell you that the senior officers of the Navy do not have the trust and confidence in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific. In view of what took place on 7 December 1941, who will judge whether or not the terrible loss of life and material damage suffered could have been avoided had the President and Stark paid greater heed to Richardson? At least we know that the brave men and women who make up Pearl Harbor Survivors Association have satisfied themselves that Kimmel and Short are not to blame [see p. 250 of this journal -Ed.].

**6.** The CINCUS post had customarily been held by its incumbent for a period of 18-24 months. Richardson was detached after barely 12 months, on 31 January 1941. His relief was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel.

7. One of the alleged failures of Kimmel was in not conducting longrange aerial reconnaissance. Regarding this we are told by Richardson that it was Stark's adverse reaction to Richardson's practice of long-range reconnaissance that prompted calling off this practice. In fact, Richardson received a letter from Stark on 23 December 1940 in which Stark said: "... While the extent of security measures required is increasing, it has not yet reached the demand of full wartime security." Under the circumstances, it was logical for Richardson to conclude:

So, I believed that some of the responsibility for the failure to have daily long-range air reconnaissance as part of the daily routine in 1941 at Pearl Harbor lies directly on the doorstep of the CNO. Having been told by the Commander-in-Chief that daily long-range reconnaissance would be carried out, he said it "was not necessary."

**8.** One might profitably read, in parallel, Admiral Kimmel's story.<sup>2</sup> This serves to confirm how the defenses of the Pacific Fleet were short-changed significantly in favor of both the Atlantic Fleet and the Philippines, to the detriment of the Pacific Fleet.

**9.** It will be recalled that Admiral Arthur Radford, while serving as CNO, was adamant that the Richardson book include a final chapter (XXII), "Retrospect." Readers of the Richardson book are urged to pay special heed to this final chapter. Among others points made are the following:

a. "I consider that, after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel received the rawest of raw deals from Franklin D. Roosevelt and, insofar as they acquiesced in this treatment, from Frank Knox and 'Betty' Stark."

b. "I consider 'Betty' Stark, in failing to ensure that Kimmel was furnished with all the information from the breaking of Japanese dispatches, to have been, to a marked degree, professionally negligent in carrying out his duties as Chief of Naval Operations. This offense was compounded, since in writing he had assured the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet twice (both myself and Kimmel) that the Commander-in-Chief was 'being kept advised on all matters within his own (Stark's) knowledge' and 'You may rest assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it along.'"

c. Since the Navy had expected and planned for a Japanese surprise attack for many years, it must be kept in mind that subordinates in a military organization cannot stand with their arms raised in protective alertness forever. It is the superior who must ring the bell to move subordinates into the ring. Kimmel's superiors in Washington never rang that bell. Stark could have picked up the phone and given Kimmel a last minute alert on the morning of 7 December 1941. By failing to do so, Stark committed a major professional lapse. In Richardson's opinion, Stark utterly failed to display loyalty downward. This could only be explained if Stark acted under the mistaken impression he owed no loyalty downward and this may have been due to either to influence or direct orders from above.

Richardson concludes this section with an all-important statement:

I am impelled to believe that sometime prior to December 7, the President had directed that only Marshall could send any warning message to the Hawaiian area. I do not know this to be a fact and I cannot prove it. I believe this because of my knowledge of Stark and the fact that his means of communication with Kimmel were equal to, if not superior to those available to Marshall for communication with Short. He made no effort to warn Kimmel on the morning of December 7, but referred the matter to Marshall. [Emphasis added].

d. Placing the onus for the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor on Kimmel and Short, in effect, placed it on the Army and the Navy. For this reason it is pertinent to emphasize the extent to which, as Richardson observes: "... the seasoned officers of the navy over a twenty-year period had correctly diagnosed the aspirations and intentions and war habits of the Japanese."

As far back as 1 February 1934, when Richardson was a student at the War College, he submitted a thesis entitled: The Relationship between Japanese Policy and Strategy in the Chinese and Russian Wars, and Its Lessons to Us. In his thesis Richardson pointed out that in these wars the complete harmony and effective strategy of the Japanese are not to be found in the wars themselves, but in the preparations for these wars. It was in Japan's participation in conferences, peace and otherwise, that we find the harmony. Richardson predicted the same would be true with respect to naval conferences which Japan would hold with us. It would be the United States that through concessions would sink her modern fleet and bind herself not to fortify any possessions west of Hawaii. In return, the U.S. would get no permanent compensating advantage. This is precisely what happened as a result of naval conferences.

To carry out the Orange War Plans, the U.S. would need a strong "train," i.e., the various auxiliaries, including repair ships, ammunition ships, refrigerator ships and above all oilers. Interestingly, during the peacetime years between World War I and World War II, the strong "peace" groups in Congress believed that the best way to keep the U.S. in its own backyard was to prevent the navy from building up an appropriate train. It is for this reason that Richardson, early on in his letters to Stark, pointed out how unrealistic were the Orange War Plans.

e. The Roberts Commission. According to Richardson it was Felix Frankfurter, then on the U.S. Supreme Court, who suggested to FDR the creation, under a carefully drawn precept, of a mixed commission composed of officers of the armed forces, with a civilian counsel and headed by a member of the Supreme Court, to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor. Such a commission would not be led by rules of evidence governing a civilian court or a military court of inquiry. In the opinion of Richardson, the report of the Roberts Commission was: ". . . the most unfair, unjust, and deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government Printing Office."

Richardson finds that the military members of the Roberts Commission were: "... later rewarded for their services by favorable assignment and promotion, for employment after retirement." Richardson tells us that the decision to relieve Kimmel and Short was made prior to the initial meeting of the Roberts Commission. In effect, the Roberts Commission could not have been intended to determine culpability or blamelessness, since that had been decided beforehand.

According to Richardson:

A more disgraceful spectacle has never been presented to this country during my lifetime than the failure of the civilian officials of the Government to show any willingness to take their share of responsibility for the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor.

When reference is made in books and articles by academic historians—and even by high government officials, including the military, of dereliction of duty by men such as Kimmel and Short—without their having been given a trial, permitted to introduce evidence or being represented by counsel, we are in effect departing from those rules of jurisprudence which our constitution guarantees even the meanest criminal in our midst.

Finally, Richardson points out that he had known Admiral William H. Standely for a long time. He knew Standley as an honest,

fair-minded, sincere man and valued his friendship. This is precisely why Standely was chosen to be a member of the Roberts Commission, in order to induce the United States Navy to have confidence in the justness of the Roberts Commission findings. Below we shall discuss the Naval Court of Inquiry on Pearl Harbor and an incident involving Adm. Richardson.

f. Richardson observes that while Japan commenced its war with Russia in 1904 after breaking off diplomatic relations, but before a formal declaration of war, at Pearl Harbor, Japan did not bother to break off diplomatic relations beforehand. To Richardson, FDR "... consistently overestimated his ability to control the actions of other nations whose interests opposed our own." Richardson believes the President's responsibility was direct, real and personal insofar as Pearl Harbor is concerned.

(When we consider the moral values of Franklin D. Roosevelt, we should not overlook his plan for judicial reorganization presented to the Congress on 5 February 1937. It was no more and no less than a plan to bring the third branch of government under popular control. Regardless of the willfulness of the justices in opposing New Deal legislation, is the step pursued by FDR one of which we can approve? The fact is that FDR was, to say the least, a willful man, who did not readily brook opposition. This quality of Roosevelt may help us understand his behavior in the Pearl Harbor controversy.)

g. In his final chapter, Richardson pays a special tribute to Congressman Carl Vinson. Richardson has this to say:

I have known the Honorable Carl Vinson since 1914 and I cannot forego the opportunity to pay my respects to him, because I firmly believe that his service to the Navy and the nation renders him one of the great living Americans.

Carl Vinson of Georgia, (1883-1981) served in Congress from 1919 to 1964, a period of 45 years. During this period two very important pieces of legislation are ascribed to Vinson. The first is the Naval Parity Act of 27 March 1934 authorizing the building of a full treatystrength Navy within the limits set by the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Limitation Treaty of 1930. A hundred warships and more than a thousand planes were provided for. However, Congress did not appropriate adequate funds, and until 1938 construction was carried out only on a replacement basis.

On 17 May 1938 the Vinson Naval Expansion Act was passed, authorizing a "two-ocean" Navy to be constructed over the next ten years. Thus, much of what was accomplished in strengthening the Navy can be attributed to the efforts of Carl Vinson, a man known to Naval officials as "Daddy" Vinson—in many ways the father of the Navy of his day. If Joe Richardson believed that Harold Stark was failing to present to FDR the Naval view of its own readiness for war, there is relevance in the fact that Carl Vinson, in July 1940, expressed to Richardson a grave concern as to whether or not Stark was, in fact, standing up to the president.

## **Revisionist Versus Anti-Revisionist**

So far as the Pearl Harbor disaster is concerned, the writing in the field, especially by academicians, serves the very useful purpose of accentuating the need for a consideration of truth in history.

In Volume Four, Number Four/Winter 1983-84 issue of The Journal of Historical Review, the Editor's Note entitled: "Pearl Harbor: The Latest Wave," is an excellent summation of the writing in the field. There is no need for this writer to duplicate this information in the note.

As the note points out, John Toland's Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath,<sup>3</sup> is remarkable for the fact that the author: ". . . had for many years been recognized as a certifiably "Establishment, 'safe' historian not known to hold any brief for the Revisionists in pinning blame on FDR and his Administration."

Soon after the appearance of Toland's *Infamy*, one Roger Pineau was quoted in the Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene<sup>4</sup> in calling Toland's book: ". . . a specious representation" of the case against President Roosevelt's handling of events leading to the Japanese attack of December 1941. It so happens that Pineau is a naval historian, a former intelligence officer, a Japanese linguist, and a former aide to Samuel Eliot Morison in the writing of the naval history of World War II.

Pineau had met Edwin T. Layton, also a Japanese language officer and the Pacific fleet intelligence officer under a succession of three Pacific Fleet Commanders: Joe Richardson, Husband Kimmel, and Chester Nimitz. Following the end of the war, Edwin Layton began to put his notes in order for a possible memoir. In 1980, it so happened that a massive amount of previously classified naval records, concerning communications intelligence, was made available at the National Archives.

Pineau and John Costello, the British author of *The Pacific War*,<sup>5</sup> began to assist Layton, then in his early 80's. In April 1984, Layton suffered a fatal stroke and his widow turned to Pineau and Costello to complete the task. The book was completed and published posthumously in 1985.<sup>6</sup> What is so very remarkable about this whole episode is the fact that two such arch anti-Revisionists were so readily transformed into champions of one of the most important accounts of Revisionist literature dealing with Pearl Harbor. In fact, it can be said that anyone seeking an understanding of what happened at Pearl Harbor can readily master the subject by reading

the four books published by Joe Richardson, Ed Layton, Husband Kimmel, and finally, Kemp Tolley's Cruise of the Lanikai.<sup>7</sup>

It should be noted as well that the Layton memoirs also make mention of how the significant victory at Midway was achieved, owing to the cooperation between the brilliant Joseph Rochefort, the radio intelligence officer at Pearl and his counterpart, Ed Layton, the fleet intelligence officer.

Ironically, it is the former anti-Revisionists, Pineau and Costello, who disclose in their authors' notes just how flimsy is the foundation of Gordon W. Prange's book, At Dawn We Slept.<sup>8</sup>

The publication of the Layton memoirs has furthermore the very definite tendency to undermine the importance of Roberta Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision,<sup>9</sup> which had, since its publication, been hailed as "the definitive book" on Pearl Harbor.

In reality, not much remains of the anti-Revisionist attempt to enshrine Franklin D. Roosevelt in Valhalla. But the task ahead is to clear the names of Husband E. Kimmel and Walter C. Short, the Pearl Harbor commanders scapegoated to deflect criticism from FDR and his lieutenants.

#### **Unfinished Business**

The Navy Court of Inquiry, consisting of Orin G. Murfin, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), President; Edward C. Kalbfus, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Member; Adolphus Andrews, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Member; Harold Biesemeier, Captain, U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate, met between 20 July 1944 and 20 October 1944. The net result of the Court's inquiry is the complete exoneration of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel while serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet on 7 December 1941. We single out for special mention this portion of the Opinion:

Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgement expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, he did not transmit immediately information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.<sup>10</sup>

Appended to the Navy Court of Inquiry's Opinion and Recommendation were various endorsements, including one from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. With specific respect to Forrestal's endorsement, we turn once again to Adm. Richardson's chapter, entitled "Retrospect," in which he states: The Secretary of the Navy sent for me and told me that he was not satisfied with the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry on Pearl Harbor or with any preceding Inquiry, and that he had so stated to the press, adding that he would have another investigation made.

He then stated that he would like to have me undertake this investigation for him. I said, "Mr. Secretary, I am sorry but I am not available for such assignment, because I am prejudiced and I believe that no prejudiced officer should undertake the inquiry."

The Secretary asked what I meant by the statement that I was prejudiced, and I replied, "I am prejudiced because I believe that any fair and complete investigation will result in placing a part of the blame for the success of the attack upon the President." Mr. Forrestal replied substantially as follows: "In this case the President was to blame only to the extent of being a poor judge of men." The Secretary amplified his remarks by naming one or more officers whose retention in high office for some time indicated bad judgment on the part of the President, but he did not mention Kimmel.

I was not ordered to conduct the investigation.

It is my firm belief that, when the President realized the extent of the damage done by the attack on Pearl Harbor, he lost his nerve and lost his head, and ordered the convening of the Roberts Commission, believing that he would best protect his own position by focusing public attention on Pearl Harbor.

At that time, and increasingly so since, I thought that the wisest course of action for the President, from all points of view, would have been to send a dispatch to those in command at Pearl Harbor, along the following lines:

"Despite the result of the dastardly unprovoked attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, the American people and I have confidence in our Army and Navy. We shall be avenged."

In Richardson's remarks which followed his colloquy with Forrestal, what, in effect, he is suggesting is that a less devious President would have faced up to a disaster which his own bullheadedness had caused by overruling Richardson, a man he had personally groomed to be Pacific Fleet Commander. Well-informed persons, including many uniformed men, knew that the Roberts Commission was a perfidious piece of chicanery, designed to put the onus for Pearl Harbor on those in command at Pearl. It is to FDR's everlasting shame that he behaved in such a dishonorable fashion. It is this deviousness which has brought on nearly a half-century of dedicated effort to bring before the American people the real truth concerning Pearl Harbor. Moreover, a careful reading of biographical material on FDR reveals that his deviousness goes back to earliest childhood, when he resorted to such behavior to wheedle things he sought from a doting mother.

It is both troublesome and inexplicable that Joe Richardson's book was withheld from public view for fifteen years, during which time the academic historians rushed to judgment with a great deal of material, obscuring the truth concerning Pearl Harbor. Moreover, even in more recent years, a book such as Admiral Layton's And I Was There was unmercifully criticized. This notwithstanding the fact that Layton occupied one of the most critical posts in the Pacific Fleet throughout the successful prosecution of the war under both Kimmel and Nimitz. Bear in mind that it was with the help of Layton that the communications intelligence information derived by Joe Rochefort was put to use in time to set an ambush for the attacking Japanese, which made possible the brilliant victory at Midway.

Nevertheless, those who wish to discredit any writer who has a good word to say about Kimmel will permit no obstacle to hinder their undeviating point of view. For example, one Ronald Spector was appointed Director of Naval History on 20 July 1986, placing him in a position where his views on all matters affecting naval history must be as devoid of subjectivity as is humanly possible. In a New York Times book review, Spector joins in the usual anti-Revisionist criticism. It is most unfortunate that a man in the official position of Naval Historian should indulge in such groundless criticism.

This brings us to a final and most important point to be discussed in this article. Reference is made to the circumstances under which the Richardson book was published by the Naval History division, the director of which was Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, U.S.N. (Ret.). Admiral Hooper wrote the introduction. In the course of his introduction, Admiral Hooper has this to say:

Insofar as lessons for the future are concerned, no historical example is of greater importance than that of the decisions and events in the period leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack.

As had others before him, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt directed deployments of the Fleet as a part of his overall national peacetime strategy. Rather than deterring the Japanese from aggressive actions, the maintenance of a major portion of the fleet at Pearl Harbor was viewed by the then militaristic leaders of Japan as an opportunity to cripple U.S. naval power in the Pacific. As she decided to launch the devastating carrier air attack of 7 December 1941, Japan had memories of the decisive results of the battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War and of territorial acquisitions made possible by the diversion of the western navies to meet the needs of warfare in Europe and the Atlantic during World War I. In 1941, with Europe again in the throes of all-out war, only the American Navy could prevent fulfillment of ambitions of establishing a "Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

In this volume, completed (except for editorial work) in 1958, Admiral J. O. Richardson records his recollections and views, concentrating mainly on the years from 1939 to 1942. He devotes considerable attention to war plans, to his efforts to obtain adequate manning for the Fleet, to his concern over the effects of the prolonged Hawaiian deployment in degrading Fleet readiness for war, and to the disagreement with the President that led to his being relieved as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet . . .

While the primary value of this book has to do with decisions and events in the months before the Japanese attack, Admiral Richardson has included material on other periods of his long and eventful naval career, thus providing valuable insights with regard to a changing navy from the turn of the twentieth century to World War II.

Mr. Edward J. Marolda of our Operational Archives, working under the direction of Dr. Dean C. Allard, located and verified sources that were cited, undertook a number of editorial tasks in conjunction with Vice Admiral Dyer, and performed other functions associated with the publication of this book. However, the Naval History Division has made no attempt to pass judgment on the views expressed in this volume; they are solely those of Admiral Richardson. With the full realization that, for a complete picture or an overall evaluation of the decision and events of the time, it will be necessary to draw also upon additional source materials and the opinions of others involved, the work is published, in the expectation that it will provide valuable contributions to naval history.

Every reader of this paper will be asked to search his mind and conscience and respond to this question: Would it be ethical for the Naval History Division which accepted a manuscript from an outstanding Pacific Fleet commander in 1958-thirty years in the past-to disavow in 1988 its imprimatur on the fundamental thesis of the work?

#### Notes

- 1. Martin Merson, "On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor" Officer Review (The Military Order of the World Wars, 6 (January 1988).
- 2. Husband E. Kimmel, Adm. Kimmel's Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955).
- 3. John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (New York, Doubleday & Company, 1982).
- 4. Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene: A Bi-Monthly Newsletter/Book Review, Volume 1, No. 4, August 1982.
- 5. John Costello, The Pacific War (New York, Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc., 1981).
- 6. Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.), with Captain Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret.), and John Costello, "And I Was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway–Breaking the Secrets (New York, William Morrow and Company, 1985).
- 7. Kemp Tolley, Cruise of the Lanikai (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1973).
- 8. Gordon W. Prange in collaboration with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981).

- 9. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor Warning and Decision (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962).
- 10 Opinion, Navy Court of Inquiry.
- 11. Ronald H. Spector, review of *And I Was There*, by Edwin T. Layton, with Roger Pineau and John Costello in the *New York Times*, 5 January 1986, p. 9.



At last, an inside look at Adolf Hitler-his personality, his ideas, his political theory and practice---by an intimate aide motivated neither by greed nor the desire to curry favor with Hitler's victorious enemies. Otto Wagener was a close companion and adviser to the Fuehrer during the years 1929-1933, the critical period in which Hitler's small fringe party surged to prominence as Germany's greatest political movement, then took unchallenged power in the Third Reich. These memoirs, written during Wagener's postwar internment in a British POW camp, give an unprecedented insight into Hitler's charisma for leadership, his mastery of detail, and his uncanny genius as a tactician and strategist of power. Wagener's controversial views of Hitler and his followers, his evewitness story of never-before-told details of Hitler's rise to power, are yours in this classic memoir, edited and with an introduction



Wagener leaves the Leipzig courthouse with Hitler in September 1930 after having given testimony in the treason trial of the "Ulm lieutenants," three army officers who were prosecuted and convicted for Nazi agitation among the troops.

by Yale historian Henry A. Turner, Jr., an expert on the Third Reich. Paperback, index, illustrations, 333 pp. \$13.95.

ORDER FROM: The Institute for Historical Review, 18221/2 Newport Blvd., Suite 191, Costa Mesa, CA 92627.

# **Book Reviews**

# WALDHEIM by Luc Rosenzweig and Bernard Cohen. New York: Adama Books, 1987, 183 pp., \$17.95, ISBN: 1-55774-010-0.

#### Reviewed by John M. Ries

Waldheim is the first book in English to deal with the controversy surrounding Austria's current President. It has much that is thought-provoking, but, unfortunately, it contains too many errors to justify any pretensions it may have to credibility. The omission of details, the proliferation of factual discrepancies, the frequency of non sequiturs, and the abundance of what could be typographical errors force one to question how this book, in its present condition, could have gotten by its publishers.

Waldheim's unforgiveable sloppiness of style aside, what of the substance of the book? It seems that the book's main objective is to determine the rationale for Kurt Waldheim's propensity for withholding certain episodes in his past. To accomplish this a rather intensive historical investigation is undertaken to show that Waldheim's repeated bouts of amnesia are only symptomatic of an equally chronic memory lapse on the part of his native Austria (for also failing to come to terms with its past), and, amazingly, of a good portion of the Western world as well.

If this sounds like a reappearance of the collective-guilt notion, it certainly is, here employed to induce a sense of shame in those nations who, for various reasons, failed to take this "last" opportunity provided by the Waldheim affair, "to attempt a critical review of that period during which Western values degenerated into barbarism." Why this is the "last" opportunity is never explained, and what could have been done to atone properly for such a pervasive memory failure on the part of the international community remains unclear.

It is also interesting to note that Israel is seriously criticized for showing "in a deliberate way... a suspect complacency with regard to this man..." How the Israelis, the principal guardians of the world's conscience with respect to the "Holocaust," managed to avoid their responsibilities is too complicated to relate adequately here. But it inevitably raises the key question of this book: namely, how seriously must the memory lapses of Kurt Waldheim be taken if the state of Israel refused to make an issue of them?

Authors Rosenzweig and Cohen's grasp of Waldheim's prewar Austrian milieu is no less shaky. In attempting to describe the extent of anti-Jewish feeling in Austria during the inter-war period, the authors introduce what could have been a most important and interesting section of the book, entitled "The Tradition of Anti-Semitism," with the passage: "Austria between the wars was also the European country which displayed the most varied range of anti-Semites and the most diverse forms of anti-Semitism." Unfortunately, however, they fail to mention one example of anti-Semitic activity proper to Austria during this period. Karl Lueger, the mayor of Vienna around the turn-of-the-century, and Hitler are included, neither of whom had anything to do with anti-Semitism in Austria during the inter-war years. Lueger had died in 1910 and Hitler's career is proper to German history following the First World War, at least from the standpoint of the scene of his political activity and triumphs.

As mentioned earlier, the numerous flaws in the text of this book require that any discussion of it must deal with the question of credibility. To point them all out in any detail would be beyond the scope of this review, so I shall cover some of the more important ones.

A key section of this book deals with Waldheim's so-called "hidden years," that portion of his past he omitted from his biographies, including his service as a Wehrmacht officer in the Balkans from 1942 to 1945. Since the purpose here is to show that Oberleutnant Waldheim was not dallying away his time putting the finishing touches on his doctoral dissertation, as he had previously claimed, a great deal of attention must be paid to exactly what he was doing. His duties included acting as a translator when the Italians were allied with Germans in their mutual operations in the Balkans, and serving as a deputy intelligence officer (03) when the Italians when the Italians were no longer allies. Information from the Yugoslavian War Crimes Commission report on Waldheim is used to show that during the retreat of the German army between mid-October 1944 and May 1945, Kurt Waldheim's "job at headquarters was sufficient to prove that the reprisals [against Serbian partisans] were conducted on his recommendation."

No "smoking gun" is found, however, and when one believes Oberleutnant Waldheim is near Kosovska Mitrovica in Yugoslavia "organizing reprisals," suddenly he's back in Greece surveying "gang activity" in a zone south of Heraklion in Crete. This abrupt shift is indicative of the confusion characteristic of this section of the account, for if the activities of Waldheim in Yugoslavia are under investigation here, why are his involvements in Greece suddenly tossed in? The fact is, the reader of this book cannot always be sure precisely where this highly elusive individual is to be found.

Waldheim's alleged involvement in the deportation of the Jews of Salonika is the source of some rather confusing anomalies. The precise problem is to determine his role (if any) in this grisly affair. The heart of the confusion lies in the dates given for the deportations. At one point it is said that they began on March 15, 1943. However, the communities involved at this time are given as Florina, Verria, and Langada, respectively. Salonika is not specifically mentioned. Earlier the text says that Waldheim "arrived at his new posting at Arsakli [near Salonika] two weeks after the Jews of Salonika had begun to be sent to concentration camps [sic]." The date given for his arrival is March 31, 1943. So far so good. Yet at this point the text says that historical evidence is lacking to establish what he was doing the first two months of his new assignment. "The gap is worrying, because it coincides with the start of the deportation operations against the Jews of Salonika." But if these began two weeks before Waldheim arrived at his new posting, then he could not have possibly been involved in them at the outset.

The confusion, however, does not end here. The chronology at the back of the book lists the deportation of the Jews of Salonika as taking place from July to August 1943. It also says Oberleutnant Waldheim arrived at Arsakli in July of that year. These dates are, it need scarcely be said, at variance with those given in the text.

One final note on the deportations, although this has no direct bearing on Waldheim's activities. A figure of 800,000 is given for the total number of Jews deported from Greece during World War Two. This number was taken from A. Kedros, La Résistance grecque, Robert Laffont, pp. 316-318. According, however, to the minutes of the conference of German leaders held at the Berlin suburb of Wannsee on January 20, 1942, where, among other things, demographic figures of the Jewish population of Europe by individual country were discussed, a total of 69,600 was given for Greece. Other reliable sources confirm that there were fewer than 100,000 Jews living in Greece in the early 1930s. Where this 800,000 figure was acquired is problematic, but in any case the authors of this book must be criticized for not confirming its veracity.

Some rather irritating misspellings, such as Schoñerer Zukunft for Schönerer Zukunft, an influential periodical in Austria during the 1930s, and wrong dates, e.g., 1920 as the date for the Revolution of the Councils of Bavaria, all detract from the credibility of this book.

The overall effect of these and the other problems adverted to earlier is comparable to that of a news account hurriedly prepared to meet a deadline and lacking adequate proofreading. Since this is the first book to deal with the Waldheim affair in English, there is still hope that a more sober and accurate rendering, free from the passions of the event itself, will be forthcoming. We await that possibility with great anticipation.

# STALIN'S WAR: A RADICAL NEW THEORY OF THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR BY Ernst Topitsch. Translated by A. and B.E. Taylor. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987, 160 pages, \$19.95, ISBN: 0-312-0989-5.

**Reviewed by Dennis Nayland Smith** 

Can there be any real doubt who was the prime mover in the tumultuous events of 1933-1945? From the vast majority of professional historians to Joe and Sue Sixpack glued to their boob tube, the answer is, "Hitler, of course." According to this universally accepted view, Hitler, joined by Mussolini and the Japanese warlords, cunningly orchestrated the political and military incidents which led to the outbreak of the Second World War.

But even this truism is now coming under attack by Revisionists. Prominent among those questioning the role played by Hitler is Ernst Topitsch, whose book, *Stalin's War*, has just appeared in English translation in the United States, published by the respected St. Martin's Press.

Topitsch is a graduate of the University of Vienna, a member of the Paris Institute of Philosophy, and a professor at Graz University in Austria. Simply stated, his well-argued thesis is that Stalin, not Hitler, was the central figure of the war. The author summarizes the evolution of his thinking on these matters at the outset of his study:

In line with prevailing opinion, for many years I considered Hitler to be the main character in the drama of the Second World War, and held his policy of violent expansion and aggression to be the most important cause of its outbreak. Yet a more thorough analysis of the interplay of the main events has led me to the conviction that at the very least this viewpoint needed a radical modification. It became more and more apparent that Stalin was not only the real victor, but also the key figure in the war; he was, indeed, the only statesman who had at the time a clear, broadly based idea of his objectives.

Following the end of the First World War, Lenin concluded that the war had been just a prelude to further imperialist wars, which would eventually lead to the final victory of socialism world-wide. In a speech given in 1920, Lenin outlined how Germany and Japan could be used to provoke another war within the "capitalist camp."

Stalin pursued Lenin's strategy. The Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939—which granted Hitler cover by the Red Army on the Eastern Front—was intended to encourage Hitler to open hostilities. Stalin was delighted with the German invasion of France. The "imperialist war" had finally broken out in earnest; Stalin stepped up deliveries of raw materials to Germany. Topitsch observes that, "In the Kremlin it was at first expected that there would be long-drawn-out battles with a heavy rate of attrition—as in the First World War—in the course of which the two sides would go on destroying each other until general exhaustion brought about a revolutionary situation." However, Germany's stunning victory over the Low Countries and France—within a matter of weeks—came as a real shock.

A new situation now presented itself to Stalin: if the German Army were defeated, the Soviets could be masters of Europe. As the author points out, given the inaccessibility of Kremlin archives, "it cannot be stated exactly when the decision was made to embark on this strategy." Topitsch is convinced that Stalin set out to provoke Hitler to attack the Soviet Union, just as Franklin Roosevelt maneuvered Japan into "firing the first shot."

Topitsch contends that regardless of what Hitler did, Stalin was preparing to attack Germany, most likely in 1942. He is not alone in suggesting that Stalin was planning a military offensive against the West. Grigore Gafencu, Romania's sometime foreign minister and ambassador to the USSR during the war, felt that Stalin had secretly provoked Germany into attacking. More recently, Brian Fugate, in a revision of his University of Texas doctoral dissertation, published as Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Presidio Press, 1984), makes the case that Soviet armaments production and military dispositions facing western Europe are a sure sign that the Soviets were intending to launch an offensive against the West.

While "Operation Barbarossa"—as Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union was codenamed—did not catch Stalin unawares, the German military victories during the summer and fall of 1941 were unexpected and thwarted Stalin's ambitious plans for a rapid counterattack to the west. The war dragged on, and the British and Americans established themselves in Western Europe before the Red Army could reach the English Channel. If Stalin's aspirations were not fully realized, the outcome of the war does not detract from Topitsch's theory that "the Second World War was only a phase—though an important one—in the realization of Lenin's grand strategy to subjugate the capitalist or 'imperialist' nations—in other words, all those which had not yet undergone the process of Sovietization."

Topitsch's book is not without its flaws, particularly in A. and B.E. Taylor's translation. On page 23, one encounters the odd formulation "Faced by the notorious dwindling of party funds during the war . . .," in connection with Hitler's turning for donations to "nationalist, conservative, and 'capitalist circles." Clearly by "war" the end phase of Hitler's struggle for political power in Germany is meant, not the Second World War, as an unsuspecting reader might reasonably conclude. One also wonders if the author believes that fascism is "the most extreme form of capitalism" (p. 27).

The translators' capricious usage in anglicizing German and Russian names is bothersome as well. For "Moldavia and Wallachia" we read "Moldau and Wallachei," while the Vistula and Narew Rivers are rendered as "Weichsel" (German) and "Narev" (?). Transliteration of Russian names generally straddles proper German and English usage, so that the reader encounters, instead of "Zhukov" or "Schukow," the translators' "Schukov." There are an irritating number of typos as well, such as "Nersky" for "Nevsky" and "Frisch" for "Fritsch."

Nevertheless, Stalin's War provides new and significant insights into our political understanding of World War II. Most followers of this journal will find it provocative reading.

# AN AMERICAN IN EXILE: THE STORY OF ARTHUR RUDOLPH by Thomas Franklin. Huntsville, Alabama: Christopher Kaylor Company, 1987. 366 pages, \$16.95, Hb., ISBN 0-916039-04-8.

#### **Reviewed by Robert H. Countess**

In the spring of 1986 I had the pleasure of interviewing several men who played key roles in the German rocket development program and in the subsequent American space program, which has taken us to the moon and far beyond. The program was one that I named "The Marketplace of Ideas" and it aired regularly over Huntsville's public radio station, WLRH.

My first guest was author Mitch Sharpe, who co-authored, with Fred Ordway, The Rocket Team (Crowell, 1979), the major treatment of Wernher von Braun and his colleagues at Peenemünde. Sharpe, who lives in Huntsville, is now at work on a manuscript dealing with "the other rocket team," the hundred or more German scientists who were taken to the Soviet Union under contract for a specified time. After these "lesser lights" had fulfilled their duties, the Soviets allowed them to return to their homes.

The other guests were Drs. Georg von Tiesenhausen, Ernst Stuhlinger, and Walter Häussermann, also members of the Peenemünde team, who live in Huntsville. Stuhlinger is a four-time winner of the prestigious Humboldt Award, given by the Alexander von Humboldt Society in the German Federal Republic. He appears in the "Acknowledgments" of James Michener's Space. He studied under Drs. Hans Geiger (of "Geiger counter" fame) and atomic physicist Werner Heisenberg. In my introduction to the program with Stuhlinger I remarked that in view of the emphasis given to February as "Black History Month," it might also be justified to denote other months for special emphasis. I suggested a "Teutonic-Germanic History Month" and indicated that, as a history teacher, if I were confronted with the dilemma of choosing which people has made the greatest contribution to Western Civilization, the ancient Greeks or the modern-to-contemporary Germans, I would have a very difficult time deciding—an infelicitous dilemma. For the modern period the Germans (to include the Dutch, et al.) would be selected hands down. From the ancient period, the Greeks.

I then cited the anti-German misanthropes Theodore Kaufman and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. (one could even include his father), whose infamous plan for the genocide of Germans is well known. For the former see Time magazine's March 24, 1941 (page 95) review of Germany Must Perish; for the latter see Germany Is Our Problem (Harper, 1945). It is too bad that these two genocidalists are not around to be hauled into court so that the United States can implement the Senate approved "Genocide Convention" of 1986. I can hardly think of two more suitable candidates for such a trial.

Dr. Stuhlinger indicated that after he had returned from the Russian Front and joined the von Braun team, he received notice one day that he had become a member of the National Socialist Party and that about two dollars a month would be taken out of his pay. This is of interest in that after the war, these gentlemen were categorized by some U.S. intelligence officers as "ardent Nazis." Later, their files were altered to "Not an ardent Nazi." This alteration-insertion has been used by the Nazi-hunter vigilantes to "prove" that the U.S. altered the records so that these "murderers" could be brought to the U.S. to aid our rocket effort. It is most unfortunate that Neal Sher, Eli Rosenbaum, and Allan Ryan, Jr. – all highly paid zealots in the Justice Department's OSI (Office of Special Investigations)–are not analytically minded types, or they might have been able to view matters more intelligently.

Stuhlinger noted that in his experience "ardent Nazis" were not sent to the Russian front. He also stated that he, Arthur Rudolph and Dr. von Braun were particularly interested in developing rockets to go to the moon. His own desire stemmed from a space fantasy movie he saw as a youth. The German Army had missiles of destruction in mind. When he came to the U.S. and to Ft. Bliss, Texas, he again wanted to work on moon rocketry, but the U.S. Army wanted missiles for destruction. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. When the Soviets put Sputnik into space and the U.S. was feverishly lamenting its second place in the space race, Stuhlinger said that the German scientists—now in Huntsville—pulled out their drawings which they had worked on over the decades (beginning at Peenemünde!) and began to work in earnest on space rocketry.

On February 23, 1987, PBS Television aired a "documentary" on the German rocket scientists that was so obviously a diatribe against these great Americans that one wonders why it was not aired on "Show Time" or "MTV." It was called "Front Line," and Dr. Stuhlinger watched it aghast. He remarked over my radio program that it was "full of inaccuracies and misconceptions." One wonders why the producers did not send someone to Huntsville to interview these clear-minded scientists for their version of events, especially since Sher and Rosenbaum were either very young or not yet born at the time of the war.

I asked Dr. Stuhlinger why he thought the OSI went after Dr. Rudolph. He conjectured that it may have been his advanced age and ill health. Earlier, Neal Sher had contacted two other German scientists here in Huntsville, and asked them for statements about Peenemünde and the treatment of prisoners. They engaged an attorney, however, who informed Mr. Sher that if he had any questions, these would have to be addressed to his clients through him. The matter was dropped. Many insiders think that had Dr. Rudolph taken this approach from the beginning, he would still be a U.S. citizen, living comfortably near his daughter in California.

Shortly after interviewing Dr. Stuhlinger on "The Marketplace of Ideas," I invited Thomas Franklin, a writer for the Huntsville News, whose twenty-part series on Dr. Arthur Rudolph had appeared during February-March of 1987. He had spent three days interviewing Rudolph in Wellingsbüttel, a suburb of Hamburg, in the fall of 1986. These newspaper fascicles became the first half of the book under review.

The hour-long live interview went very well, and all the phone calls were positive, except for one from a very naive man who assumed that if Rudolph had been a National Socialist, then he ought to be deported. The caller also assumed that the PBS program was accurate and true, etc.

Since I thought Thomas Franklin had just begun to scratch the surface of a topic of great interst to Huntsvillians in general and to the significant German community there, I scheduled him (along with Dr. Walter Häussermann) to return the following Monday and continue. I had not counted, however, on a mid-course change of philosophy by the station's program director, who until then had always been friendly and supportive.

Today I hold the view that someone put inordinate pressure on him. When, the following Monday, my guests and I arrived at the station, we learned that there "had already been too much talk about Dr. Rudolph." The "M.P.I" hour that day carried a canned program instead, and my "career" as a volunteer quickly went downhill. The old reliables were trotted out: I was "neo-Nazi" and, of course, "anti-Semitic."

I then sent a copy of the Franklin interview tape and the newspaper series to National Public Radio's Ann Edwards in Washington. Speaking with her over the phone, I was told that she wanted to do a segment on the Rudolph case. She assured me that she was independent of such intimidation. It is now nearly a year since she declared her interest, and after many phone calls to her, she has not yet followed through on her verbal commitment.

During the month of August, 1987, I met with Dr. and Mrs. Rudolph in their small but comfortable apartment in Germany, and talked with them about their situation. The Rudolphs warmly appreciated my visit. They long to be back in California near their daughter. Most certainly they deplored the tactics by which they had been led to surrender their U.S. citizenship. Sher and OSI have targeted an octogenarian with a bad heart and few resources as a war criminal and a threat to the well-being of the U.S.A.

The Friday evening before I arrived, German television aired yet another "Holocaust" appeal for mesmerized German televiewers. The Rudolphs were particularly upset over the singling out of Rudolph by name by OSI's authority, Eli Rosenbaum, who called him "a murderer."

My personal interest in the Rudolph case goes back to my high school days in Huntsville (1951-55), when the town was a sleepy, typically Southern cotton town of 16,000 people. I quickly became aware of fellow students whose first and last names I could not easily understand or spell. There were Ueter, Tschinkel, Debus, Roth, Stein, and then the hard ones like Ursula, Dieter, Wolfgang, Hans, et al. Some wore sandals and leather shorts and had longish hair styles and just *looked* different. But they were nice, and serious about their studies. I even dated the daughter of Dr. Kurt Debus on a couple of occasions, and I lunched at the home of the Tschinkels, where I saw, for the first time, wheat germ on the table. At first I was apprehensive about taking into my body something called "germ."

Over the years I have made a modest attempt to learn to read and speak German and have traveled to the "Germanies" (including the Federal Republic) seven times, with two years in residence thanks to Uncle Sam's largesse. In recent years, however, I have made a studious effort to learn of the contributing factors to the two great wars of this century, and to understand the present legend known as "the Holocaust."

Thomas Franklin's An American in Exile gives readers a chance to draw their own conclusions as to the facts of Rudolph's past and as to the justice of his treatment at the hands of OSI. The book includes interviews with Dr. Rudolph, his friends, and family members, who related their experiences of trauma in Nazi Germany and the goals and challenges of the space program. There are also included complete transcripts of an OSI interrogation of Rudolph. The latter will enable, I judge, the reader to marvel OSI's audacity in bringing a case against Rudolph.

Sher and Rosenbaum attempted to paint Rudolph with the antisemantic "anti-Semitic" brush, claiming that he held "blind hatred for inferior races." (p. 139.) Rudolph replied:

I told them in the interview that I didn't believe in the German master race. Germany, being in the center of Europe, was at the crossroads of many, many people. It was a melting pot, and the idea of a pure Aryan race is nonsense.

Sher and Rosenbaum damned Rudolph for "his taking schnapps with Camp Commandant Förschner." The reader must always realize that the "Holocaust" mentality of Sher-Rosenbaum assumes that the German camps were by definition "death camps." A commandant, so the syllogism runs, must by definition be a murderer of "martyrs" (if the dead and dying are Jews, that is—when have we been treated to a "Holocaust" miniseries on Gypsies martyred by the Nazis? or Jehovah's Witnesses? or Protestants? or Roman Catholic martyrs?). Lastly, the syllogism concludes that not only was the commandant a war criminal but those Germans who served with him were also murderers and war criminals as well.

Tom Bowers, in The Paper Clip Conspiracy (Little, Brown), describes "The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists." Unfortunately, Bower partakes of the error that "Nazi" means per se "criminal." This error is as faulty, in my opinion, as Adolf Hitler's equating "Jew" with "Bolshevik." Hitler certainly had reasons sufficient to himself to view all Jews as possible enemies of his Reich, inasmuch as world Zionism had declared war on Germany. To this may be added the Jewish religious observance prayer of "next year in Jerusalem." A people who can sincerely keep praying that their G-d will deliver them to another land must see how suspicious this prayer renders them in the eyes of their "host" government.

Bower writes of Rudolph being "100 per cent Nazi, dangerous type, security threat... Suggest internment." This characterization comes from a U.S. government document prepared right after the war. The OSI transcript that Thomas Franklin provides is not, however, available. Franklin got his copy from Dr. Rudolph. One wonders with good reason why Sher and his crew keep their "evidence" from a researcher. One may conclude from reading it that it is because there is nothing incriminating in it.

When Franklin was asked about the Bower quotation, he replied that it was an evaluation rather than a fact. (See the Huntsville Times, January 10, 1988, p. 7C.) Franklin is obviously correct. Would Bower conclude that a Soviet Jew should be barred from entry into the U.S. for praying "next year in Jerusalem," or for having been a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union?

Bower claimed that Rudolph had "quite voluntarily" gone to see the hanging of some inmates, and thus, Rudolph was guilty of something. The transcript of Rudolph's interrogation by the OSI reveals the context, however. At the Mittelwerk production facility there were numerous Russian inmates, some of them "Kapos" controlling other inmates, that is, an "organization within the organization," according to Rudolph. (p. 240.) The order had come down to Rudolph's unit that all work was to cease and that all the inmates inside the tunnel were to assemble in main tunnel number two. The S.S. troops led the inmates to the tunnel where six convicted inmates were hanged. Dr. Rudolph also attended. The OSI claim is that they were murdered because of alleged "sabotage." Rudolph asserted that he understood them to be preparing a "putsch," to take over the facility and kill all the Germans.

The reader of at least average intelligence ought to be able to read this account mindful that a government in time of war will protect itself from putsches as well as from material sabotage of its production facilities. Apparently, Bower and OSI lawyers do not find German opposition to possible putsches and sabotage justifiable. Since the legislation which created OSI deliberately restricted itself to alleged misdeeds by the Germans and their allies during the years 1933 to 1945, we haven't been able to test what OSI's attitude might be to Soviet or Israeli residents in America who had repressed anti-Communist or Palestinian sabotage or uprisings before coming to these shores.

Franklin's book is, to be sure, written in a popular style, but it clearly presents Dr. Rudolph's side of the case, as well as the transcript of his interrogation by OSI. I think that readers will marvel over how those Justice Department bureaucrats treated an American citizen. Some readers may well wonder if this could not happen to them; there are German-Americans in Huntsville who speak of the Rudolph matter reluctantly because of apprehension as to their own status.

The OSI "holy crusade" will no doubt find other victims. Readers would be well advised to learn from Rudolph's too eager willingness to cooperate with this branch of government that one should neither talk nor surrender papers to police agencies like OSI without first contacting an attorney with expertise in this sort of persecution.

One final item should be mentioned. At great personal expense and time, Dr. Friedwardt Winterberg, Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Nevada, studied and interrogated the socalled "witnesses" against Rudolph, having learned of the case from a newspaper. On page 158 is the box score of the nine OSI witnesses on which the case was based.

| Gave unfavorable testimony that was accepted: | 0 |
|---|---|
| Gave unfavorable testimony that was rejected: | 2 |
| Gave favorable testimony:                     | 1 |
| Were mentally unfit to testify:               | 2 |
| Knew nothing about Rudolph:                   | 4 |
| Total   | 9 |

The above data are from the German Federal Republic and are consistent with what Dr. Winterberg could learn. OSI has no credible witnesses and its "star witness" (p. 154) was merely the blacked-out name of Hannelore Bannasch, a secretary whose testimony has been a matter of public record for over forty years. The OSI attempted to represent her as one who could incriminate Rudolph and whose identity needed to be protected!

The Justice Department might instead wish to investigate whether or not Sher and Rosenbaum committed an obstruction of justice by its suppressing evidence from the DDR (East Germany), which, if known at the time of the proceedings against Rudolph, might have exculpated him. It has also been claimed that Attorney General Edwin Meese did not wish to see Dr. Rudolph deported, but that he was under tremendous ideological pressure to comply with the new breed of "witch-hunters" stalking the OSI corridors. Perhaps after a new president assumes office in 1989 and Meese has left, someone can inquire of Meese his thoughts on this matter. Meese will presumably no longer be sensitive to political pressures.

After the Israelis kidnapped Adolf Eichmann and assassinated him after his show trial in Jersualem, the handwriting should have been on the wall. Then the Rudolphs of America would have been justly suspicious of the Justice Department's new "Witch Hunt" suboffice, the OSI, established under Jimmy Carter. The Elizabeth Holtzman amendment that birthed this new era of inquisition also coincided with the demise of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, a committee long opposed by America's Left (Stalinist and otherwise). Here readers may want to consult Lydia Demjanjuk's informative two volumes, Nazi War Criminals in America, available from P.O. Box 31424, Cleveland, OH 44131, \$10. Her brief biographies of Holtzman, Ryan, ex-Congressman and convicted felon Joshua Eilberg, and Rosenbaum make for interesting reading, especially their pro-Soviet sentiments with reference to accepting Soviet "evidence" at face value.

What does the future hold for Dr. Rudolph? He would like very much to return to the U.S. and have his citizenship restored. He is willing to appear before a Senate committee, with a doctor present, and testify as to his mistreatment at the hands of the OSI. Alabama's senior senator, Howell Heflin, has written that he is willing to aid Dr. Rudolph in this pursuit. Rudolph's supporters in Huntsville have worked diligently to this end. Senator Heflin has not carried through on his promise as of this date. One wonders if political considerations may intervene to keep the Senator from becoming involved after all, even though his Alabama constituents like to think themselves independent of the ideological sentiments of Sher and Rosenbaum and their ilk.

Dr. Rudolph is bitter toward the OSI. "I feel persecuted," he told me. But the "Free Soviet Jewry" demonstrators will never take up the cause of Arthur Rudolph. He's merely a German and Germans cannot be persecuted—just deported, imprisoned or assassinated. Rudolph is also puzzled.

It is really hard to understand, but for one thing they have to continue to find people to presecute if they [OSI] are to continue to exist. Then too they may be after revenge. They tried to blame me for the death of Jews. They consider all Germans "Nazis" and hence criminals. I could be wrong, but what else could be the reason? As it says in the Old Testament, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." (p. 160.)

Huntsville attorney Dieter Schrader wrote in a letter to the editor of the Huntsville Times that the reason Dr. Rudolph is now back in Germany is not because he allegedly committed crimes at the Mittelwerk, but because "we don't need him anymore." It sounds as if the attorney has exposed something of an American pragmatist philosophy reminiscent of soldiers' romantic philosophy: "Find 'em, feed 'em, \_\_\_\_\_ 'em, forget 'em." Harsh as that sounds to our noble ears, the rape of Arthur Rudolph sounds far harsher.

# HECKLING HITLER: CARICATURES OF THE THIRD REICH by Zbynek Zeman. Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1987, Pb., 128 pp., illustrated, \$14.95, ISBN 0-87451-403-7.

### Reviewed by Jack Wikoff

Heckling Hitler, a recent selection of the Jewish Book Club, is a Collection of 178 anti-Hitler, anti-National Socialist and anti-German political cartoons of the Weimar Republic and Nazi eras. The author, Zbynek Zeman, lives and teaches in England and has written several books on the propaganda of the Second World War.

This volume of political cartoons, which is accompanied by an extensive text, will be of interest to the Revisionist solely because of its historically curious and valuable illustrations. Unfortunately, the text is riddled with anti-Hitlerian platitudes, unhistorical clichés and myths. Author Zeman displays a complete lack of objectivity throughout his textual commentary.

Zeman is clearly no Germanophile. In the introduction he brazenly claims that Germans have no sense of humor. The reader is repeatedly told that Germany was an ideologically and socially backward nation. From the first chapter, titled "Young Hitler: The Making of a Famous Monster," the following chapters continue in this disparaging vein to discuss chronologically the events which inspired the political cartoons in this volume.

Political caricature has traditionally flourished in mass circulation daily newspapers. The staff cartoonist, working to tight deadlines, produces a visual statement in quick response to rapidly changing news developments. In *Heckling Hitler* the reader is provided with many examples of the Allied view, in caricature, of such events as the burning of the Reichstag, the "Night of the Long Knives," the Spanish Civil War, the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-American alliance with Communist Russia. In retrospect, these political cartoons provide today's historian and student of popular culture with an understanding of how the National Socialist regime was represented to the daily newspaper reader, the "common man" in the Allied nations.

Many prominent English, American, European and Soviet cartoonists are introduced throughout the text in short biographies, among them David Low, Josef Capek, Paul Weber, George Grosz and Karl Arnold. Many of the artists featured were sufficiently politically organized to mount an anti-Nazi and anti-fascist exhibition of cartoons as early as April-May 1934 in Prague.

Paul Weber is representative of the remarkable careers of many of these cartoonists. Up to 1934 he produced powerfully executed anti-Nazi drawings for pamphlets and periodicals published by the "National Bolshevist" radical Ernst Niekisch, the former chairman of the Munich Workers' and Soldiers' Council of the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic. Weber spent much of 1937 in the custody of the Gestapo, then emigrated to Florida in 1938. He returned to Germany in 1939 and subsequently produced a series of lithographs condemning British imperialism. Much of this work was published in National Socialist Germany in a work titled Britische Bilder (British Pictures) in 1941.

Perhaps because *Heckling Hitler* was originally published in Britain, the very important American caricaturist, Arthur Szyk, who produced brilliantly malicious and sarcastic covers and cartoons for *Colliers* magazine, is regrettably not represented. Because anyone may be caricatured and ridiculed by exaggeration, political cartoons inherently lend themselves to propaganda against the leaders of other nations. Especially interesting are the many cartoons which lampoon savagely the National Socialist German leadership. As indicated by the title, Adolf Hitler is the target of the majority of illustrations.

Next to Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, is ridiculed most often. Very effective is a cartoon by the Soviet three-man team of graphic artists called Kukriniksy (a composite of their names: Mikhail Kuprianov, Porfiri Krylov and Nikolai Sokolov). Entitled "Fascist Lie Gun." the cartoon portrays Goebbels as a Hitler-operated machine gun spouting paper (propaganda) through his megaphone-like mouth. One 1931 cartoon strip by the Czech artist Frantisek Bidlo mocks Goebbels' novel Michael. [Now available in English translation from the IHR.] Elsewhere Goebbels is drawn as a monkey riding on Hitler's shoulder. Alfred Rosenberg is presented as a fur-clad German barbarian with white collar, bow tie and cuffs dancing around a bonfire of books; Herman Göring as a fat, bemedaled boor or a golden-tressed Wagnerian opera singer with horned helmet; Robert Lev. the director of the German Labor Front, as a drunk: SA leader Röhm as a homosexual and so forth through the Nazi hierarchy.

Several of the cartoons in Heckling Hitler rely upon crude racial stereotypes of German people. Thus the Germans are sometimes drawn as beer-swilling louts in Bavarian peasant costume, sexually rapacious, dunderheaded bullies, or obese, blond Bauernfrauen.

After viewing the drawings in Heckling Hitler, many readers are likely to be curious about what sorts of political cartoons were being produced in National Socialist Germany. The average reader is not likely to find a collection of National Socialist German cartoons at the local bookstore or library. The diligent collector can gather a representative collection by making photocopies from scarce bound and microfilmed copies of Nazi-era German and National Socialist periodicals such as Völkischer Beobachter, Das Reich, or the Englishlanguage News from Germany.

Nor are we likely to discover a volume of cartoons by major German political artists such as "Erik," Ernst Heimer, "Groth," or E.O. Plauen. Especially forbidden would be a collection of the anti-Jewish cartoons of "Fips," the pen name of Phillip Ruprecht, who drew for Julius Streicher's Der Stürmer.

Hopefully the publication of *Heckling Hitler* will, if nothing else, stimulate the study of political cartoons of all the belligerent nations during World War Two. Certainly in a war as brutal and merciless as that tragic conflict, one cannot expect the political cartoonists to have pulled any graphic punches. After all, if one is going to bomb, shoot, hang and torture the enemy, then drawing degrading, savage and comical pictures of that same enemy is to be expected.

# KEEPER OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS: DILLON S. MEYER AND AMERICAN RACISM by Richard Drinnon. Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1987, 339 pp., \$24.95. ISBN 0-520-05793-7.

#### Reviewed by John P. Strang

With the exception of the few months in which Milton Eisenhower ran the program, Dillon S. Meyer, a typical New Deal bureaucrat, was the chief administrator of the WRA, the "War Relocation Authority," which was responsible for the imprisonment of over 100,000 Japanese nationals and American citizens of Japanese ancestry (the second group making up the majority of those imprisoned). This notorious violation of our Bill of Rights has spawned a number of books, historical and popular, including Meyer's own Uprooted Americans.<sup>1</sup> Richard Drinnon's new book is a thought-provoking—if somewhat subjective—biography of this rather unlovable man. After the war, Meyer ended up as head of the BIA (Bureau of Indian Affairs) where he carried out policies not unlike those in force when he was involved with Tule Lake, Manzanar, Leupp, et al.

Drinnon declares that his aim is to deal with Meyer as an epitome of Hannah Arendt's phrase about the "banality of evil."<sup>2</sup> The work is well-footnoted and -documented, and despite Mr. Drinnon's subjectivity and occasional lapses into excessive emotionalism, well worth the reading, even for someone already familiar with the controversy surrounding America's "noble experiment" with concentration-camp solutions to "social problems."

It is Drinnon's contention that Second World War "Jap"-hating went hand-in-hand with Indian-hating, and that both are integral parts of American mainstream culture. He is impatient with those who label either the wartime mistreatment of Japanese-Americans or the postwar treatment of American Indians as "mistakes."<sup>3</sup> This does not, of course, mean that Mr. Drinnon approves of either sort of hating—he just tends to prefer to think that American culture is the mistake.

Indeed, the book makes a strong connection between anti-Indian and anti-Japanese racism (most convincing for me was the continuity of bureaucrats and personnel involved.) However, even Drinnon admits that much of the force behind the camps came from New Deal do-gooders eager to use the war as an excuse to engage in social experimentation.<sup>4</sup> (They would probably have welcomed a chance to pen up and forcefully "assimilate" and "Americanize" other minority groups such as the Chinese, Latinos, or Puerto Ricans in the same way, had a different excuse been forthcoming.) Such people are not admirable, but they are also not racists. (Presumably the last thing that diehard racists would want would be to "assimilate" or "Americanize" members of a hated and despised outgroup.) Although Meyer did seem to have some quaint and stereotyped attitudes toward American Indians (a point Dillon makes a bit too much of ),<sup>5</sup> he was hardly one who subscribed to a "the only good 'un is a dead 'un," philosophy, either with Japanese-Americans or with Indians.

This is not to defend Meyer. The picture of him painted in Mr. Drinnon's book is unlovable, and if one might doubt slightly the "evil" part of the definition (although only slightly—Mr. Drinnon does offer lots of evidence that Mr. Meyer was a liar<sup>6</sup>), there is little question about the banality. But how much of a defense is it to say that someone is "only a little" racist? Nor is it really a defense of either Meyer or the WRA to argue that the camps could have been a lot worse, or that allegedly worse camps have existed in other countries.<sup>7</sup> Thankfully, Mr. Drinnon gives short shrift to such arguments.

He also gives short shrift to Japanese-American Citizens League (JACL), and provides much disturbing information about the unholy alliance between the JACL, the government, and the "civil libertarians" of the New York City branch of the American Civil Liberties Union. This is welcome muckraking, and has not appeared in too many books before. So, too, is information about some of the bizarre racial theories of FDR,<sup>8</sup> and the serious doubts about the legality of the WRA and its programs expressed by none other than the FBI!<sup>9</sup>

The second half of the book, starting with the chapter titled "Commissioner," deals with Meyer's mistreatment of the American Indians as head of the BIA. Here I at first expected Mr. Drinnon to be on less firm ground—and perhaps he is, but only slightly so. Meyer was one of the chief architects of the "termination" program that sought to "free" the Indians from their reservation ways—and incidentally, to transfer millions of acres of their land to Whites.<sup>10</sup> Meyer fought tooth and nail any attempt by his "wards" to assert themselves, and, as he did with the Japanese-American camp internees, attributed such opposition to "troublemakers." The case is strong that there was a continuation of policy and attitudes from the WRA days—hardly surprising, considering the continuity of personnel. (Many of Meyer's former associates and underlings followed him from the WRA to the BIA, and many of the camp staff in the WRA days had been drawn from the BIA.)

While the connection clearly exists one may be slightly leery about attributing it all to "racism," however real and evil the treatment of both groups seems to have been. As pointed out previously, a pernicious sentiment of assimilationism was present in the treatment of both groups, and assimilationism can't be truly argued to be a "racist" trait.

The implications of the title are also a bit unpleasant: Dillon S. Meyer once said that he did not want posterity to remember him as an administrator of American concentration camps.<sup>11</sup> The fact that Mr. Drinnon, aware of this quote, does entitle his book Keeper of Concentration Camps seem malicious, however merited it is that Mr. Meyer be so remembered. One is, in fact, reminded of some of the malicious remarks Mr. Meyer himself made about opponents such as Felix S. Cohen and Ernest Besig.<sup>12</sup> It is as if Mr. Drinnon deliberately chose the title that would offend Meyer's shade the most, and, much as this reviewer has no love for Dillon S. Meyer, he finds that disturbing.

#### Notes

- 1. Uprooted Americans, Dillon S. Meyer, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971.
- 2. Keeper of Concentration Camps, xxviii. Unless noted otherwise, page numbers cited in this review will be from Mr. Drinnon's book.
- 3. Op. cit., p. 266, for example.
- 4. Op. cit., p. 60.
- 5. Op. cit., pp. 21-25.
- 6. Op. cit., p. 253, for example.
- 7. The loss of life in the original concentration camps set up by the British to house Boer "troublemakers" was much higher than in the WRA camps.
- 8. Op. cit., pp. 254-256.
- 9. Op. cit., p. 51.
- 10. The "relocation" of the Japanese-Americans also had the practical effect of transferring much of their real property to White (often actively anti-Oriental) interests—and at bargain prices, and it is a weakness of Mr. Drinnon's book that he does not draw as much attention to this real and concrete parallel as he does to alleged parallels of philosophy and attitude.
- 11. Quoted by Mr. Drinnon in op. cit., p. 249.
- 12. For example, the quote from Meyer on p. 232.

# MARXISM IN THE UNITED STATES: REMAPPING THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEFT by Paul Buhle. London: Verso (Haymarket Series), 1987, paperback, 299 pages, \$12.95, ISBN 0-86091-848-3.

#### Reviewed by Samuel Edward Konkin III

The most enjoyable treasure is that which is found in the most unlikely place. Who would have thought of looking in a history of American Marxism, written by a New Left activist, published by a British New Left press, for a neglected, if not suppressed, account of the political history of early German-American immigrants? Or how the conversion of the U.S. (Marxist) Left from its interventionist globalism in the 1940s to an anti-interventionist New Left version in the 1960s happened because, at least in part, of its birth on a Wisconsin campus, in a population center of isolationist German-American Progressives?

Paul Buhle tells us his own history in the penultimate chapter of *Marxism in the U.S.* He was the founding editor of *Radical America*, which he describes as the "unofficial journal of SDS" (the Students for a Democratic Society), as "there was no official journal." He was one of Cold-War Revisionist William Appleman Williams' students at the University of Wisconsin and active in SDS from its takeover from the Old-Left League for Industrial Democracy to its spectacular demise in 1970.

This reviewer came across Radical America in 1970 while at UW; it contained a remarkable notice (remarkable to your reviewer, who like many of you, evolved from the right) which verified something Murray Rothbard has been telling us early Libertarians (this reviewer founded the first Libertarian Alliance at UW in February 1970). Rothbard and fellow Libertarian Revisionist Leonard Liggio had been doing missionary work amongst the SDS and New Left historians, converting them to Isolationism. Many of us could not believe our old campus opponents were open to such reason, but there it was in Radical America: a special "Old Right" issue concerning the heroic Isolationists who had kept the faith during the New Deal, Second World War and even the Cold War, until the New Left came along.<sup>1</sup> It had a profound effect on our thinking and led us out of the Left-Right statist trap cramping our reason.

Buhle has continued his historical work, largely Revisionist in both the historical sense and in the sense that Marxists use it, since those days; today he is the editor of The Encyclopaedia of the Left for Garland Publishing.<sup>2</sup> Marxism in the U.S. is one of the first in the Haymarket Series published by the still-New-Left Verso Press in England; American Revisionists and anti-imperialists should keep their eyes out for new books in this series.

The history of the Left, in particular the American Left, is fairly simple in outline, and generally agreed upon; however, once one seeks any details, the versions diverge dramatically according to which faction is telling the tale. Buhle has his heroes and villains and many would not match ours. Furthermore, he neglects the proto-Libertarian individualist anarchists, who considered themselves of the Left, in the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, he covers many of the common ancestors often neglected: Jacksonian Democrats, Abolitionists, Populists, Spiritualists, Bellamy Nationalists and native Utopians. Herein lies the interest to today's Revisionist readers.

Immigrants brought Socialism to the United States, and remarkably early at that. In 1848 the U.S. was mopping up the Mexican War and native radicals has risen up against the blatantly imperialist policy. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote The Communist Manifesto that year, on the eve of a European-wide insurrection centered in the German states. Many of the insurgents fled to German communities in the United States, bringing with them the ideas that had led them to the barricades. Although Marx has his followers in the first wave. Ferdinand Lassalle was an even more popular German Socialist leader ("statuettes of whose countenance graced the Socialist locals and often served as raffle prizes").4 The '48ers supported the Radical Abolitionist cause; Adolf Douai edited a Texas Abolitionist paper and died still editing a German-language Socialist daily in 1888. Not surprisingly, German-Americans disproportionately joined the Union in the Civil War/War between the States.

The '48ers were the alte Genossen to the post-war wave of German immigrants. Editor and playwright August-Otto Walster, son of a leathersmith, immigrated to America to start the German-language national weekly newspaper, Arbeiter Stimme. The large Germanlanguage press was disproportionately Socialist, and quite cosmopolitan. Douai worked on the New Yorker Volkszeitung side by side with Russian nobleman Serge Schevitsch (who brought Lassalle's mistress to the U.S., where she became and actress after Lassalle had died in a duel over her) and with German Jew Alexander Jonas, who commuted every few years between Germany and the United States, working freely in the press milieu and later, importantly, attracting Jewish immigrants to Socialism.

As the German Social Democratic Party grew in success (it became the largest party in the new German empire, though not allowed to take power until the final days of World War I), its progress was followed in the German-American press. Socialism, or social democracy, was not achieving notable success in the United States, and Germans tended to drop it as they became progressively assimilated. As they were followed by other Eastern European immigrant waves, these new groups replaced them, particularly if they were familiar with German already (Poles, Bohemians, Jews, Croats and so on). Interestingly, Buhle singles out the German-Jews (later followed by Russian Jews, though still Yiddish-speaking) and hints that their slowness in assimilating may have led to their becoming the core of U.S. Socialism:

Taking nothing away from the German-American papers, they had not (except, perhaps, the weekly anarchist Arme Teufel from Detroit) become the site of an avowed search for identity; Socialism and their homeland traditions provided that easily, no doubt too easily. The editorials, the headlines, the formal understanding of the Jewish press do not seem so superficially different. But to the close observer, Tsukunft and even more the Arbeiter Tseitung made that search the focus for Socialist politics.<sup>5</sup>

In the 1890s the immigrants reached out to an Anerica seething with a wave of strikes, a depression, and Populist uprisings in the rural areas-seemingly ready for class revolt. A Portuguese from Trinidad, Daniel DeLeon, entered the Socialist Labor Party in the U.S. and began its first English-language weekly, The People, in 1891. Buhle credits DeLeon with being the first truly American Marxist; he brought theoretical rigor to the U.S. movement-and a pre-Leninist discipline and sectarianism which had the SLP in ruins by 1899. (The SLP still has a tiny organization alive today; it is perceived through the Left as DeLeon's personal cult.)

What American Socialism needed was a native American standard-bearer who could appeal both to the theoretically rigorous immigrants and the Utopians, Christian Socialists, Spiritualists and radicals in the native populace-a synthesizing Socialist in the James Stewart/Henry Fonda mold. It found this in Eugene V. Debs, and the new Socialist Party reached its high point under his leadership, particularly in becoming the focus of opposition to American entry into World War I. Unlike the European Social Democratic Parties. the American Socialists remained united against American participation, from the Left to the Right ends of their spectrum (though with defectors and opportunists from all parts as well). Had not the Bolshevik Revolution occurred, it would be fascinating to consider what might have happened in 1920, at the end of the Palmer raids, when the U.S. SP and the International Workers of the World, its sometime ally, though wounded from persecution, were at the height of popularity, as the rest of the U.S. populace soured on war and intervention following Versailles.

Unfortunately, the Russian Revolution completely changed the utopian expectations of the Left, not merely in the United States but throughout the world. And V.I. Lenin's apparent success in bringing about a form of Socialist utopia granted him followers throughout every Socialist organization and, hence, instant factionalism. At its height, then, the U.S. Socialist Party split apart. In America the "Menshevik" faction really was the minority but excluded the majority delegates to hang onto control and maintain the SP as an increasingly anti-Communist but ever smaller Left organization. The "Bolsheviks" split immediately into squabbling factions, arguing over which splinter was the real standard-bearer of Lenin in the U.S.<sup>6</sup>

All this is covered in the first three chapters of Marxism in the United States, roughly half the book. The next three chapters deal with the Leninist infection, its impact on culture (particularly literary) in the thirties, Eugene Lyons' Red Decade and the winning of intellectuals to the supposedly proletarian cause, then the Communist Party U.S.A.'s sudden acceptability during the World War II, followed by its anathema and persecution as the Empirebuilders cranked up a "no-win," "Cold," "perpetual war for perpetual peace."

Near the end of the sixth chapter, Buhle delineates the roots of the New Left, and here is another section of interest to Isolationist-Revisionists:

Shortly after the New York Intellectuals evolved definitively toward accommodation with Pax Americana, a less prestigious but—from the retrospective viewpoint of the New left—more important group moved in the reverse direction for precisely opposite reasons. The University of Wisconsin had been a center of anti-monopolist, anti-imperialist thought since the days of Robert La Follette. It was shortly to regain its historic role, in New Left guise.

Many intellectuals in the old Middle Border had bowed uneasily to the inevitability of war mobilization, suspecting—with a handful of Trotskyists, unrecalcitrant pacifists, and Charles Beard—that militarization of American life would become permanent . . . A new generation of scholars, mostly refugees from Old Left families and from the Henry Wallace campaign, joined these odd ducks on the Madison campus and relearned radical history with native coloring. The same youngsters were also, and not coincidentally, the first generation of immigrants' children who could fit comfortably into a field now composed not of gentlemen scholars but of middling professionals. They took their models . . . from the quasi-isolationist, anti-military tradition of Progressive historians and from the new mass student culture.<sup>7</sup>

A few paragraphs later, Buhle pays homage to Cold-War Revisionist William Appleman Williams and the historical school he founded; earlier C. Wright Mills gets his due for bringing class theory (or, if you prefer, conspiracy theory) back into respectable academic discourse.

Readers of the reviewer's (and Buhle's) age will find a Big Chill or two in the seventh, penultimate chapter, on the New Left. Buhle was there and tells it, honestly, first-hand, admirably dropping the detached-historian voice for that of the first person.

Buhle is weakest in his Conclusion, an eighth but unnumbered chapter. This is hardly surprising for a historian, for he is trying to assimilate the seventies and eighties even as he is still within them. The Black movement, the feminists, the literary deconstructionists and structuralists, and the liberation theologists all require analysis, which would redeem them perhaps from their status here, as undigested lumps disgorged by Buhle. But even in these chunks Buhle's basic honesty and analytic mind is evident:

A favorite sport of right-wing commentators from the late 1970s has been the attack upon the New Left greybeard, the mutton-chop sideburned college professor who forces his Marxist ideas upon hapless undergraduates. This attack cannot be denied its industrialsized grain of truth. Radicals in the academy have found themselves trapped inside a massive contradiction, not between theory and reality (as the Right claims) but between theory and practice, between (in the theoretical version) materialism and idealism.<sup>8</sup>

Paul Buhle provides us with not only the first modern comprehensive overview of the American Left, even if primarily of its Marxist strand, but begins the task of re-inclusion of those strands deliberately severed, buried and covered up during the Leninist fever. Besides the value this book has in returning integrity to the Left, it contains numerous gems for the pleasure of discovery by those who consider the label "Left," let alone "Socialist," fit only to hang on enemies and future targets. Even they may consider swapping their scatterguns for more accurate rifles after conferring with Paul Buhle.

#### Notes

- 1. For those interested in following up the New Left/Old Right connection, a search for the out-of-print magazine Left & Right, largely written by Rothbard, Liggio and their friends between 1965 and 1968; I inherited my copies from a prominent Libertarian. Somewhat more available is Carl Oglesby's excellent Cold War isolationist book, Containment & Change, which describes the Libertarian "Old Right" as the best allies for the New Left's coalition building against the U.S.-centered Empire. Best of the New Left, before he turned Establishment apologist, was Ronald Radosh, who wrote paeans to the heroes of most JHR readers: Oscar Garrison Villard, John T. Flynn, Robert A. Taft and even alleged "fascist" Lawrence Dennis, in his still-available Prophets On The Right.
- 2. Who are also preparing *The Encyclopaedia of Libertarianism*, edited by this reviewer.
- 3. Benjamin Tucker called himself a "laissez-faire Socialist" and belonged, along with many other free-market anarchist advocates

(mostly in New England), to the First Workingmen's International (which Marx dissolved rather than let the Anarchists take it over).

- 4. Marxism in the United States, p. 29.
- 5. Marxism in the United States, p. 49.
- 6. See the film Reds for a portrayal of this schism; John Reed (played by Warren Beatty) exemplified the conversions that occurred and the later feuding.
- 7. Marxism in the United States, pp. 215-6.
- 8. Marxism in the United States, p. 264.

## HISTORICAL NEWS AND COMMENT West Germany's Holocaust Payoff to Israel and World Jewry

#### MARK WEBER

**T** he passions and propaganda of wartime normally diminish with the passage of time. A striking exception is the Holocaust campaign, which seems to grow more pervasive and intense as the years go by. Certainly the most lucrative expression of this seemingly endless campaign has been West Germany's massive and historically unparalleled reparations payoff to Israel and world Jewry for the alleged collective sins of the German people during the Hitler era. Since 1953, West Germany has paid out more than \$35 billion in reparations to the Zionist state and to millions of individual "victims of National Socialism."

How did this remarkable program get started? How lucrative has it been? What does it suggest about the "six million" figure? And what are its social and political implications?

#### **Bowing to Pressure**

In September 1945, shortly after the end of the Second World War, Jewish leader Chaim Weizmann submitted a memorandum on behalf of the Zionist Jewish Agency to the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France "demanding" (in the words of the Encyclopaedia Judaica) "reparations, restitution and indemnification due to the Jewish people from Germany." The western Allies lost no time in responding favorably to Weizmann's demands.<sup>1</sup> The American government was particularly eager to have the Germans pay up.<sup>2</sup> As a result, the German government set up by the western Allies at Bonn in 1949 never had any real choice but to acknowledge the alleged collective guilt of the German people during the Hitler era and pay what was demanded.

Indeed, a major provision of the treaty of May 1952 by which the United States, Britain and France granted "sovereignty" to the Federal Republic of (West) Germany obligated the new state to make restitution.<sup>3</sup>

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer laid the emotional

and psychological groundwork for the reparations program when he solemnly declared to the Bundestag on 27 September 1951:

The Federal government and the great majority of the German people are deeply aware of the immeasurable suffering endured by the Jews of Germany and by the Jews of the occupied territories during the period of National Socialism . . . In our name, unspeakable crimes have been committed and they demand restitution, both moral and material, for the persons and properties of the Jews who have been so seriously harmed . . .

Adenauer went on to promise speedy conclusion of restitution and indemnity laws and announced that reparations negotiations would begin soon. Accordingly, delegations representing the Bonn government, the State of Israel and an ad hoc organization of Jewish groups began talks in the Netherlands in March 1952.

The representative of the Jewish organizations was the "Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, Inc." or "Claims Conference," a body formed for the sole purpose of demanding maximum reparations from the German people. The 20 member organizations represented Jews in the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Argentina, Australia and South Africa. Jews in the Soviet Union, eastern Europe and the Arab countries were not represented.<sup>4</sup>

The West German government was under pressure to conclude quickly a reparations agreement satisfactory to the Jews. In his memoirs, Chancellor Adenauer wrote:

It was clear to me that, if the negotiations with the Jews failed, the negotiations at the London Debt Conference [which were going on at the same time] would also run aground, because Jewish banking circles would exert an influence upon the course of the London Debt Conference which should not be underestimated. On the other hand it was self-evident that a failure of the London Debt Conference would bring about a failure of the negotiations with the Jews. If the German economy was to achieve a good credit standing and become strong again, the London Conference would have to be ended successfully. Only then would our economy develop in a way that would make the payments to Israel and the Jewish organizations possible.<sup>5</sup>

Zionist leader Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Jewish Congress and chairman of the Claims Conference, warned of a worldwide campaign against Germany if the Bonn officials did not meet the Zionist demands: "The non-violent reaction of the whole world, supported by wide circles of non-Jews, who have deep sympathy with the martyrdom of the Jewish people during the Nazi period, would be irresistible and completely justified."<sup>6</sup> The London Jewish Observer was more blunt: "The whole material weight of world Jewry will be mobilized for an economic war against Germany, if Bonn's offer of reparations remains unsatisfactory."<sup>7</sup> The talks culminated in the Luxembourg Agreement, which was signed on 10 September 1952 by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett and World Jewish Congress President Nahum Goldmann.

#### A Legal Novelty

This agreement between the West German government, on the one hand, and the Israeli state and the Claims Conference, on the other, was historically unprecedented and had no basis or counterpart in international law. For one thing, the State of Israel did not exist at the time of the actions for which restitution was paid. Moreover, the Claims Conference had no legal authority to negotiate and act on behalf of Jews who were citizens of sovereign countries. Jews were represented in an internationally recognized treaty with a foreign state not by the governments of the countries of which they were citizens, but rather by a supranational and sectarian Jewish organization.

It was as if the Catholic citizens of the United States had allowed themselves to be represented in a treaty with a foreign government not by the U.S. government, but rather by some ad hoc supranational Catholic orgainzation or by the Vatican. The Luxembourg Agreement thus legally implied that Jews everywhere, regardless of their citizenship, constitute a distinct and separate national group and that world Jewry was a formal party to the Second World War.<sup>8</sup>

Nahum Goldmann, a co-signer of the Agreement, was one of the most important Jewish figures of this century. From 1951 to 1978, he was president of the World Jewish Congress, and from 1956 to 1958, he was also president of the World Zionist Organization. In his autobiography, the German-born Goldmann recalled his role in the negotiations and the remarkable nature of the agreement:

My negotiations with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his associates, which culminated in the Luxembourg Agreement of 1952, make up one of the most exciting and successful chapters of my political career.

There hardly was a precedent for persuading a state to assume moral responsibility and make large-scale compensation for crimes committed against an unorganized ethnic group lacking sovereign status. There was no basis in international law for the collective Jewish claims . . .9

In a 1976 interview, Goldmann said that the agreement "constituted an extraordinary innovation in the matter of international rights" and he boasted that he had obtained 10 to 14 times more from the Bonn government than he had originally expected.<sup>10</sup>

#### The Payoff for Israel

The agreement meant economic security for the new Zionist state, as Goldmann explained in his autobiography:

What the Luxembourg Agreement meant to Israel is for the historians of the young state to determine. That the goods Israel received from Germany were a decisive economic factor in its development is beyond doubt. I do not know what economic dangers might have threatened Israel at critical moments if it had not been for German supplies. Railways and telephones, dock installations and irrigation plants, whole areas of industry and agriculture, would not be where they are today without the reparations from Germany. And hundreds of thousands of Jewish victims of Nazism have received considerable sums under the law of restitution.<sup>11</sup>

Goldman said in 1976:

Without the German reparations, the State of Israel would not have the half of its present infrastructure: every train in Israel is German, the ships are German, as well as the electricity, a large part of the industry . . . without mentioning the individual pensions paid to the survivors . . . In certain years, the amount of money received by Israel from Germany exceeds the total amount of money collected from international Jewry-two or three times as much.<sup>12</sup>

As a result of the West German reparations program, wrote Jewish historian Walter Laqueur:

The ships laden with German capital goods began to call at Haifa regularly and unfailingly, becoming an important—ultimately a decisive—factor in the building up of the country. Today [1965] the Israeli fleet is almost entirely "made in Germany," as are its modern railway equipment, the big steel foundry near Acre, and many other enterprises. During the 50's and early 60's about one-third of investment goods imported into Israel came from Germany . . . In addition to all this, many individual Israelis received restitution privately.<sup>13</sup>

It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of the program: the five power plants built and installed by West Germany between 1953 and 1956 quadrupled Israel's electric-power-generating capacity. West Germans laid 280 kilometers of giant pipelines (2.25 and 2.5 meters in diameter) for the irrigation of the Negev (which certainly helped to "make the desert bloom"). The Zionist state acquired 65 Germanbuilt ships, including four passenger vessels.<sup>14</sup>

#### **Payments to Individuals**

West German reparations have been paid out through several different programs, including the Federal Indemnification (or Compensation) Law (BEG), the Federal Restitution Law (BReuG), the Israel Agreement, and special agreements with 12 foreign countries (including Austria).<sup>15</sup> By far the most important of these has been the BEG indemnification law, which was first enacted in 1953 and revised in 1956 and 1965. It was based on a compensation law

promulgated earlier in the American zone of occupation.

In the words of a background article about the reparations program that appeared in a 1985 issue of Focus On, an official publication of the Bonn government, the BEG laws "compensate those persecuted for political, racial, religious or ideological reasons—people who suffered physical injury or loss of freedom, property, income, professional and financial advancement as a result of that persecution." It also "guarantees assistance to the survivors of the deceased victims."<sup>18</sup>

The BEG compensation law defined "persecution" and "loss of freedom" very liberally. It stipulated payments for Jews who had simply been required to wear the yellow star, even in Croatia, where the measure was ordered by non-Germans. Payments were also ordered for any Jew who was ever in a concentration camp, including the one in Shanghai, China, which was never under German control. The BEG law authorized payments to any Jew who was ever arrested, no matter what the reason. This meant that even Jews who were taken into custody for criminal acts were entitled to German "compensation" for "loss of freedom."<sup>17</sup>

The 1965 revision of the BEG specified that Germany was to be held accountable for measures taken by Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary as early as April 1941, if these actions had deprived the victims of all their freedom. The fact that these countries acted against the Jews in 1941 independently of Germany did not matter.<sup>18</sup>

Significantly, the many Jewish survivors living in the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries of eastern Europe were not covered by West Germany's BEG compensation program.<sup>19</sup> And, of course, Jewish "Holocaust survivors" who died before the West German compensation law (BEG) was enacted in 1953 or before it really became effective in 1956 also never received BEG restitution money.

The Canadian Jewish News reported in December 1981 that by the end of 1980, "The number of successful claimants is 4,344,378. Payments have reached 50.18 billion German marks."<sup>20</sup> The Focus On article cited above noted that between October 1953 and the end of December 1983, the West German government paid out 56.3 billion marks on a total of 4,390,049 claims from individuals under the BEG legislation.<sup>21</sup>

Nevertheless, the Atlanta Journal and Constitution stated in 1985 that about half of the Jewish "survivors" in the world have never received reparations money. "An estimated 50 percent" of the Holocaust "survivors throughout the world are on West German pensions," the newspaper reported.<sup>22</sup> In addition to survivors in Communist countries who are not entitled to West German compensation, the paper reported that many Jewish survivors living in the United States have never received reparations money. The paper found that 79 percent of the Jewish "Holocaust survivors" living in the Atlanta area had, at one time or another, asked the Bonn government for restitution. About 66 percent received something.

About 40 percent of those receiving BEG compensation money live in Israel, the Focus On article reported, while 20 percent live in West Germany and 40 percent live in other countries.<sup>23</sup> It would thus appear that about 80 percent, or 3.5 million, of the 4.39 million claims are from Jews.

Although the number of BEG compensation claims is larger than the number of individual claimants, it is nevertheless difficult to reconcile these figures with the legendary "six million" Jewish wartime dead, particularly since at least half of the world's Jewish "survivors" never received German compensation.

#### Conclusion

The Luxembourg Agreement obligated the West German government to pay three billion German marks to the State of Israel and 450 million marks to various Jewish organizations. Accordingly, the West German Finance Minister announced in 1953 that he expected that the reparations payments would eventually total four billion marks. Time would prove this a ludicrous underestimate.<sup>24</sup>

By 1963, the German people had already paid out 20 billion marks, and by 1984 the total had risen to 70 billion.<sup>25</sup> In late 1987 the West German parliament approved an additional 300 million marks in "restitution to the victims of National Socialist crimes." The Bonn government announced at that time the 80 billion marks had already been paid out and estimated that by the year 2020 the payoff would total 100 billion marks which, at recent exchange rates, would be the equivalent of \$50 billion.<sup>28</sup>

Although the West German reparations program is accepted and often praised in the democratic West, it is also, at least implicitly, strikingly undemocratic in two fundamental respects:

First, it regards Jews not as equal and fully integrated citizens of whatever country they live in, but rather primarily as members of an alien and cosmopolitan national group.

Second, it is based on the premise that the German nation, including even the Germans who grew up since 1945, is collectively guilty of terrible crimes, contrary to the democratic notion of individual responsibility for crime.

West Germany's lucrative and historically unparalleled payoff to Israel and world Jewry is a legacy and permanent reminder of Germany's catastrophic defeat in 1945 and subsequent domination by foreign powers.

#### Notes

- 1. "Reparations, German," Encyclopaedia Judaica, Vol. 14, pp. 72-73.
- D. v. Westernhagen, "Wiedergutgemacht?," Die Zeit, No. 41, 5 Oct. 1984, p. 33.
- 3. "Restitution in Germany," Focus On, May 1985, p. 2.
- 4. K. Lewan, Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 1975, pp. 48-49.
- Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1953-55 (Stuttgart: 1966), pp. 140-142. Quoted in: K. Lewan, Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 1975, pp. 53-54.
- 6. Quoted in: K. Lewan, Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 1975, p. 54.
- J. Kreysler and K. Jungfer, Deutsche Israel-Politik (Munich: 1965), p. 33. Quoted in: K. Lewan, Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 1975, p. 54.
- 8. L. Sebba, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 450, July 1980, p. 206.
- 9. N. Goldmann, Thé Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann, p. 249.
- 10. Le Nouvel Observateur, 25 October 1976, p. 120. See also interview with Robert Faurisson in The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1981 (Vol. 2, No. 4), pp. 350, 373.
- 11. N. Goldmann, Autobiography, p. 276.
- 12. Le Nouvel Observateur, 25 Oct. 1976, p. 122.
- 13. W. Laqueur, Commentary, May 1965, p. 29.
- 14. Nicholas Balabkins, West German Reparations to Israel. Cited in: K. Lewan, Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 1975, p. 42.
- 15. "Restitution in Germany," Focus On, May 1985.
- 16. "Restitution in Germany," Focus On, May 1985, p. 3.
- 17. R. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 3, p. 1166.
- 18. R. Hilberg, Destruction, Vol. 3, p. 1173.
- R. Hilberg, Destruction, p. 1170. The New York Times reported in 1983 that the clients of the New York office of the Conference on Material Claims Against Germany "are primarily newly arrived Russian [Jewish] victims of the Nazi era." (D. Margolick, "Soviet Emigre Lawyer...," The New York Times, Thursday, 10 March 1983, p. B2.)
- 20. Canadian Jewish News, 11 Dec. 1981, p. 4.
- 21. "Restitution in Germany," Focus On, May 1985, p. 3.
- 22. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 31 March 1985, 14A, 15A, 17A.
- 23. "Restitution in Germany," Focus On, May 1985, p. 3.
- 24. D. v. Westernhagen, Die Zeit, 5 Oct. 1984, p. 36.; "Restitution in Germany," Focus On, May 1985.
- 25. D. v. Westernhagen, Die Zeit, 5 Oct. 1984, p. 36.
- 26. "Bundestag Approves Additional DM 300 Million for Victims of Nazis," The Week in Germany (New York: German Information Center), 11 December 1987. The dollar value of the German mark has

fluctuated over the years. A recent exchange rate was 50 cents per mark.

# Pearl Harbor Survivors Association Honors Kimmel and Short

#### MARTIN MERSON

When Percy Greaves died of cancer on 13 August 1984—eleven days short of his 78th birthday—little did he know of the seeds he had planted. No man, to this writer's knowledge, has done more to inspire others to continue along the trail he blazed; a trail beginning with his service as Chief, Minority Staff, of the 1945-1946 Joint Congressional Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

Undoubtedly, Percy Greaves, in preparation for the Joint Congressional Investigation—the last of nine wartime investigations, beginning shortly after 7 December 1941—made it a point to familiarize himself with all the material resulting from the ninth as well as each of the preceding investigations: the Frank Knox inquiry at Pearl Harbor of 11-12 December 1941; the Roberts Commission of 18 December 1941-23 January 1942; the special inquiry of Thomas C. Hart of 22 February-15 June 1944; the Army Pearl Harbor Board of 20 July 1944-20 October 1944; the Navy Court of Inquiry, 24 July 1944-19 September 1944; the special inquiry of Col. Carter W. Clarke, USA of 14 September 1944 and 13 July 1945-4 August 1945; the special inquiry of Maj. Henry C. Clausen, USA of 23 November 1944-12 September 1945; and the special inquiry of Adm. H. Kent Hewitt, USN of 14 May 1945-11 July 1945.

The mastery of some 44 volumes published by the Government Printing Office, covering the material in the nine separate and distinct investigations, was essential to Percy Greaves. These volumes comprise thousands of pages of testimony, taken over hundreds of days, millions of words, and involving virtually every political and military leader of importance in the war effort; mastering this material clearly required herculean exertions. Today's Revisionist heritage of some four decades of research and writing on the subject, reflects, in large part, the dedication which Percy Greaves brought to the task. For this reason, we must acknowledge a very special debt to Percy Greaves, and, without question, a leadership position in the field.

These seeds which Greaves sowed have lately germinated and sprouted in a recent action of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association. PHSA is an organization of both enlisted personnel and officers from the Air Corps, Army, Coast Guard, Marines, Navy, Nurses-Army, and Nurses-Navy, and is, today, approximately 10,000 members strong. Every fifth year since its founding, the PHSA has commemorated the fateful Day of Infamy by meeting in Hawaii. In 1986, the men and women of the PHSA marked the 45th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, which killed or wounded over 3,000 of their comrades, many entombed in their ships, with a special meeting in Honolulu. For the first time in the annals of American history, so far as this writer knows, the men and women of PHSA, who participated in full uniform, and who so generously and proudly laid their lives on the line at a time when most were in the flower of their youth, paused to recognize and honor their two wartime commanders, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief. Pacific Fleet: and Lt. General Walter C. Short. U.S. Army, Commander, Hawaiian Department, The surviving sons of both Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short-both with distinguished military careers in their own right-were presented parchment scrolls embodying resolutions adopted by PHSA, together with specially struck medals. Here it should be noted that Manning, the elder son of Adm. Kimmel, was lost with his submarine while on war patrol in 1944. PHSA further collected monies for an educationscholarship fund on behalf of deserving decendants of Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short.

Inevitably, it will be asked—as this writer did of PHSA's president Thomas J. Stockett—why, after the passage of nearly half century, did you see fit to honor your wartime commanders? A response was forthcoming, in his letter of 12 February 1987, exemplifying the splendid quality to which each of us strives—and so seldom attains:

Every endeavor undertaken by men certainly began with a modicum of faith, hope and expectation for its fruition. Some were excellent, many were good and a few of them weren't worth mentioning.

All of us were young on that terrible morning. It wasn't for us to either condemn or condone the actions of our immediate military leaders. But now, after over 45 years, we have learned to be more tolerant, somewhat wiser, a lot less cynical, and suddenly imbued with a faith and trust toward our fellow man. What a tremendous victory it would be for us, after all these years, to play a role and be able to accept even a small fraction of success toward the complete



had an excellent Navy service record and was carefully chosen for his respective command in Marvail by persons of higher authority, and

Whereas Admiral Rimmel shouldered the brunt of the blame for the national catastrophie that was Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941; and

Whereas, in the light of extensive documented writings on the subject many PYSA members feel that others, and the whole nation, should have shared the burden of these charges, and

Whereas, Admiral Kimmel cooperated fully with higher authority immediately following his removal from command, offered his resignation as requested, and generally displayed his soldierly training and love of country that had become a way of life for him from the moment he entered the military service, and

tuincreas, because of the stated need for maintaining national security Admiral Kimmel was not afforded the opportunity to clear himself of the charges leveled against him; he was never granted an official court martial through which medium he would have had full access to all forms of evidence, the right to counsel, to introduce, examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertaining to his examination, and to testify and declare in his own behalf, and in essence mount a full blown defense of his actions and policies leading to the Pearl Harbor catastrophie,

Now Therefore, Be It



**rsnlued**, while there is still time in our generation, we members of the MGA wishing to express a teeling of admination and respect toward this officer do hereby request the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association to formally recognize. posthumously Admiral Ximmel for his sincere and dedicated performance of duty and for carrying until his death, and thereafter, the unfortunate burden and stigma associated with the catastrophe at Pearl Marbor.



In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and scal this 8th day of December, 1986.

Thomas J. S. Mockett Thomas 7. Stockets Justional President

The text of the PSHA resolution in honor of Admiral E. Kimmel

exoneration and restoration to rank for Adm. Husband E. Kimmel and Gen. Walter C. Short. You have my complete assuance that I will do everything I can to attain this reachable goal.

It is of interest that John Tsukano, a Japanese-American journalist who treated this 45th Anniversary Meeting in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of 5 December 1986, had this to say, in part:

Why? Why do they continue to subject themselves to relive their private hell, even as their ranks get thinner with the passage of time? Perhaps the survivors themselves cannot fully answer that eternal and haunting question. Perhaps there are not enough words to accurately describe their trauma, agony and mysteries, which must still be lurking in the deepest recesses of their minds and hearts, compelling them to keep returning to the scene of their greatest sacrifice, forever searching for answers.

Tsukano provides his own answer:

Perhaps still, the answer is as simple as the known fact that each and every human being has a conscience which always demands that truth and justice must be preserved, cherished and protected. This ever present conscience was perhaps the catalyst which prompted the members of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association to unanimously pass a resolution . . . (Honolulu Star Bulletin, 5 Dec. 1986, "The General the Admiral, and the Pearl Harbor Survivors").

honoring their Wartime Commander, the provisions of which merit careful study by all thoughtful citizens having an interest in the opinions of those who had studied the matter for 45 years, and who, in the process, had pursued, diligently, research leading to their final action.

Notable, too, is the fact that those who are charged with directing government operations in Washington, civilian and military, have failed, as is so very often the case, to set any example whatsoever, by refusing to adopt a course of action calculated to undo a grievous wrong. (continued from page 4)

on the continuing tenacity of the Pearl Harbor Survivors' Association in its fight to vindicate the commanders of Army and Navy forces at Pearl, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, as to their role on that "day of infamy."

As ever, the book reviews reflect the broad concerns of Historical Revisionism, concerns imposed by the ruling historical Establishment's continuing obsessive attempts to hamper the rewriting of the propaganda of the victors of the Second World War. On the contrary, there are unremitting attempts by some, particularly militant Zionist interests, to drum up new hatreds out of old: witness the campaigns against Kurt Waldheim and German-American rocket expert Arthur Rudolph, campaigns ably dissected by historians John Ries and Robert Countess in their reviews of two relevant books.

Englishman Dennis Nayland Smith applauds an Austrian philosopher's persuasive case for Josef Stalin as a more able manipulator than either Adolf Hitler or the Führer's Western counterparts, Roosevelt and Churchill, while Jack Wikoff reviews yet another treatment of Hitler, this time in the form of a gloss on World War II caricatures, which fails to rise above wartime partisanship and hatreds.

Libertarians John Strang and Samuel Konkin throw approving yet critical glances on two books dealing with American history. The two libertarians' anti-statist perspective has afforded them valuable insights on a biography of the man who succeeded Dwight Eisenhower's brother as chief of America's wartime concentration camps for Japanese-Americans, as well as on a neo-Marxist study of the history of the American Left.

The necessity for Historical Revisionism, the bringing of historiography into accord with the facts, is being demonstrated daily by reports from the Soviet Union and China, where ruling elites are laboriously scrapping a wrong-headed and injurious scheme of history, politics and economics, Marxism-Leninism. Mao Tse-tung and Iosef Stalin, each of whom consolidated a mighty continental empire, and went on to rule absolutely over his creation for three decades, have been relegated to the status of a virtual nonperson, in Mao's case, or to the object of growing condemnation, in the case of Stalin. IHR and The Journal of Historical Review do not intend to confer cheap laurels on regimes which continue to oppress their own peoples and the subject nations under the rule, regimes which continue to falsify history by generating fake documents and periured testimony in order to send innocent men to their deaths. Nevertheless, the ruthlessly practical men who wield power in the USSR and China are finding that they cannot reform the present without revising the official view of the past, a revision which has lately included acknowledgement of the extent of and state role in the great Ukrainian hunger terror of the early thirties.

It is imperative that the leaders of the Western world now join in the trend toward historical revision now underway in the Communist nations by jettisoning wartime propaganda, including the Holocaust myth, that has long congealed into a hardened mass of antipathies and hatreds, ever ready for evocation against enemies old and new. The key to Western Revisionism, furthermore, is the skewed and distorted history of the two world wars, which continues to sap the West's collective will to reasoned deliberation and caution in matters foreign and domestic by holding the image of a diabolical enemy up to our politicians and our populace, an enemy which must not be "appeased," but rather annihilated, not once but again and again in ritual trials and auto-da-fés. If the IHR, and the Institute for Historical Review, have one great task, it is to bring home to the world, as forcefully as possible, that the ongoing Hitlermania and Nazi frenzy have not supplied a basis for peace and understanding, as good-hearted supporters of the United Nations and other peace schemes may have once thought: rather, unchallenged lies and distortions about the Second World War have supplied leaders, East and West, with all the weapons, and all the power, to accomplish far greater devastation and ruin than Hitler and his most evil henchmen ever could have dreamed.

-Theodore J. O'Keefe

### About the Contributors

ROBERT H. COUNTESS holds a Ph.D. in New Testament textual studies from Bob Jones University, and an M.L.S. from Georgetown University. His book The Jehovah's Witnesses' New Testament is now in its second edition. Dr. Countess has published over fifty articles and book reviews, and is presently pursuing several Revisionist publishing projects.

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